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1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
Wireless ad hoc networks are self-organizing and self-conﬁguring infrastructure-less networks
of nodes which are connected by wireless links. Examples are the 802.11/WiFi products and
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Wireless technologies also include mobile devices, such as
cellular phones and the new cognitive radio network.
The popularity of these technologies is growing rapidly. Many of the tasks conducted on
the devices require the use of Personal Identiﬁable Information (PII). The increasing frequency
of incidents in which criminals are attempting to steal PII makes security of the information
stored and transmitted from the devices, a well as the device itself, paramount.
Recently we have seen large scale attacks on networks that go initially undiscovered due
to the large amount of data created by the intrusion detection tools themselves. High rates of
false positives can have an eﬀect upon system administrators that is similar to the eﬀect on
the townsmen in the story in which which the boy cries wolf too often. Additionally, large
volumes of security data can create a situation in which the administrator does not have time to
properly analyze it in a reasonable time. An example of this is the Target point-of-sale breach
in 2013. Although an alert was sounded by the intrusion detection system FireEye, system
administrators missed the warning. Over 40 million credit card numbers were sent to Russia
before administrators investigated the alarm and took action to close the breach [107]. Similar
breaches occurred at Home Depot and a variety of other retail centers. With high false positive
rates for anomaly detection common, research has now moved more towards hybrid solutions.
All of these methods require some prior training of the network nodes or pre-positioning of data
for comparison.
Perhaps the solution is not more data. Rather, the solution may lie in the ability of a system
to eﬀectively use select data. Igor Baikalov, chief scientist at Securonix, was quoted in an article
2by the New York Times [107]: We don't need 'big data'. We need big information. By carefully
removing the noise created by large amounts of data, we allow our security professionals to focus
on information with value, quickly identify attacks, and make timely decisions.
Our motivation for research related to intrusion detection arises from the current lack of
comprehensive research into methods of analysis of selective information in an eﬀort to construct
a big picture of network security and integrity, termed as network health. Research into the
parameters of the nodes and networks, the interplay of parameters and their eﬀect upon each
other, and how the concurrence of certain parameter levels portend negative or positive network
health can bring valuable insight into the diagnosis of network ills.
Our hypothesis is that, by adapting a methodology borrowed from the science of meteorology,
we can utilize the data available at both the node and cooperative network levels and create
a synoptic picture of network health, providing indications of any intrusions or other network
issues. Parameters such as packet delivery ratio, packet sequence number, route-add ratio, and
many others have previously been used to alert on and/or identify intruders. However, this data
also provides valuable information about the state of the network as a whole. By analyzing the
packet, route, and node data at a network level we expect to develop a synoptic picture of the
network. The visual representation of the synoptic network picture is expected to be much
like synoptic weather charts depicting the pressure centers that, once properly analyzed, are
indicative of changing weather. In this sense, just as barometers can monitor the environment
for approaching storms, we have network tools that monitor parameters that can be used to
identify malfunctioning areas of the wireless network. Since the synoptic analysis technique
presented is founded upon comparing the counts of events in or eﬀects on the wireless network
it is anticipated that other attacks that are based upon causing or aﬀecting countable events
that trigger changes in network characteristics are candidates for synoptic analysis. Examples
are attacks at the physical, network, and data link layers such as a sinkhole, jamming, and
wormhole assaults.
Chapter Two consists of our ﬁrst paper, A Layered Approach to Cognitive Radio Network:
A Survey, which explores the attacks on the cognitive radio network [40]. In order to better
understand the types of attacks levied on wireless systems, and the cognitive radio network in
3particular, we conducted a survey of the current research. By classifying the attacks according
to the protocol layer at which the attack occurs we can better determine threat severity, precau-
tionary methods, and recovery strategies. Additionally, basing the classiﬁcations upon protocol
layers utilizes terminology already used in wireless communication security while simultaneously
describing for the reader the attack vector. Finally, understanding the similarities between the
threats can help us apply knowledge about previous attacks on other technologies to cognitive
radio networks.
Our major contribution is presented Chapter Three in our second paper, Design and Anal-
ysis of a Method for Synoptic Level Network Intrusion Detection [41]. The result is a rev-
olutionary way to analyze node and network data for patterns, dependence, and eﬀects that
indicate network issues. The paper describes a method based on utilizing packet delivery ra-
tio (PDR), node reliability, route reliability, and entropy to develop a synoptic picture of the
network health in the presence of a sinkhole.
Chapter Four presents our third paper, A Method for Synoptic Level Intrusion Detection
in a Wireless Ad Hoc Network, which revisits sinkhole detection and identiﬁcation in a grid
network. The work is expanded to include a sinkhole in a thirty node scrambled network, and a
sinkhole in a one hundred node grid network. We also include the detection and identiﬁcation
of a HELLO Flood attacker using the same methodology.
4CHAPTER 2. A LAYERED APPROACH TO COGNITIVE RADIO
NETWORK SECURITY: A SURVEY
Modiﬁed from a paper published in Computer Networks1
Deanna T. Hlavacek234 and J. Morris Chang5
2.1 Abstract
Cognitive radios have been identiﬁed as a solution to the crowded spectrum issue. With
the realization of cognitive radio networks came the recognition that both new and old security
threats are relevant. The cognitive radio network is still vulnerable to many of the denial of ser-
vice, wormhole, routing, jamming attacks that plague other wireless technologies. In addition,
the cognitive radio network is vulnerable to new attacks based on cognitive radio innovations,
such as spectrum sharing, spectrum sensing, cognitive capability, and radio reconﬁgurability.
The scope of this survey is to present an overview of security threats and challenges to the
cognitive radio network, especially focusing on new solutions from 2012 and the ﬁrst half of
2013. Included are prior mitigation techniques that are adaptive to the new technology, as well
as new mitigation techniques speciﬁcally targeted at new cognitive radio vulnerabilities. The
threats provided are organized according to the protocol layer at which the attack is targeted.
1Reprinted with permission of Computer Networks, 24 December 2014, Volume 75, Part A, Pages 414-436
2Graduate Student, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
3Primary Researcher and Author.
4Author for correspondence.
5Associate Professor Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
52.2 Introduction
It has been estimated that the people of the United States are now outnumbered by their
wireless devices. The proliferation of wireless devices such as laptops, notebooks, cellular phones,
smart phones, and tablets has caused the frequency spectrum used for transfer of information to
become crowded [84]. Also, the expected growth in media-rich consumer applications and wire-
less data transfer will continue to crowd the network, making additional spectrum throughput
a priority.
Currently in the United States spectrum is allotted to various services in three main cate-
gories: licensed, lightly licensed, and unlicensed [1]. Licensed spectrum refers to the portions of
the spectrum reserved by each country's equivalent of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) for speciﬁc uses, such as military, public safety, and commercial uses. Lightly licensed
spectrum refers to the bands that are generally regulated for licensed users, with regional or
other exceptions. In the unlicensed band there are predeﬁned technical rules for the hardware
and radio technology intended to mitigate interference between the bands. The spectrum is
available for network setup by any person or entity, public or private, to include commercial
high speed internet, that does not infringe upon the band's rules [1].
In an eﬀort to provide relief to the users of the overused spectrum, in 2010 the FCC allocated
unused spectrum between television channels, or white spaces for unlicensed use. In addition,
the FCC has proposed setting aside some low band spectrum, and possibly underutilized por-
tions of the military, amateur radio, and paging frequencies, for unlicensed use as long as the
primary user experiences no interference. Finally, in early 2013, the FCC opened a process to
allocate more high frequency spectrum for unlicensed use.
Another of the major challenges for the wireless medium is security. The WiFi brand
was adopted in 1999 based on the 802.11 standard. It was immediately realized that using the
electromagnetic wave as the propagation medium made physical security of the transmitted data
an impossibility. A conversation made of electromagnetic signals can be intercepted, jammed,
or injected with extraneous bits. These actions can cause the release of private information, the
inability to send and receive information, or the receipt of false or unreadable data.
6As with other wireless communications, the cognitive radio technology based on the 802.22
standard must enforce the security triad of conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). The
cognitive radio is subject to many of the same types of attacks that plague other cellular and
wireless communication systems. In addition, due to the cognitive radio's ability to self-organize
a network and establish routing similar to wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the cognitive radio
network (CRN) is also vulnerable to attacks originally designed for WSNs. Finally, the abilities
of the CRN to sense the environment, adjust spectrum usage parameters, collaborate with
neighbors, and learn provide new avenues for attack.
Because cognitive radio is in its infancy, there are many opportunities for research into the
security issues to which the new technology is vulnerable. Such research can drive the creation
of a more secure product. The papers [11], [69], and [83] provide a general overview of the
cognitive radio network model with a broad description of secure model considerations. The
authors of [68] provide a very extensive overview of all cognitive radio network issues, with an
in-depth look at the security issues speciﬁc to the new CRN vulnerabilities.
The papers [52] and [106] each provide a high level view of the legacy and newer threats
that can be applied to the cognitive network. The authors of [8] and [109] both take a broad
stroke at listing and describing threats speciﬁc to the cognitive radio. In addition, the paper [8]
adds a focus on the threats speciﬁc to the policy controlled cognitive radio. An in-depth look at
the primary user emulation attack and mitigation is presented by the authors of [99] and [109].
The paper [88] analyzes vulnerabilities of existing spectrum sensing and access protocols under
stochastic channels in the presence of jamming attacks. The authors of [92] concentrate on the
vulnerabilities of the physical layer.
Comprehensive, security focused studies for the cognitive radio network were presented by
[9, 32, 77] and [90]. The paper [90] takes the traditional approach of describing the possible
attacks on a CRN. The authors of [9] categorize and analyze the threat vectors (as compared
to attacks) and provides design considerations to alleviate the threats. A discussion on security
evaluation and certiﬁcation is included. Rather than analyzing the threats or attacks to the
cognitive radio, the paper [32] analyzes the 2010 and earlier solutions presented to mitigate
CRN security issues.
7The paper [77] takes a layered approach in its study of cognitive radio network security.
Four layers are presented: security applications, security strategies, security infrastructure, and
security primitives. Threats are also presented in categories: learning, hidden node, policy,
parameter, sensing.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a survey of security issues related to the cognitive
radio network. Potential attacks will be described, and proposed mitigation techniques will be
explored. The attacks in the survey are presented according to the targeted protocol layer.
Emphasis has been placed on presenting solutions proposed in 2012 and early 2013, when
available. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the general
concepts and security considerations of the cognitive radio. Starting at Section III the paper
presents attacks and mitigation techniques based on communication layer protocols. Sections
III through VII present the Physical Layer, Data Link Layer, Network Layer, Transport Layer,
and Application Layer. Section VIII presents the Cross Layer attacks. The Cross Layer is a
class of attacks launched at one layer with the intent to do damage to another layer. Section
IX presents a framework for security of the cognitive radio network. Section X provides a
conclusion. Table 2.1 will provide snapshots of the attacks presented by layer.
2.3 Cognitive Radio
The cognitive radio is based on a software deﬁned radio with adjustable operational pa-
rameters [2]. The software allows the radio to tune to diﬀerent frequencies, power levels, and
modulation schemes to establish or maintain a communication link. The hardware consists of
an antenna, a radio frequency conversion modules, a modem, and other modules [71]. The best
conﬁguration for the radio is determined by optimizing an objective function that considers
such factors as interference and noise, traﬃc demand, mobility levels, and location.
In addition to the variable parameters mentioned above, the cognitive radio network is
further adaptable to changing situations with its ability to operate successfully in collaborative
(cooperative) or uncooperative networks. Generally, the throughput of the collaborative network
will be higher than that of the uncooperative network due to the ability of the cooperating radios
to share the frequency to which they will hop. However, when the network is under certain types
8of attacks, or in certain environmental situations, the uncooperative network conﬁguration may
be optimal. We must therefore analyze attacks and mitigation techniques for both scenarios.
It is generally agreed the cognitive radio must provide the following functions: spectrum
sensing, spectrum management, spectrum sharing, and spectrum mobility. Spectrum sensing is
required for the cognitive radio to sense the spectrum for the presence of the primary user or
other traﬃc. Through spectrum management the radio is able to utilize the available spectrum
eﬃciently without interfering with the primary user. The protocols established in the IEEE
802.22 standard govern the ability of the radio to share the spectrum with the primary user
and other secondary users. The radio is able to vacate a spectrum when the primary user is
indicated as present while continuing communication with the network due to the function of
spectrum mobility. The spectrum functions required by the cognitive network radio add avenues
of attack on the radio, network, and primary users in the area. These attacks may target the
spectrum sensing function by changing the spectrum environment, the decision making function
by manipulation of parameters of the objective function, or the learning engine by providing
false data about the environment that the learning radio will use in the future to make incorrect
or ineﬃcient decisions.
By classifying threats we can better determine threat severity, precautionary methods, and
recovery strategies. Additionally, understanding the similarities between the threats can help
us apply knowledge about previous attacks on other technologies to cognitive radio networks.
The following framework provides a classiﬁcation system for all cognitive radio network threats.
The threats are classiﬁed according to the protocol layer upon which the attack is performed:
physical layer, data link (or MAC) layer, network layer, application layer, and cross layer. Cross
layer attacks are those in which the attack is launched utilizing one layer while the attack targets
another layer. Basing the classiﬁcations upon protocol layers utilizes terminology already used
in wireless communication security while simultaneously describing for the reader the attack
vector. We start our discussion at the bottom of the layer stack and move upwards.
Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 list each attack explored with the leg(s) of the security triad
aﬀected by the attack. A majority of the attacks aﬀect the availability of the cognitive radio
services. Protecting the system availability basically includes protecting the common control
9channel from saturation, ensuring the spectrum is sensed accurately, and the members of the
network are properly identiﬁed and their information is accurate. Ensuring conﬁdentiality and
integrity of the data transmitted is accomplished by encryption with a proper key distribution
system, and proper identiﬁcation and vetting of the network members. Mitigation of the attacks
listed will help ensure secure communications.
Table 2.1 Attacks By Layer - Physical
Attacks
by Layer
Net-
work
Mem-
ber?
CIA Description Citation
PHY
Layer
Jamming External A Jammer maliciously sends
packets to hinder legitimate
spectrum usage.
[12, 14, 31,
60, 64, 75,
85, 93, 95,
97, 98, 111,
114, 119,
129]
Objective
Function
Internal A Attacker manipulates
transmission rate parameters so
cognitive engine will calculate
results that are biased towards
the attacker's interests.
[7, 17, 21,
56, 96, 121,
124]
Overlapping
Secondary
User
Both A A geographical region may
contain overlapping secondary
networks with a malicious user
in one network transmitting
signals that cause harm to the
primary and secondary users of
both networks.
[115, 127]
Primary
User
Emulation
External A An external attacker emulates
the signal of the primary user.
[16, 20, 27,
35, 36, 37,
48, 59, 65,
120, 126,
128, 132]
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2.4 Physical Layer
The physical layer is the lowest layer of the protocol stack, providing an interface to the
transmission medium. The physical layer consists of anything that is used to make two network
devices communicate, such as the network cards, ﬁber, or, as in the cognitive radio network
framework, the atmosphere. The operation of the cognitive radio network is more complicated
than other wireless communication networks because the cognitive radio uses the frequency
spectrum dynamically. Following are network attacks aimed at disrupting communication by
targeting the physical layer of the cognitive radio network.
2.4.1 Primary User Emulator Attack
Testing results show that the number of dropped calls can be increased by up to two or-
ders of magnitude due to primary user attacks [48]. Proper function of the spectrum sharing
feature of the cognitive radio network requires the radio's ability to distinguish between the
primary and secondary user signals. Techniques such as ﬁlter detection, energy detection, and
cyclostationary-feature detection need to be leveraged to provide this distinction. In a hostile
environment, distinguishing the primary user from others can become extremely diﬃcult. In the
primary emulation attack, an attacker may modify their air interface such that it emulates the
primary-user's signal characteristics causing other secondary users to falsely determine the fre-
quency is in use by the primary user, and so vacate the frequency. The imposter may perpetrate
the attack selﬁshly, so he can use the spectrum, or maliciously, so the other legitimate users will
have their communication disrupted, resulting in a Denial of Service attack. In addition, the
attacker can poison the data collected about the spectrum usage that is used by the learning
cognitive radio to determine which frequencies to try to access in the future. Therefore, the
primary user attack (PUE) can lead to an objective function attack (section 2.4.2) [120].
Determination that there is an imposter present in the network is the ﬁrst step in mitigat-
ing the PUE attack. This subject falls into the area of robust distributed cooperative sensing
and the detection of anomalies. Most anomaly detection is based upon statistical analysis of
the sensed data. Localization of the malicious user can assist in the mitigation of the attack.
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The paper [65] provides a received signal strength indicator (RSSI) based transmitter localiza-
tion technique that can be used when three or more trusted nodes are present. Triangulation
with a correction technique considering multi-path signals and refraction provides an improved
localization method.
In a cooperative cognitive radio network each secondary user senses the spectrum period-
ically and reports the measurement results to the fusion center. The fusion center combines
the data and makes a determination as to whether the primary user is present or not. If an
attacker injects false positive oﬀset data, the fusion center may determine the primary user
is transmitting, when actually it is not. Conversely, if the attacker injects negative data, the
fusion center may falsely determine the primary user is not present.
In [36] a diﬀerential game is proposed as an avenue for primary user emulation mitigation.
Based on the diﬀerential attack game model the Nash equilibrium is derived, and the optimal
attack/defense strategy is devised. Experiment results indicate that using this strategy, the
secondary user can maximize the usability of the cognitive channels, and minimize the disruption
to the network due to primary user emulation attacks.
In the paper [59] the authors introduce the robust principal component analysis (PCA)
technique for spectrum sensing. The authors consider a cooperative cognitive radio network
with one primary user, several nodes, and one fusion center. In the worst case PUE attack,
the attacker would use tactics that include appearing intermittently and randomly to try to
prevent discovery. This activity can be represented by a sparse matrix. Robust PCA is based
upon matrix theory and can be applied to get the estimated low rank matrix and the estimated
sparse matrix from the corrupted observation matrix. Once the low rank and sparse matrices are
estimated, the received signal power can be estimated for the suspect nodes. This transmission
energy data is removed from the collected data at the fusion center. The data cache is no longer
poisoned, and the determination of the presence of a primary user is more accurate.
The authors of [27] and [126] provide methods of determining if a primary user emulator is
in the network when the primary user location is known and ﬁxed. The method of the paper [27]
is based on using a trust-based transmitter veriﬁcation scheme to properly vet the primary user.
It is assumed all radios are aware of the location of, and therefore the distance to, the primary
12
Figure 2.1 Proposed transmitter veriﬁcation scheme
[27]
users in the area. The distance between the primary user and the cognitive radio is calculated
based on known coordinates. The distance between radio and the user sending the primary
user type signal is also calculated based on the received power levels. The trustworthiness of
the user is determined by a comparison of the resulting distances. Figure 2.1 reﬂects the ﬂow
of the decision process.
In [126] the authors provide a method of defense against the primary user emulation attack
using belief propagation. All secondary users in the network iteratively calculate the location
function, a compatibility function, compute messages, exchange the messages with neighbors,
and calculate the belief function until convergence. At convergence, any existing attacker will
be detected, and secondary users will be notiﬁed of the attacker's signal characteristics via
broadcast message. This allows all secondary users to avoid the attacker's primary emulation
signal in the future.
The location function can locate the attacker based on diﬀerences in the received strength
of the transmitted signal. Since none of the secondary users are aware of the transmitted signal
strength or their distance from the attacker, the pinpointing of the attacker location depends
upon the diﬀerence in measured signal strength by several neighbors. It was determined that
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one secondary node needs to interact with at least three neighboring nodes to estimate the at-
tacker's location. After determining the location and computing the compatibility function until
convergence, if the belief manipulation sum is higher than a speciﬁc threshold, the transmitter
is determined to be the primary user, and not an attacker.
Similarly, the authors of [19] provide a transmitter veriﬁcation scheme called LocDef (localization-
based defense). The scheme veriﬁes whether a signal is from an incumbent by estimating its
location and observing the signal ﬁngerprint. Localization is determined by utilizing an under-
lying wireless sensor network (WSN). The WSN collects snapshots of received signal strength
across the cognitive radio network. The collected measurements are smoothed and the peaks
are identiﬁed. Using the peaks, the transmitter locations can be identiﬁed.
The papers [16] and [35] propose methods for cooperative sensing in the presence of a primary
user emulator and the probable detection of a primary user. When an attack is underway,
secondary users in the area receive the signals from both primary user and attacker. This sensing
information is sent to the fusion center. In [35], when diﬀering signal energy is reported as
determined by a network threshold, statistical probability is applied to the reports to determine
if the primary user or a malicious emulator is present.
In [16] the information is combined with a weighting system to maximize the probability
of detection within the constraints of a false alarm probability. The weights are related to
the channel state information (CSI) between the nodes. The CSI is estimated using existing
channel estimation algorithms. The method presented maximizes the probability of detection
of the primary user by deriving optimal weights. It must be noted this paper assumes the
primary user emulator (attacker) has been determined as present, and so the goal is to detect
the primary user in the presence of the attacker with the assistance of multiple cooperative
cognitive radio users.
Identiﬁcation of a primary user emulator through a radio ﬁngerprint has been proposed in
the papers [20], [37], [117], and [132]. With a radio ﬁngerprint, a wireless device can be identiﬁed
by its unique transmission characteristics. Electronic ﬁngerprinting is already used by cellular
operators to prevent cell phone cloning. The ﬁngerprint is due to the slight variations in the
manufacture of the hardware components.
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In the paper [20], the authors employ the spectrum sensing capability of the cognitive radio
itself to identify primary user attacks. The uniqueness, or ﬁngerprint, of the wireless signals is
determined by use of the Neyman-Pearson test. The test is used to diﬀerentiate between the
channel states of transmitters over Rayleigh fading channels. Simulation showed the method
was eﬀective in identifying a primary user emulator, thereby allowing the network to defend
against the attack.
The authors of [132] focus on the phase noise of a signal created by the local oscillator.
Phase noise is the rapid, random ﬂuctuations in the phase of the waveform. It causes spectrum
spread and deformation, and is unique. After extraction of the phase noise from the received
modulated signal, applet wavelet and higher-order statistical analysis is applied to identify the
fake primary user transmitters. Results of simulation experiments showed the phase noise of two
receivers using the same local oscillators was diﬀerent. This indicates it is feasible to identify a
transmitter for primary user emulation defense.
Performance analysis of the cognitive radio network is the focus of the paper [128]. The
authors create a three dimensional Markov model to provide a method of performance analysis
using a common control channel when under primary user attack. The outage probability
metric is redeﬁned, and the new performance metric common control channel recovery time
is introduced. Together, the metrics identify and evaluate the impact of the common control
channel on the network. The blocking rate and dropping rate of the cognitive radio network
are also calculated.
Outage probability, or the probability of network suspension, reﬂects the chance a cognitive
radio network will suspend. Suspension occurs with the arrival of a new primary user when all
of the available N channels are already being utilized by only primary users, fake primary users,
and the common control channel. Since no secondary users are currently using a channel, the
common control channel must drop, opening the frequency for the new primary user. At this
point the cognitive radio network is suspended.
With the system state deﬁned as (i, j, k) where i and j represent the number of primary
users and primary user emulators, and k represents the sum of the secondary users plus the
common control channel, the outage probability is the sum of the state probabilities where k =
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0. Therefore, the outage probability is determined by
Poutage =
∑
(i, j, k)Ω1P(i, j, k) , (Eq. 1)
where Ω1 = {(i, j, k) | i + j = N and k = 0}.
The common control channel recovery time is the average time expected for recovery after an
outage. The common control channel will only recover by using a channel vacated by a primary
user or primary user emulator. The analysis is based upon the property that the sum of two
Poisson processes results in a Poisson process. Therefore, the state probability distribution
combined with the holding time of the local primary users and emulators provides the common
control channel recovery time as
T ccc =
∑
(i j,k)Ω2
1
iµPU + jµPU + λPU
P(i,j,k)
+
1
NµPU
P(N,0,0), (Eq. 2)
where Ω2= {i + j = N, j > 0, k = 0}, the arrival rates of PUs, fake-PUs and SUs are λPU ,
λfPU and λSU , respectively, and the channel holding times are exponentially distributed with
the mean,
1
µPU
,
1
µfPU
, and
1
µSU
.
As expected, the analysis of tests using the formulas above show that a network under
the attack of primary user emulators takes a longer time to recover than a network not under
attack. This recovery time was also shown to increase as the number of primary user emulators
increased. Additionally, the larger the number of primary user emulators, the greater chance
the network would drop into the suspended state.
2.4.2 Objective Function Attack
Cognitive radios are adaptive to the environment. Many radio parameters are available
for manipulation in the eﬀort to adapt the radio to the environment by maximizing objective
functions, and therefore the radio's ability to communicate over the medium. Objective function
attacks apply to an attack on any learning algorithms that utilize objective functions. Another
name for objective function attacks is belief-manipulation attacks. Parameters manipulated
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include, but are not limited to, bandwidth, power, modulation, coding rate, frequency, frame
size, encryption type, channel access protocol.
The authors of [21] give the following objective function example. Assume the function
exists where w i are weights, P is power, R is rate, and S is security.
f = w1P + w2R+ w3S (Eq. 3)
Now assume an attacker wishes to lower the security with which the radio is transmitting
messages. The attacker would monitor the channel, and jam the channel whenever the radio
tries to send a message at the more secure level. The cognitive radio would learn that attempting
to transmit at the higher security level would not be successful. This would result in either the
higher security messages being sent at a lower security level, or the messages would not be sent
at all. Similar attacks could cause a radio to avoid certain frequencies, rates, modulations, or
bandwidths.
There have been few clearly eﬀective methods of mitigating objective function attacks. One
simple proposal has been made by [56]. The proposal suggests naively deﬁning thresholds for
each of the adjustable parameters. Communication would be prevented when one or more of
the parameters did not fulﬁll its predeﬁned threshold.
The authors of the papers [17] and [124] present the covert adaptive injection attack. In
these examples of an objective function attack, the attacker is capable of learning and adjusting
its strategies in response to the environment. The attacker attempts to stealthily manipulate
the sensing results of a distributed network, thereby attacking the objective functions and
decision making of the cognitive radio network. A robust distributed outlier detection scheme
is presented to counter the covert attack.
The method presented by [124] uses a localized detection threshold at each node, and adapts
the threshold with the diminishing behavior of state diﬀerences, exploiting the state convergence
property. With this scheme, it is more diﬃcult for an attacker to guess all of the thresholds of the
neighbors at any instance. When a network node suspects an attacker, it sends a primitive alarm
to its the immediate neighbors. The alarm is not forwarded. If the node collects primitive alarms
from at least half of the nodes that are common neighbors of the node and suspected attacker,
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it broadcasts a conﬁrmed alarm. The conﬁrmed alarm is forwarded to the remaining network.
Veriﬁcation of the attacker is provided using a hash-based computation. This veriﬁcation ensures
the correctness of a neighbor's state update process with the goal of thwarting collusion attacks
by common neighbor cross-validation.
Alternatively, the method presented in [17] uses a neighborhood voting system. After each
secondary user has collected the sensing reports from its immediate neighbors, the nodes de-
termine an algorithm based mean, and conduct a spatial correlation test. Based on the results,
each node casts votes about the legitimacy of each of its neighbors. If a node receives more
than half of the neighbor votes categorizing it as suspicious, the node is considered malicious.
The authors of [96] present a solution to the false channel information exchange attack. This
is a form of the objective function attack because the goal of the attacker is to aﬀect the decision
making algorithms of the network nodes. The authenticity of the received channel information
is analyzed using spatial correlation algorithms. Simulation shows that the algorithms achieve
a high detection rate of malicious nodes with a low false alarm rate.
In [121] the authors explore a framework of power control schemes based on a robust Markov
decision process. If an attacker can inﬂuence the power scheme of the radio, the attacker can
aﬀect the throughput of the network. Additionally, the authors use a delayed Markov decision
process to model the throughput maximization problem while experiencing spectrum sensing
delay caused by a malicious user. The delayed Markov decision process is solved by using a
modiﬁed dynamic programming approach.
Belief manipulation attacks as related to the knowledge base of learning algorithms is pre-
sented in [7]. Many defense methods have been studied as related to the mitigation of jamming
and other throughput aﬀecting attacks. However, less studied has been the eﬀect on the learn-
ing that takes place over time based on the objective function results, and how the learning is
poisoned by intermittent attacks. To determine if there is an attacker present, monitor nodes
are assigned to sample the channels over a time window and Wald's Sequential Probability
Ratio Test rule is applied.
The softmax policy [100] includes randomized user actions based on some probability dis-
tribution in an eﬀort to hide information about the learning algorithm. In the algorithm, more
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weight is applied to actions that performed well in the past. By avoiding the attacker's inﬂuence
by using and sensing channels where the attacker is not expected to be present, the learning
algorithm is reinforced and becomes increasingly accurate.
2.4.3 Overlapping Secondary User
As shown in Figure 2.2, a geographical region may contain coexisting, overlapping multiple
secondary networks. Such a situation places dynamic spectrum access sharing at risk through
both objective function and primary user vulnerabilities by one malicious node, or accidentally
by a friendly node. A malicious user in one network may transmit signals that cause harm
to the primary and secondary users of both networks. Signals transmitted maliciously may
provide false sensing information, thereby negatively aﬀecting the objective function in one or
both networks. The malicious user may intermittently falsely emulate the primary users of
each network causing each network to vacate the channel. Additionally, in special situations,
a friendly node reporting the presence of the primary user in network one may inadvertently
be relaying the same information to network two, negatively impacting network two's objective
function. This attack can be hard to prevent since the malicious node may not be under the
direct control of the secondary station or users of the victim network. This is essentially an
attack on the capability of the cognitive radio network for spectrum sensing and sharing of both
infrastructure and ad hoc based networks. The result is a denial of service attack.
The authors of [127] provide three possible mitigation solution categories for the overlapping
secondary user attack. These mitigation techniques are also applicable to many other denial of
service attacks, and are based upon work in other areas.
1. Modifying the modulation scheme: The use of frequency hopping and direct-sequence
spread spectrum techniques can make it more diﬃcult to launch eﬀective denial of service
attacks. The attacks may still degrade service quality.
2. Detection and prevention of attacks: Observing the primary user's location and
signal characteristics, as described in section 2.4.1, Primary User Emulator Attack, can
help the network identify if a node is performing maliciously.
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3. Using authentication and trust models: In the paper [115] a system is designed to
determine a suspicion level, trust value, and consistency value to identify and exclude
a malicious user. Nodes become suspicious when the reported channel state is not in
agreement with the channel state reported by others. A trust value for each node is
calculated over time, and a consistency value reﬂects the consistent trust value over time.
A node with a consistently low trust value will eventually be identiﬁed as a possible
malicious user and dropped from the network.
Figure 2.2 Overlapping Secondary Attack
2.4.4 Jamming
Cognitive radio networks require a minimum signal-to-noise ratio to decode a signal sent
from their corresponding transceivers. Jamming, one of the most basic types of attacks in the
cognitive radio network, attempts to adversely aﬀect the signal-to-noise ratio. In this attack, the
malicious user intentionally and continuously transmits on a licensed band, making it unusable
by the primary or other secondary users. The attack is ampliﬁed by transmitting with high
power in several spectral bands. Jamming can be detected with triangulation and energy based
techniques. However, the time lost with these techniques allows the attacker to severely impact
the network. A mobile attacker can be even more diﬃcult to locate.
Before initiating mitigation techniques against jamming, the cognitive radio network must
ﬁrst determine that a jammer exists. Besides the presence and actions of a jammer, poor
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performance experienced by a receiving node can also be caused by natural causes such as
network congestion.
A statistical approach is often used for detecting anomalous spectrum usage attacks, specif-
ically stealthy jamming, and is proposed in both papers [85] and [97]. In [85], the statistical
analysis is a three-step cross-layer process. First, statistical analysis is performed on the infor-
mation gathered from multiple layers. Next, a multiple layer discrepancy search is conducted on
the data collected by comparing the data from several layers. In the third step, simple statistical
measures are used to determine if there are discrepancies among the data from the network and
physical layers using only snapshot data. For instance, the physical layer may report numerous
available channels in the area, but few nodes appear in the resultant paths. This may indicate
jamming is occurring. Due to the possibility that there can be other reasons the nodes do not
appear, there could be a high false alarm rate if a comparison to historic data is not conducted.
Using time series data available from multiple layers can minimize the false alarm probability.
This is because the probability distribution of chosen observables will change when the network
is under attack. The observables are carefully chosen such that their statistics will indicate a
sharp change with high probability in the presence of an attacker. Although it is assumed the
data from diﬀerent layers is independent, it has been shown that the observed changes before
and after the event are related via time.
In the paper [97] sequential detection is used to compare the statistical distribution before
and after an attack. Conﬁrmation of attack is obtained by a cross-layer three-step process.
First, the statistical analysis of the paths/nodes is obtained from route discovery. If there are
anomalous patterns observed, passive checking is performed by cross checking the pattern with
the physical layer spectrum sensing results. Last, active checking is performed by selectively
injecting controlled traﬃc into the potentially congested area and collecting measurements. The
passive and active steps are conducted to conﬁrm the results in the statistical analysis.
Jamming is an attack that aﬀects both cooperative and uncooperative cognitive radio net-
works. In general, uncooperative networks are more resistant to jamming attacks because the
nodes do not need to use a common channel to share information about the frequency to which
they are hopping. In cooperative networks, the jammer can either capture the shared channel
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information and move to the same frequency to continue the attack, or inhibit the channel data
exchange by jamming the common channel. However, although existing anti-jamming schemes
for uncooperative networks are more robust when under attack, they are not as eﬃcient as
cooperative network channel sharing schemes when not under attack [98]. With no jammer
present, network throughput is lower in uncooperative networks because the nodes need to
use energy in the attempt to discover upon which channel the intended transmitter/receiver
is transmitting/listening. Therefore, combining cooperative frequency sharing techniques with
uncooperative networking and anti-jamming methods will make the cognitive radio network
adaptable to changing network conditions while preserving network throughput. Below we
describe anti-jamming methods for both cooperative and uncooperative networks.
2.4.4.1 Cooperative Network Jamming Mitigation Techniques
A scenario comprised of a primary user, secondary user, and jammer was studied in the paper
[12]. The authors conducted a simulated jamming attack to derive the best combinations of
the number of control and data channels to enhance the legitimate secondary user transmission
during jamming. The data and control channel allocation determination was also speciﬁc to the
type of application and the quality of service required for good throughput of the application.
It was shown that there is a tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and transmission probability when
allocating more than one channel to common control. Additionally, it was noted that the results
did not always conform to what was initially expected. For an example, using the extremely
conservative strategy of ﬁve control channels and three data channels was less eﬃcient than using
a less conservative strategy of four control channels and four data channels for an electronic
mail application under jamming attack.
The paper [114] explores collaborative defense of the network against collaborative jammers.
The collaborative defense is mounted using a multi-tier proxy-based cooperative defense strat-
egy designed to exploit the temporal and spatial diversity available to the legitimate users in
an infrastructure-based cognitive radio network. The network is divided between proxies and
followers. The proxies act as relays between the followers and the base station. Followers must
connect to a proxy, rather than straight to the base station. This adds another layer to the
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communication hierarchy. When the users cooperate, the jammers necessarily need to jam both
the followers and proxies to jam all communication. Therefore, with the collaborative defense
strategy, the jammers need more jammers to eﬀectively suspend the network communication.
Simulation results show that spectrum availability is greatly improved when the users cooperate.
However, due to the extra layer in the communication hierarchy, the latency of communication
is also increased.
A targeted jamming attack and its mitigation is presented in [43]. The authors describe the
Most Active Band attack in which a jammer determines and targets the band with the most
traﬃc for jamming, resulting in denial of service on that band. The coordinated concealment
strategy (CCS) is oﬀered as a countermeasure. Basically, a few secondary user nodes sacriﬁce
themselves by moving to a single band, drawing the attacker's attention. The surviving nodes
are free to operate on other bands under the concealment of the ruse.
In [93] and [111] the authors assume the jammer's signal and the primary user signal are
distinguishable and the attackers will not jam the primary user. The contention between the
jammer and the secondary users is based upon the secondary users' aim at maximizing spectrum
utilization with carefully-designed channel switching schedules, while the malicious attacker's
desire is to decrease spectrum utilization by strategic jamming. From this description, the
objectives of the secondary user and jammer are opposite, and can be modeled as a zero-sum
game. In the game model the secondary users adapt their strategy on switching between control
and data channels according to their observations about spectrum availability, channel quality,
and attacker's actions. According to simulation the calculated optimal policy can achieve better
performance in terms of throughput as compared to a learning policy that only maximizes the
payoﬀ at each stage while not considering the environment dynamics, the attackers' cognitive
capability, and a random defense policy.
A game-theoretic perspective is also used to determine the optimal defense strategy in [129].
A simple stochastic swarm optimization algorithm, called particle swarm optimization (PSO),
is applied to solve the optimization problems numerically. PSO is motivated by many natural
phenomena, and has been shown to represent each group member seeking the optimal solution
for itself as it relates to its neighbors.
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2.4.4.2 Uncooperative Network Jamming Mitigation Techniques
The authors of [23] provide a jamming solution based on a distributed, probabilistic protocol.
This method is unique in that it avoids control channels, does not require information related to
the node neighborhood, and does not require statistics about the channel usage. The solution
is based upon probabilistic pairing approach that allows the node to dynamically ﬁnd a peer
and sync on a random, available frequency. The solution also requires the nodes be preloaded
with pairwise keys which are used as seeds to the process of ﬁnding a common frequency band.
In the syncing process, each node randomly chooses a key and challenges its neighbors. If there
is a collision, the nodes agree on a frequency band for communication. Nodes experiencing no
collision again randomly choose a key and challenge their neighbors. For the scheme to work,
each node needs to dynamically sense the spectrum to determine a frequency free for use.
The authors of [119] developed a channel hopping defense strategy using the Markov decision
process approach based on a secondary user that uses only one channel. To adequately use the
decision process the user must learn some attacker information by observing the environment.
The secondary user ﬁrst estimates useful parameters based on past observations using maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE). The user then utilizes the Q-learning process, which is presented
as an avenue for the secondary user to learn and update the defense strategy without knowledge
of the underlying Markov model. The scenario is extended such that the secondary user can
utilize all available channels simultaneously. In this scenario, randomized power allocation is
used as the defense strategy. Derivation of the Nash equilibrium for this Colonel Blotto game
provides minimization of the worst-case damage.
In the paper [18], the authors developed a similar jamming-hopping, policy iteration scheme
based on the Markov Decision Process which utilizes the Q-learning process to lessen the com-
putation burden. However, in this scheme the secondary user has a ﬁnite set of channels from
which to choose. The set of channel choices is dependent upon the state of the environment at
decision time.
The paper [31] uses a game-theoretic context to formulate the interaction between commu-
nicating nodes and an adversary. Experimental results show that randomized actions by both
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the secondary user and the jammer result in lower game values than the expected Nash equilib-
rium for pure information-centric channel capacity. Results also show that packetized, adaptive
communication is an advantage for the power-limited jammer. Additionally, it is proven there
exists a threshold on the average power of a jammer above which the transmitter must use a
rate equivalent to the maximum power of the jammer.
The authors of the paper [95] present the solution to jamming modeled after a solution
to a multi-armed bandit problem. In this scenario the secondary user is the player trying to
pull the most rewarding lever at each time slot. The authors use Whittle's linear program to
determine which channel the secondary user should select for transmission. The model is valid
for a situation in which the state of the non-accessed channels changes when not chosen. For the
situation in which the state of the channels is static even when not chosen (in other words, the
jammer's strategy is ﬁxed), the author's solution is based on a stochastic multi-armed bandit
process using indexing solutions.
Similarly, the authors of [112] and [113] formulate the jamming problem as a multi-armed
bandit problem. In this solution the secondary sender and the receiver both adaptively choose
their sending and receiving channels by basing their decisions on all of their past decisions and
observations. With the convergence of the learning algorithms, the sender and receiver hop to
the same set of channels with high probability under the presence of a jammer.
The paper [98] presents the Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH) scheme in an eﬀort to
allow key establishment between two nodes in the presence of a jammer without a pre-shared key.
With the assumption that a jammer cannot jam all of the communication channels at the same
time, the message is divided into multiple parts and sent across several frequencies according
to a random frequency hopping scheme. Although a secret channel sequence is not utilized by
the sender and receiver, it is shown that with suﬃcient transmission attempts the sender and
receiver will converge upon the same channels in a number of time slots. Note also that the
time slots for the sender and receiver do not need to be synchronized; instead the receiver is
allowed to switch channels less often than the sender. The eﬀect is a reduced number of partially
received fragments. Experimental results show that the UFH scheme achieves the same level
of anti-jamming protection as coordinated frequency hopping. However, the experiments also
25
show that the UFH scheme results in lower communication throughput with higher storage and
processing costs.
The authors of [61] present the time delayed broadcast scheme (TDBS). The scheme does
not rely upon commonly shared secrets or common control channels to coordinate broadcasts.
Alternately, the scheme relies upon a pseudo-noise (PN) frequency hopping sequence to establish
communication. Unlike conventional PN sequences for multi-access systems, the PN sequence
presented exhibits high correlation to enable broadcast. Additionally, the experimental results
show the TDBS scheme can support and maintain broadcast communications while in the
presence of an inside jammer.
The paper [75] examines the resiliency of rate adaptation algorithms (RAA) against smart
jamming attacks. According to the experimental results, several techniques can prevent smart
jamming by limiting the amount of key information that can be inferred by an attacker. The
lack of information forces the attacker to operate as a memory-less jammer. For example,
the SampleRate protocol can be protected by using randomized, non-sequential probing. To
conceal the explicit and implicit rate information, such information should be protected using
post-coding encryption. Using a shared secret key and a random initialization vector can ensure
the explicit and implicit rate information is concealed.
In the work [14] the authors present another secret-sharing mechanism that does not require
pre-shared secret keys. The method is called Time Reversed Message Extraction and Key
Scheduling (TREKS). The TREKS mechanism is shown to be eﬃcient and adversary-resilient
and is based upon intractable forward decoding and eﬃcient backdoor decoding. As with the
other methods provided which do not use pre-shared secret keys, TREKS solves the circular
dependency problem. Additionally, experimentation showed that TREKS was four magnitudes
faster than the prior solutions to CDP, with minimum storage overhead and at most twice the
computation required for traditional spread spectrum communication.
2.5 Media Access Control Layer
The Media Access Control (MAC) layer is a sublayer of the data link layer. The MAC layer is
designed to support multiple users on a shared medium within the same network. A Common
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Table 2.2 Attacks By Layer - Data Link
Attacks
by Layer
Net-
work
Mem-
ber?
CIA Description Citation
Data
Link
Layer
Byzantine Internal A Attacker sends false local
spectrum sensing results to
neighbors/fusion center causing
the receiver to make wrong
spectrum sensing decisions.
[4, 25, 26,
27, 30, 38,
45, 50, 62,
70, 74, 76,
79, 80, 81,
87, 123]
Control
Channel
Jamming
Both A Jamming of the control channel
causes network confusion by
interrupting the radio
cooperation.
[15, 54, 61,
63, 64, 66,
101, 102,
130]
Control
Channel
Saturation
Internal A Based on the fact that if a
cognitive radio is unable to
complete negotiations during
the limited time of the control
phase, the radio defers from
transmission during the next
data phase.
[66, 73]
Control Channel (CCC) may be used for an exchange of control messages to coordinate the
users.
2.5.1 Byzantine Attack
In the Byzantine attack, also known as spectrum sensing data falsiﬁcation, the attacker
injecting the false sensing information into the decision stream is a legitimate member of the
network, and is referred to as the Byzantine. Byzantines may perpetrate the attack to selﬁshly
acquire increased spectrum availability for themselves, or the attackers may have a goal of
disrupting the throughput of the network for other nefarious reasons.
The authors of [103] propose a method of detection of Byzantines called Pinokio. Pinokio
uses a Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) that maintains a proﬁle of the network's normal
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behavior based on training data. The MDS detects misbehavior by monitoring the bit rate
behavior. By protocol, the bit rate should change periodically, should be adjusted by a node
contiguously, the bit rates between two nodes should show some reciprocity, and usage of a
low-bit rate over a wide channel. Nodes exhibiting these characteristics are not acting in a
manner conducive to spectrum eﬃciency, and so are suspect.
Another method of misbehavior detection called Cooperative neighboring cognitive radio
nodes (COOPON) is provided by the authors of [49]. Detection of the selﬁsh node is detected
by the cooperation of other legitimate neighboring nodes. All of the secondary nodes exchange
channel allocation information both received and sent to the suspect nodes. Each neighbor
compares the number of channels reported to be used by the suspect node to the channels the
neighbors report as being used. A discrepancy reveals a selﬁsh actor.
Several techniques have been proposed related to trust and reputation metrics. In the
context of cognitive radio networks, trust and reputation based schemes are very similar. Trust
in a behavior based model is deﬁned as the mutual relationship between two entities for a
speciﬁc action. Trust most often refers to acknowledging nodes that are proven trustworthy in
some way. Alternatively, reputation schemes are generally more interested in identifying those
nodes that are bad actors.
A trust framework is proposed by [70] consisting of a TrustPolicy Engine and a TrustMetrics
Engine. The TrustPolicy Engine targets four main areas: security mechanisms, enhancing sec-
ondary user's worthiness, spectrum sharing with legacy networks, and inter-operator spectrum
sharing. The engine is designed to analyze the behavior of a cognitive radio according to the
notion of trustworthiness. The proposed solution considers two types of trust. Social trust
is based on historical actions; quality of service trust is related to performance issues. Both
trust aspects are used to determine a trust level based on past behavior and impact on the
performance of the network.
The TrustMetrics Engine provides for the exchange of trust information between the nodes
and algorithms. This information consists of past performance actions and impacts, and is used
to create a prediction of future behaviors. The data is passed to a Performance Engine that
implements mechanisms to thwart cognitive radio network attacks.
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Several recent authors have tackled the idea of trust or reputation based mitigation methods
for the Byzantine attack using the sensed data sent to the fusion center. The authors analyze
the case in which the Byzantines do not send true information about the state of spectrum. The
information sent by the suspect nodes is compared to the information received from a trusted
node.
In the paper [30], a node's reported sensed data that deviates from the data supplied by
a trusted source results in the node being labeled as malicious. In [74], when diﬀering signal
energy is reported as determined by a network threshold, statistical probability is applied to
the reports to determine if a malicious node is present.
The papers [25], [62], [87] and [122] all use reputation-based detection schemes over time to
identify bad actors. In these schemes, a reputation measure is assigned to each node representing
the number of times the local decision of a node was diﬀerent than the global decision of the
fusion center in a time window. The higher the value of the measure, the less reliable the node's
observation is considered. To increase the accuracy of the decisions made by the fusion center,
data from nodes with a high number of mismatches is not included in the sensing algorithms.
The papers diﬀer in the algorithms, weights, and observables used to determine the trust levels
of the nodes.
In [76], [79], and [80] the authors present trust based authentication systems. In the model
in the paper [76], the node with the highest level of trust is appointed as the base station. Au-
thentication between each node and the base is accomplished in two ways. With cryptographic
authentication, the base station generates secret keys for the network members. Each node
shares a unique key with the base station.
With the certiﬁcate based trust authentication technique, the base station generates trust
values for each node. Trust values are based upon the recent activities of a node in the network,
such as success or failure in forwarding a packet, and the length of time the node has been a
member of the network. The trust value of each node is updated by the base station every time
the base station sends a broadcast message. If a request is received by the base station, the
base station references the node's trust value for a determination of the appropriate action. A
second secret key is shared between the base and all nodes of a speciﬁc, equal trust level.
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The base station also sets a trust threshold for the network. Any node not meeting the
minimum trust threshold is expelled from the network and placed on a blacklist for rejection of
future joining or other requests. By using the trust method, any bad actors, or Byzantines, in
the network will be identiﬁed and segregated from the network.
The method to assign trust in [80] is based on three factors for determining sensing trust
level. Context is the ﬁrst factor and includes time, location, spectrum, code, and angle. The
second factor is based on sensing evidence scope and importance. This factor reﬂects the
importance of evidence based on the impact of the action on the network. Lastly, all node
behavior is collected relative to a time window. The time window allows a node ﬂuctuating
between trustworthy/untrustworthy and considerate/inconsiderate behavior to be properly ana-
lyzed for intent over time. Together the three factors help capture the transition of a benevolent,
well-behaving node to a malevolent node over time, allowing the network to properly and con-
tinuously identify currently misbehaving nodes. Additionally, the algorithm allows the node's
reputation to rise slowly but fall quickly to punish a secondary user's erratic behavior. The
reputation values are considered in data fusion and resource allocation for the secondary users.
The trust calculation presented in [79] relies on several steps and inputs. The direct trust
calculation is based on a cumulative attribute determined by the success or failure of past
requests, responses, and retransmissions. The indirect trust calculation considers the neighbors'
determination of the node's trust. The trust values are integrated, and a historical trust value
is added to the algorithm. The node's ability to access the network resources is based upon the
trust determination.
The unfair penalization of honest users due to severe pathloss in some locations is considered
in the trust based scheme proposed by [45]. The proposed Location Reliability and Malicious
Intention (LRMI) trust metric has two parts:
1. Location Reliability reﬂects pathloss characteristics of the wireless channel.
2. Malicious Intention captures the true intention of secondary users.
Evaluation of sensing reports sent to the fusion center is based on two sources of evidence - the
cell the report was sent from (Location Reliability) and who generated the report (Malicious
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Intention). A trust value is applied to each cell based on the activity of the cell members. The
Dempster-Shafer theory is used to evaluate trustworthiness as related to a mobile node. The
algorithmic combination of the two values help to alleviate the trust devaluation that generally
occurs due to a node's signal pathloss because of its location and mobility, hence providing a
more accurate trust determination.
In the paper [38] the authors present an alternate detection method using two conditional
frequency check statistics (CFC). The statistics are developed under the Markovian model for
the spectrum state and are not adversely aﬀected by an increasing number of Byzantines. The
newly proposed CFC enforces two constraints on the attacker's behavior as compared to the
conventional one constraint. This is done by exploring the correlation between the consecutive
spectrum states.
The fusion center evaluates the two CFCs for every sensor and compares the results to
those of a trusted sensor. Diﬀering values between a sensor and the trusted sensor indicate the
corresponding sensor is malicious. Consequently, any ﬂipping attacker that maliciously ﬂips its
local inference can easily be identiﬁed with the CFC. With at least one trusted user the method
can achieve an accuracy rate of greater than 94% in detecting malicious users.
Statistically based analysis schemes that detect malicious users and alleviate the false sensing
observations are proposed in [4] and [50]. The ﬁrst scheme, proposed by [4], allows for an
unknown number of malicious cognitive radios in a network, with the possibility that any node
can suddenly turn malicious. The mathematical basis for sensed data analysis is a modiﬁed
version of the Grubb's test for the detection of a single outlier in a normally distributed data
set. Simulations showed that the modiﬁed Grubb's test was able to detect any number of
malicious cognitive radios in a network, as long as at least half of the network was made up of
trustworthy nodes. The second paper [50] compares the Dixon's test for outliers, the Grubb's
test for outliers, and the box plot test when applied to sensed data. It is shown that the Dixon's
test out performs the Grubb's test and the box plot test in detecting the presence of a single
bad actor.
The authors of the paper [81] use a statistical attack model to aid in the development of a
Bayesian approach to identifying malicious nodes. Belief propagation is used with factor graphs
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to solve the Bayesian estimation problem and the derivation of an algorithm. The algorithm
is used to estimate channel status and the attack probabilities of the malicious nodes, thereby
identifying the Byzantines.
A technique using the primary user's received signal strength (RSS) is introduced in [123].
The method has been shown to work no matter the ratio of trustworthy nodes to malicious
nodes in the network. The technique compares the location determined by the strength of the
primary user's received signal at a secondary user and reported to the fusion center, to that
calculated using the combined data from the network secondary users at the fusion center. This
comparison is used to determine whether the secondary user node is providing true or false
data.
The authors of [26] present a punishment based mitigation scheme. Using the indirect
punishment method, the malicious user does not need to be identiﬁed. There only needs to
occur collisions with the primary user. It is assumed that when such a collision occurs, the
primary user applies a punishment to the entire network. If the attacker can be determined, a
punishment is applied directly. Assuming the bad actor is acting selﬁshly, either punishment
will deny the malicious node throughput over the network, and will cause the node to change
its behavior.
Alternatively, the authors of [10] present an incentive, or payment based solution that makes
it detrimental to a node to refuse to forward packets over free channels. The basis of the system is
that a node will receive payment after oﬀering a free channel to forward packets for a neighbor.
A transmitting node will pay a neighbor for packet transmission over a channel when that
neighbor's services are required for transmission. A central authority is required to maintain
the credit balance for each node.
2.5.2 Control Channel Saturation
The control channel saturation attack can occur if a cognitive radio is unable to complete
negotiations during the timeframe of the control phase, the radio defers transmission during the
next data phase. This situation may occur when the channel is saturated by a large number
of contending cognitive radios. An attacker can broadcast a large number of packets with the
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intent to saturate the control channel. By sending diﬀerent types of packets, a malicious node
reduces the risk of detection. Combining the control channel saturation attack with the small
window backoﬀ attack (described in section 2.9.2 Small Backoﬀ Window), the attacker may
be able to ensure the malicious node captures the control channel before other users.
The authors of [66] propose using dynamic channelization to address the common control
channel access problem. The authors deﬁne an atomic channel as a basic unit of b Hz. Upon
the event of control channel migration, a composite channel is formed from the atomic channels,
centered around a new carrier frequency. The formula f = f 0 + mb provides for the shifting of
the center of frequency from f 0 to f by a multiple of the basic unit b Hz where m = 0, +1, +2,
etc. The bandwidth around f can be obtained by channelization as a factor of kb, such that k
= 1, 3, 5, etc. Figure 2.3 shows the migrated control channel for the case of (m, k) = (4, 3).
The paper [73] presents a method to react to control channel saturation with an alternative
decision making strategy based on rendezvous negotiation to ensure user's communication co-
ordination. In essence, the paper presents an mathematical analysis of the resources required
for channel negotiation for the network based upon the number of secondary users present and
the current channel throughput. When the common control channel usage approaches the point
at which the additional allotment of resources to rendezvous channel negotiation will create a
saturation condition, the network moves to the phase of rendezvous channel negotiation. This
method avoids the situation in which common channel saturation is reached, and there are no
resources available for additional channel rendezvous negotiation. Therefore, the early channel
analysis and start of negotiation prevents the waste of data transmission resources while the
common control channel is saturated.
2.5.3 Control Channel Jamming
Control channels facilitate the cooperation among cognitive radio users. As a single point of
failure, common control channel jamming (CCC) is the most eﬀective and energy eﬃcient way
for an attacker to destroy the entire network system. With common control channel jamming,
receivers are prevented from receiving valid control messages when a strong signal is injected
into the control channel. This results in denial of service for users of the network [63].
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Figure 2.3 Migration of common control channel with (m, k) = (4, 3)
Using dynamic control channel allocation methods combats control channel jamming by
maintaining control communications during the attack. There are two methods for dynamic
allocation of control channels: cross-channel communication [66] and frequency hopping [54].
The authors of [66] take advantage of the fact that successful communications during a
jamming attack can be conducted on another channel not aﬀected by jamming signals. Cog-
nitive radio users can continue to transmit on the channel experiencing interference to notify
other network users not experiencing jamming of the new control channel for receiving control
messages. This results in successful communication during jamming by using diﬀerent channels
for transmitting and receiving control messages with neighbors. Although communication is
maintained, this method incurs high channel switching overhead for radios equipped with a
single transceiver.
In the papers [54] and [61] the authors present methods to mitigate common control channel
jamming for cluster-based ad-hoc networks using hopping sequences. The cluster-head deter-
mines the hopping sequences and identiﬁes the operating control channels for the cluster. Due
to the nature of the clustering of the network, the network is partitioned into smaller groups.
Therefore, when a jamming attack targets a cluster, the aﬀected network area is reduced. The
method presented by [61] diﬀers in that no two nodes share the same hopping sequence.
The mitigation tactic presented by [54] hides the control channel location (frequency), and
uses key distribution techniques to allow legitimate users to decrypt the control messages en-
crypted with keyed hash functions. Control messages are repeatedly transmitted on multiple
control channels, so compromised nodes would only have partial keys. Consequently the com-
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promised nodes would be unable to jam all of the control channels. Suﬃciently large key
distribution with message duplication would therefore allow continuation of control information
exchange during jamming attacks.
A polynomial based jamming resilient key assignment protocol is presented by [15]. The key
space consists of p * q keys, where p is the number of time slots in a period, and q is the number
of control channels. The control transmission is sent repeatedly over all of the control channels
in each of the time slots in the period. Each node, including the malicious users, is identiﬁed by
a unique polynomial. The scheme guarantees access of the nodes to the control channel within
a certain time period. However, since the key space must be suﬃciently large, based on the
number of time slots and control channels, it may incur large control retransmission overhead
and delay.
A random key distribution scheme was proposed in [101] and [102] for control channel ac-
cess under jamming attack. As in [15], the keys are used to hide the control channel allocation
in time slots with duplicate transmission on several control channels. The diversity of keys is
large, and so it is probable that authorized users hold keys unknown to compromised users.
Keys are periodically reused in time slots to limit the key space and corresponding storage over-
head. Cryptographic hash functions are used to map the control channel keys to the allocated
frequency and time slot for control channel relocation in a reuse period.
The paper [130] provides a method of control channel jamming avoidance without a pre-
shared key distribution system. The control data is distributed through cluster heads in the
network with each network node belonging to only one cluster. A cognitive radio network with
N nodes requires 2log2N keys, with each secondary user receiving log2N keys based on a unique
binary ID. Each cluster head generates and sends two control signals in every time period i. The
functionsF (ki, i) and F (k
′
i, i) are used by the cluster head to determine the control channels,
and are known to the cluster nodes. All nodes, including the jammer, receive their assigned
keys. Since no two nodes have a full set of matching keys as relates to each time period, the
jammer will be unable to prevent any node from transmitting in at least one time period.
Referring to the example from [130] in Table 2.3, assume a malicious jammer, node 3. The
jammer can jam the channel determined with k′1 in period 1, the channel determined with k2
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in period 2, and the channel determined with k3 in period 3. However, since none of the other
nodes have the same three keys in the same time periods as node 3, each will be able to transmit
on the assigned control channel in at least one of the three periods.
A stochastic general-sum game called jamming-resilient control channel (JRCC) is presented
in [64]. The game models the interchange among the cognitive radio users and the attacker under
the impact of the primary user. The game objective is to determine the best control channel
allocation strategy to combat jamming using multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL). The
optimal control channel is found when the game reaches the Nash equilibrium.
In each stage of the game, each radio selects an action that maps to a set of selected common
control channels. The nodes receive their rewards by complying with conditions applied to
each common control channel. To facilitate cooperation, each radio broadcasts the control
message according to the conditions of the channel. Each node's strategies are updated with
the parameters received from its neighbors. If the primary user changes the game state, the
radios sense the channels to obtain the new state, and update their parameters, learning rate,
and strategy. In this manner, the JRCC algorithm enables cooperation between the nodes with
low overhead to facilitate common control allocations while adapting to the primary user and
learning rates. Simulation results show that the JRCC algorithm eﬀectively combats jamming
in an environment that includes primary user activity.
Table 2.3 Key for 8 Secondary Users with 1 Attacker
Node Unique ID Key
0 000 k1 k2 k3
1 100 k1 k2 k3'
2 010 k1 k2'k3
3 001 k′1 k2 k3
4 101 k′1 k2 k′3
5 011 k1' k2 'k3
6 111 k1' k2' k3'
7 110 k1 k2' k3'
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Table 2.4 Attacks By Layer - Network
Attacks
by Layer
Net-
work
Mem-
ber?
CIA Description Citation
Network
Layer
HELLO
Flood
Internal A Node broadcasts HELLO loud
enough so all nodes think it is a
neighbor. Packets are lost since
the node is far away.
[29, 51]
Ripple External A The wrong channel information
is provided so that the other
nodes in the area change their
channel. The attacker's intent
is to cause the false information
to be passed hop by hop and
cause the network to enter a
confused state.
[133]
Sinkhole Internal C, I,
A
Attacker advertises itself as the
best route and does selective
forwarding in which packets are
modiﬁed or discarded.
[51, 118,
125]
Sybil Internal A Attacker sends packets as
diﬀerent identities subverting
the trust system.
[24, 51, 72,
105, 122]
Wormhole Internal C, I,
A
Attacker tunnels messages or
pieces of messages to diﬀerent
parts of network to replay them.
[44, 51]
2.6 Network Layer
The network layer provides the ability to route data packets from a source node on one
network to a destination node on another network, while maintaining quality of service. It also
performs fragmentation and reassembly of packets, if required. The cognitive radio network
shares security issues with the classic wireless communication networks due to the three shared
architectures of mesh, ad hoc, and infrastructure. Cognitive radio networks also share simi-
larities with wireless sensor networks. These include multi-hop routing protocols and power
constraints. In addition, there are special challenges faced by cognitive radio networks due to
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the required transparency of the network activities to the primary user. Routing in the cognitive
radio network is further complicated by the requirement of the radio to vacate the frequency
when the primary user is sensed as present. Cognitive radio security vulnerabilities are therefore
also inherited from these architectural requirements.
2.6.1 Sinkhole
Cognitive radio networks often use multi-hop routing. A sinkhole attacker takes advantage
of multi-hop routing by advertising itself as the best route to a speciﬁc destination. This
activity spurs neighboring nodes to use it for packet forwarding. In addition, the neighbors of
the attacker will advertise the oﬀender as the best route, creating a sphere of inﬂuence for the
attacker.
The attacker can begin the attack by building a trust base. The attacker can use a higher
level of power so it can send any received packets directly to the base station. It can advertise
that it is one hop from the base station, and forward all received packets appropriately for a
time. After trust has been established, and advertising of the node as the best route has been
propagated through the local area, the perpetrator can begin other types of attacks, such as
eavesdropping.
The attacker can perpetrate the selective forwarding attack by forwarding packets from
select nodes, or modifying or dropping received packets. This attack is particularly eﬀective
with mesh and infrastructure architectures since all local traﬃc looking to be relayed to another
network have the same destination - all traﬃc leaving the local network needs to go through
the base station.
Countermeasures for the sinkhole attack from outside the network are based upon link layer
authentication and encryption. Using authentication, an outside attacker will be unable to join
the network. Since the cognitive radio network will only use members for routing, the attacker
will be unable to advertise as the best route [51].
Countermeasures for the insider attack could be based upon a continually updated trust
determination. The cognitive radio network would need a system to monitor dropped or changed
packets, and report issues to the fusion center. After analyzing the received data, the base
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station would ﬂood the network notifying its members of the communication issues recently
experienced. It would then drop the attacker as a member of the community.
Additionally, countermeasures to the insider attack can be adopted from wireless sensor
network studies, such as the security-aware ad hoc routing protocol (SAR). SAR is based upon
on-demand protocols, such as Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing or Dynamic
Source Routing (DSR) [125].
With SAR a security metric is added to the route request packet (RREQ) and the route
discovery procedure is modiﬁed. Intermediate nodes receiving the RREQ packet determine if
the security metric or trust level is satisﬁed. If it is satisﬁed, the node processes the packet
and uses controlled ﬂooding to propagate the packet. If the required security is not satisﬁed,
the packet is dropped. A reply packet (RREP) is generated if an end-to-end path can be found
based on the required security attributes. A notiﬁcation is sent to the sender if such a path
cannot be found. The sender can then modify the trust level in order to ﬁnd a route [125, 118].
With the assumption that a key cannot be determined by nodes that did not receive it from
the base, a malicious node that interrupts the ﬂow by altering the security metric cannot cause
serious damage. Without the key, the attacker cannot decrypt the packet, and a legitimate
node receiving the packet with an altered security level will drop it [118].
2.6.2 Wormhole
The wormhole attack is closely related to the sinkhole attack. Basically, an attacker tunnels
messages received in one part of the network over a low latency link. The messages are replayed
in another part of the network. In the simplest example, a node situated between two other
nodes forwards messages between the two of them. Wormhole attacks are usually administered
by two malicious nodes that understate the distance between them by relaying packets along
an out-of-bound channel that is unavailable to the other nodes.
A wormhole attack is perpetrated by convincing nodes that are usually multiple hops from
the base station that they are only one or two hops away through the adversary. If the end
point of the wormhole is relatively far from the base station, most nodes in the local network
area will try to use the attacker for forwarding. Packets can then be selectively forwarded to the
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malicious node close to the base station for additional forwarding, or captured for eavesdropping
as they are forwarded [44, 51].
If the adversaries are placed carefully, the attack could result in a partitioned network when
the attackers stop relaying the packets. This action would trigger network routing discovery.
Participating in the discovery eﬀort may provide the attacker with additional information that
could be used for other attacks, such as eavesdropping.
One prevention method for the wormhole attack was suggested by [51]. Karlof and Wagner
suggest using geographic routing protocols to forward packets in the network. Such protocols
construct a topology based on routing traﬃc physically towards the base station. Using this
routing method, it is diﬃcult to attract traﬃc towards a sinkhole or wormhole. Local nodes
would detect an artiﬁcial link because they would notice the distance between themselves and
the attacker, or between the attackers, is beyond normal radio range.
The authors of [44] propose using packet leashes to detect and defend against wormhole
attacks. The authors present two types of packet leashes: geographic and temporal. Both
leashes allow the receiver of a packet to detect if that packet traveled farther than the leash
allows.
The geographic leash is used to ensure the packet recipient is within a certain distance from
the sender. For the geographical leash to be constructed, each node must be aware of its own
location, and the clocks of all nodes must be loosely synchronized. Sending nodes include in
their packets their own location and the time the packet was sent. The receiving node compares
this data to its own location and the time of receipt. Assuming the clocks of the nodes are loosely
synchronized, the receiver can compute an upper bound on the distance between the sender and
itself. It is noted that obstacles in the network ﬁeld would not allow distance bounding based
on location data. Therefore, wormholes could still be created, since communication may not be
allowed between two nodes that would otherwise be in transmission range.
The temporal leash provides an upper bound on the packet lifetime. This lifetime in eﬀect
restricts the maximum travel distance of the packet. Creation of a temporal leash requires
tightly synchronized clocks, such that the maximum diﬀerence allowed is t. All nodes in the
network must be aware of the value of t, and it must be on the order of a few microseconds or
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less. When sending a packet, the sender would include in the packet the time the packet was
sent. The receiving node would compare the time to the time received. From this information,
the receiver would be able to determine if the packet had traveled too far based on transmission
time and the speed of light.
Figure 2.4 Wormhole attack
2.6.3 HELLO Flood
The HELLO attack was ﬁrst introduced by [51] as an attack against wireless sensor networks.
However, due to the possibility of using similar routing strategies, the attack can be applied
to the cognitive radio network. The attack is perpetrated by an attacker that broadcasts
a message to all nodes in a network. The packet may be advertising a high quality link to a
speciﬁc destination. Enough power is used to convince each node that the attacking node is their
neighbor. The nodes receiving the packets assume the attacker is very close due to the strength
of the received signal, when in fact the attacker is a great distance away. Packets sent from the
network nodes at the regular signal strength would be lost. In addition, network nodes may
ﬁnd themselves with no neighbors available to forward packets to a particular destination, since
all nodes are forwarding packets towards the attacker. Protocols that depend upon localized
information exchange between neighbors for topology maintenance are also subject to the attack.
Note that an adversary need not to be able to read or construct legitimate traﬃc - the attacker
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needs only to capture and re-broadcast overheard packets with enough power to reach every
node in the network [51].
The HELLO attack can be defended against by verifying the bi-directionality of links before
using the link established by a message received over the same link. Using a base station as a
trusted third party to facilitate the establishment of session keys between parties in the network
can provide veriﬁcation of bi-directionality. The session key allows the communicating nodes to
verify each other's identity, as well as provides an encrypted link between them. It should be
noted the number of shared keys needs to be limited to prevent the attacker from establishing
a link between every node. An alarm should be raised about the detection of an attacker if one
node claims to be a neighbor to an inordinate number of nodes [29, 51].
2.6.4 Sybil
Local entities that have no direct physical knowledge of remote entities perceive the others
as informational abstractions. These are referred to as identities. A system must have the
capability to ensure that distinct identities refer to distinct entities [24]. Without this ability,
the reputation system used to prevent other types of attacks will be subverted.
An attacker perpetrating the Sybil attack will create a large number of pseudonymous
identities so it can gain a disproportionately large inﬂuence on the network. In other words,
the mapping of identities to entities is many to one. Pairing the Sybil attack with the launch
of the primary user and Byzantine attacks can allow the attacker to prevent use of the channel
by legitimate users by eﬀectively poisoning the decision making process [104]. Additionally, the
misbehavior can be spread amongst the nodes acting as Byzantines, making any one of them
especially diﬃcult to identify [72].
Validation of each node's identity is the key to defending against the Sybil attack. The
two ways to validate an identity are direct validation, in which a node directly tests whether
the identity of another node is valid, and indirect validation, in which nodes that are already
veriﬁed provide validation or refutation for other nodes.
In [24] resource testing is proposed as a method of direct validation. An assumption made
with resource testing is that the resources of the attacker's physical entity are not unlimited.
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Identities are tested to verify that each identity has as much of a tested resource as a physical
device. The authors proposed measuring the resources available for computation, storage, and
communication.
One communication testing example is to broadcast a request for identities, and only accept
replies that occur within a given time interval. To test storage resources, each entity is asked
to store a large amount of unique, incompressible data. The challenging entity keeps small
excerpts of the data to use to verify the challenged identities are storing the data they are sent.
Finally, to test computation resources, each entity is asked simultaneously to solve a unique
puzzle in a limited time.
The authors of [72] suggest another validating method that may be suitable for cognitive
radio networks. For the radio resource testing method, it is assumed each physical device has
only one radio. It is also assumed that a radio can only send or receive on one channel at any
moment. A node can verify that none of its neighbors are Sybil identities by assigning each
of the neighbors a diﬀerent channel on which to broadcast a message. From the same set of
channels, a channel is then randomly chosen by the challenger on which to listen. The challenger
will hear the message if the neighbor assigned the channel is legitimate.
In [51] a solution involving symmetric keys is suggested. With this solution, every node
shares a unique symmetric key with a trusted base station. The base station also acts as
a trusted third party to facilitate the establishment of session keys between parties in the
network. The session key allows the communicating nodes to verify each other's identity, as
well as establish an encrypted link between them. It should be noted the number of shared
keys needs to be limited to prevent the attacker from establishing a link between every node.
Also, the base station can place a reasonable limit upon the number of neighbors a node is
allowed. An alarm should be raised about the detection of an attacker if one node claims to be
a neighbor to an inordinate number of nodes.
As mentioned in [122], many of the trust and reputation based schemes previously proposed
can be applied to the Sybil problem. Refer to 2.5.1 for descriptions of these techniques. Nodes
with a bad reputation, or those that are proven as untrustworthy, will be punished or removed
from the network, regardless of whether they are truly a distinct node, or a Sybil.
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2.6.5 Ripple Eﬀect
The ripple eﬀect is a new attack that is speciﬁc to cognitive radios because of their ability
to change channels during communication. Cognitive radios actively change channels to avoid
the primary user and to utilize the channel that will provide the best throughput in the local
area. The ripple eﬀect is similar to the primary user emulation or Byzantine attack in that the
wrong channel information is provided so that the other nodes in the area change their channel.
However, the ripple eﬀect attacker's intent is to cause the false information to be passed hop
by hop, and in turn cause the network to enter a confused state.
It should be noted that the attack is especially eﬀective when the attacker transmits with a
strong signal because of the following:
1. The activity of a primary user is generally greater than that of a secondary user, so the
appearance of a primary user may aﬀect several ongoing transmissions of secondary users.
2. Secondary users expend time and energy for spectrum sensing, neighbor discovery, and
channel switching (a few milliseconds) when changing channels.
3. Channel switching of one secondary user may cause a ripple eﬀect, or cascaded switching
of multiple secondary users [133].
Countermeasures to the ripple eﬀect attack are similar to those for the primary user emulation
and Byzantine attacks. It is essential that primary user presence can be detected and validated.
Similarly, it is essential that the information passed from a neighbor about the presence of the
primary user is also validated. Such validation can ensure the licensed channel is vacated when
necessary, and channel switching will only occur when necessary.
2.7 Transport Layer
The transport layer responsibilities include ﬂow control, congestion control, and end-to-end
error recovery. The transport layer in the cognitive radio network is subject to many of the
vulnerabilities that plague wireless ad hoc networks.
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Table 2.5 Attacks By Layer - Transport and Application
Attacks
by Layer
Net-
work
Mem-
ber?
CIA Description Citation
Transport
Layer
Key
Depletion
Internal C, I With the great number of
session keys created in a
cognitive radio network, it is
very likely a key will be
repeated. Repetitions provide
an avenue to break the
underlying cipher system.
[67, 86]
Applica-
tion
Layer
Cognitive
Radio
Virus
Both A The cognitive radio network
is vulnerable to viruses that
can eﬀect radio function and
learning.
[21, 42]
Policy
Attacks
External A Policy of the radio is changed
or not allowed to be updated,
providing the attacker unfair
spectrum access.
[8]
2.7.1 Key Depletion
CRNs suﬀer from short transport layer session duration due to high round trip times and fre-
quently occurring retransmissions [86]. This necessarily implies that a large number of sessions
are initiated. Most transport layer protocols, such as secure socket layer (SSL) and transport
layer security (TLS), establish cryptographic keys at the beginning of each transport layer ses-
sion. With the great number of session keys generated, it becomes more likely a session key will
be repeated. Repetitions of a key can provide an avenue of exploitation to break the underlying
cipher system. It has been established that wired equivalent privacy (WEP) and temporal key
integrity protocol (TKIP) protocols used for IEEE 802.11 are prone to key repetition attacks.
Security protocols used below the network layer currently are designed to accommodate
the total number of sessions that are typically created for wireless LANs. The newer Counter
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Cipher mode with block chaining Message authentication code Protocol (CCMP) is designed to
exponentially delay key repetitions [67]. CCMP oﬀers enhanced security compared to TKIP by
using 128-bit keys with a 48-bit initialization vector. This architecture minimizes the vulner-
ability of the system to replay attacks. Since the current design is inadequate for the security
requirements of cognitive radio networks, new protocols need to be investigated.
2.8 Application Layer
The application layer is the layer closest to the end user. The user and the application layer
interact with the application software. The application layer is responsible for determining the
resources available, synchronizing communication, and identifying the communicating devices.
Cognitive radios require a greater processing power and memory capacity than the traditional
smart phone. This is because of the extra tasks performed by the cognitive radio, such as
spectrum sensing and learning. Cognitive radios are therefore expected to be the target of
software viruses and malware [5]. Additionally, physical and link layer delays due to spectrum
handoﬀs, unnecessary rerouting and stale routing due to network layer attacks and delays due
to frequent key exchanges cause degradation of the QoS in the application layer protocols [67].
2.8.1 Cognitive Radio Virus
The cognitive radio network is as vulnerable to viruses as other types of networks and
platforms controlled by software. Viruses are computer programs that can replicate themselves
and spread from radio to radio. For replication, the virus must be able to execute code and
write to memory.
In a self-propagating network like the cognitive radio network a virus can be particularly
devastating. A radio infected with the virus can impose upon its neighboring node a false state,
or a series of transition states. The neighbor will pass along this false state. A particularly
troublesome side eﬀect of this propagation is that an artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) cognitive radio
will erroneously learn to react to this false environment, aﬀecting future network decisions.
The authors of [42] present a model for the propagation of a self-propagating AI virus
through a cognitive radio network. Simulation showed that the time taken to infect the whole
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cognitive radio network increased exponentially with network size. Second, it was shown that
the anti-virus performance of static networks is better than the performance of a dynamic
network in the presence of a AI virus. It was also shown that the AI virus propagation speed
increases with an available abundant spectrum resource in the area. However, the variability of
the spectrum does not aﬀect the propagation speed noticeably.
In the paper [21] the authors suggest a feedback loop into the network to cause the radios
to re-learn in the case of propagated false environmental information and consequent decisions
and learning. A second approach is to build in logic that will invalidate learned actions that
are known to violate certain principles.
2.8.2 Policy Attacks
There are four main functions of the policy system of the policy based cognitive radio. They
are policy derivation, policy distribution, policy reasoning, and policy enforcement. The paper
[8] describes the security threats associated with each of the functions. The attack on the
policy derivation and distribution functions by spooﬁng, and policy reasoning and enforcement
threats, are described below. The policy attacks via forging occur at a diﬀerent level, targeting
the application layer; therefore, those attacks are described under the cross layer attacks.
The functions of policy derivation and policy distribution can be disrupted by a malicious
node through spooﬁng the policy administrator. With the spooﬁng attack on policy derivation,
the faked policy administrator feeds the radio policy manager false or misleading policies de-
signed to decrease network performance or cause interference with the primary user. Similarly,
the spooﬁng attack on the policy distribution function allows a faked policy server to supply
misleading policies to the radio's policy engine. An authentication protocol that uses certiﬁcates
to validate the policy administrator can mitigate these attacks.
The policy reasoning and enforcement attack occurs when a selﬁsh policy controlled cog-
nitive device sends false reasoned information to other ordinary cognitive controlled devices in
the area stating there are no available bands for transmission. In this way the selﬁsh device
keeps transmission opportunities for itself. Reputation or collaborative decision schemes are
recommended as mitigation avenues.
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2.9 Cross Layer
Cross-layer attacks launched by adversaries target multiple layers. These types of attacks
can aﬀect the whole cognitive cycle of spectrum sensing, spectrum analysis, and spectrum
decision. Many of the attacks described earlier can be combined to create cross-layer attacks.
In addition, the same attacks may target one layer, but aﬀect the performance at another layer.
Often the cross-layer attack will take place on the physical layer while targeting the performance
of the MAC layer.
Table 2.6 Attacks By Layer - Cross Layer
Attacks
by Layer
Net-
work
Mem-
ber?
CIA Description Citation
Cross
Layer
Jellyﬁsh Internal A Based on the dual role of the
radio as router with forwarding
behavior. The attack targets
closed-loop ﬂows responsive to
network conditions like delay
and loss.
[47, 67, 78,
82, 89]
Lion External A Attack utilizes the PUE attack
at PHY layer to disrupt the
TCP. TCP continues to create
logical connections and send
packets. The packets timeout,
and TCP retransmits.
Retransmit timer doubles with
backoﬀ resulting in delays and
packet loss.
[29, 55]
Routing
Informa-
tion
Jamming
Internal A A malicious node causes a
targeted node to initiate
spectrum hand oﬀ before the
routing information is
exchanged.
[67, 134]
Small
Backoﬀ
Window
Internal A Node decreases its own backoﬀ
window size so it has a better
chance of getting the channel.
[116, 131]
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2.9.1 Routing Information Jamming
This attack can take place in a cognitive network with no common control channel. It also
takes advantage of the fact that there is delay during spectrum hand oﬀ. The delay allows
jamming of the routing information among neighboring nodes. The result is the use of stale
routes and incorrect routing of packets.
To start the attack, a malicious node causes the targeted node to initiate spectrum hand
oﬀ before the routing information is exchanged. When spectrum hand oﬀ occurs, the targeted
node stops all ongoing communication, leaves the frequency, determines a new spectrum for
transmission, identiﬁes neighboring nodes, and informs neighboring nodes of the change in
frequency. The targeted node cannot receive or transmit updated routing information until the
hand oﬀ is complete; this is referred to as deafness. Until the routing information is updated,
the targeted node and its neighbors will use stale routing information. By causing the targeted
node to continuously perform spectrum hand oﬀ just before routing information exchange, the
attack can be extended and made more severe [67].
The paper [134] presents a collision-free resident channel selection based solution (CF-RCS).
A resident channel is selected by each node from the available channel set during network
initialization. It then broadcasts this selection with its neighbors. Nodes are expected to receive
any updates on the resident channel. However, this protocol requires that each cognitive node
is equipped with two half duplex transceivers with one waiting on the resident channel for a
request of control message exchange, and the other sitting on the data transmission channel.
2.9.2 Small Backoﬀ Window
The small backoﬀ window attack is also known as the backoﬀ manipulation attack. In
this attack the attacker manipulates the contention protocol parameters to retain exclusive or
more frequent access to the channel. Selﬁsh or malicious users choose a very small backoﬀ, or
contention, window in the eﬀort to gain more access to the channel. This attack is feasible
against cognitive radio networks using Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance
(CSMA/CA) protocol at the MAC layer.
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The authors of [116] base their proposal on the method presented in the ﬁrst paper, only us-
ing a more reﬁned test to compute the diﬀerence between distributions. A strategy is presented
in which the backoﬀ value of a sender is assigned by the corresponding receiver. Monitoring
of the sender's compliance with the assigned backoﬀ window is also provided by the receiver.
If the sender deviates from the assigned value, it incurs punishment with the assignment of
a larger backoﬀ value for future transmissions. Continued misbehavior can result in the node
from being ejected from the network.
The mitigation described above does not apply to events if collusion occurs between the
sender and receiver. Neither does it apply if the receiver assigns large backoﬀ values to alleviate
contention for its own transmissions. Increasing the number of cognitive radios monitoring the
backoﬀ can help alleviate issues of collusion, or the event of the malicious receiver. It was
suggested that every cognitive radio publish its backoﬀ schedule in advance, or publish the seed
to a publicly known pseudo random number generator used to generate the backoﬀ values. With
this information, neighbors can detect misbehavior of neighboring nodes[131].
2.9.3 Lion Attack
The Lion attack is speciﬁc to the cognitive radio network. The attack takes place at the
physical/link layer, while targeting the transport layer. In essence, the attacker uses a primary
user emulation attack in order to disrupt the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection.
The attacker can be an outsider or a part of the network.
The attack aﬀects the Transmission Contol Protocol by forcing frequency handoﬀs in va-
cating the channel due to the perception that the primary user is present. When the hand oﬀ
occurs, the TCP is not aware of the switchover. TCP will continue creating logical connec-
tions and sending packets while not receiving any acknowledgments. If no acknowledgments
are returned, TCP considers the segment as lost due to congestion. As a consequence, TCP re-
transmits the segment while reducing the congestion window. This results in delays and packet
loss, reducing throughput.
The attack can become even more extended and severe, becoming a denial of service attack,
if the attacker can anticipate the new channel to which the secondary user will move. If the
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attacker moves to the new channel, and again simulates the primary user, or jams the channel,
the sender will not be able to successfully send data [29].
The authors of the paper [55]present a method of mitigation to the lion attack. Besides
identifying the attack, the authors suggest that cross-layer communication must be established
in order to make the TCP aware of the attack. This communication will allow the cognitive
radio network to halt the TCP connections during frequency hand oﬀ. The TCP parameters
can then be adapted to the connection parameters after hand oﬀ.
Additionally, the control data that is shared by the whole group of cognitive radio network
participants needs to be protected from eavesdropping by the attacker to prevent the attacker
from becoming aware of the current and future actions of the network. The authors of [55]
suggest the use of a common shared secret key. The group key will provide group members the
ability to send encrypted data, decrypt received data, and authenticate itself as a network mem-
ber. Of course, only the current group members should know the group key, so the key would
need to be updated as the membership changes. It is suggested current group key management
(GKM) studies be applied to the cognitive radio network as a solution. Unfortunately, the
cross-layer communication and group key can only mitigate the lion attack since these solutions
cannot stop denial of service or channel degradation due to jamming. In an eﬀort to identify
the attacker, the authors of [55] suggest adding a parallel cross-layer intrusion detection system
adapted to cognitive radio networks.
2.9.4 Jelly Fish Attack
The jelly ﬁsh attack and the lion attack are related in that they both target the TCP. In the
lion attack, the degradation of the TCP occurs because of frequent frequency handoﬀs. In the
jellyﬁsh attack, throughput is decreased because of out of order, delayed, or dropped packets.
The jellyﬁsh attack is performed at the network layer, while targeting the transport layer.
The attacker can perpetrate the attack by intentionally reordering the packets it receives and
forwards. TCP has a vulnerability to out of order packets; out of order packets trigger retrans-
missions and degrade network throughput. Dropping a fraction of the packets also degrades
throughput, similar to a sinkhole attack. However, in this variant the packets are dropped intel-
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ligently such that they coincide with the TCP transmission window. This can cause near zero
throughput in the TCP protocol. Additionally, if the malicious node randomly delays packets,
throughput will be aﬀected because it causes the TCP timers to be invalid, resulting in network
congestion [67]. Part of the diﬃculty in mitigating the jellyﬁsh attack is that the jelly ﬁsh obeys
all of the data plane and control plane protocol rules. Therefore, supportive nodes can hardly
distinguish between the attack, and a congested network [78]. It is possible that successful jelly
ﬁsh attacks can partition the network [89].
In the paper [89] a scheme is presented that exploits the broadcast nature of the wireless
medium for detection and mitigation of jelly ﬁsh attacks. A jelly ﬁsh can be detected by its
neighbors simultaneously when the neighbors are set as promiscuous so they can observe each
other's activities. In the proposed scheme the TCP protocol is altered such that catalyst-helper
packets are sent to check for congestion when the network experiences low throughput. The
packets are supplied with cumulative sequence numbers and a ﬂow id number. Observing nodes
are able to identify if packets are delayed, dropped, or sent out of order by a neighbor. When
a threshold of such detected misbehavior is reached, the misbehaving node is punished, and
can be isolated from the network. Punishment can include revocation of the certiﬁcate of the
malicious node by the centralized trusted authority, or isolation of the malicious node by the
dropping of all control and data packets forwarded or originated from the node.
A trust based mechanism is presented in [82] for establishing and managing trust in pure
ad-hoc networks where no base station or other central entity exists and the nodes are not
required to be pre-conﬁgured. Routing protocols, such as Dynamic State Routing (DSR) and
Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV), are modiﬁed to allow establishment of routes
with a certain level of conﬁdence. Nodes ﬁrst check the trust value at the next hop to ensure it
is equal to or greater than a speciﬁed threshold before forwarding packets to the node. If the
threshold value is not adequate, the sending node will try to avoid a path using the suspect
node [82].
A scalable and a robust approach to enforce collaboration in a mobile ad hoc network is
presented by [47]. In this mitigation eﬀort, every node observes its neighbors' activities. Each
node computes the ratio of dropped packets in a certain time window for its neighbors that
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drop packets. When a ratio for a node exceeds an predetermined threshold value, the one-hop
neighbors punish the node with isolation for a time period.
2.9.5 Policy Attacks
As mentioned in 2.8.2, the paper [8] describes the security threats associated with each of
the main functions of the policy system of the policy based cognitive radio. The attack on the
policy reasoning and enforcement functions, as well as the policy derivation and distribution
functions by spooﬁng, were already described. The forging policy attacks occur at a diﬀerent
level, targeting the application layer, and are described here.
In the forgery attack against the policy derivation function, the malicious entity intercepts
communications from the policy administrator intended for the policy manager. The original
policy is replaced with a forged policy resulting in a compromised network and decreased network
performance. Similarly, the forgery attack on the policy distribution function intercepts and
replaces the policy from the policy server intended for the policy engine. The use of certiﬁcates
or other authentication protocols for identity validation can mitigate these attacks.
2.9.6 A Suggested Multi-Level Security Framework as Attack Mitigation
Trying to address several layers of attack of the cognitive radio network, the paper [91]
presents a multi-level framework for the security of the cognitive radio network. The basis of
the proposal is a new, secure, adaptive MAC protocol called dynamic decentralized and hybrid
MAC (DDH-MAC). This cognitive radio MAC protocol is a hybrid that lies between the static
common control channel using an unlicensed spectrum band (commonly referred to as GCCC)
and the non-GCCC protocols. The protocol creates an adaptive, secure, and energy eﬃcient
network by tuning its parameters eﬃciently and intelligently based on the current situation of
the network. The protocol includes a primary control channel and a backup control channel,
both sent over the white spaces in the spectrum.
Four levels of security are provided by the DDH-MAC protocol. First is the encryption of
the beacon frame. Recipients of the beacon frame apply the relevant decryption scheme to read
the primary and backup control channels.
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The second level of security is the secure transmission of the free channel list (FCL). The
FCL is exchanged secretly over the primary control channel. The chosen control channel is only
known to the cognitive radios in the vicinity. Additionally, all frames are encrypted using the
public key, and only nodes with the private key can retrieve the information.
Dynamic decentrlized and hybrid MAC adds a time stamp to each data transmission as
a third level of security. Data is expected to be received in a certain period of time; if the
data is not received in the speciﬁed time period, it is assumed the integrity of the data could
be compromised and therefore untrustworthy. This protocol helps protect the system against
man-in-the-middle attacks.
The last level of security is the dynamicity of the control channel. Since the primary control
channel is sent over a white space, the appearance of the primary user could occur, thus moving
the network communication to the backup control channel. If the primary user also appears
on the backup control channel, the nodes switch to the GCCC to search for a beacon frame.
Any attacker targeting the primary and backup control channels via smart jamming will need
to re-compile their attack strategy whenever the primary users appear. This provides a higher
level of security to the network.
2.10 Conclusion
With our increasing usage of the air as a medium for connecting electronically with the
world, the current spectrum deﬁned for commercial and personal usage has become crowded.
The cognitive radio network with software deﬁned capabilities will open to users more spectrum
frequencies, and hence, enhanced communication opportunities. However, the new technology
also provides avenues for new attacks perpetrated by malicious or selﬁsh users with the desire
to inhibit communication, capture or change the message, or use the spectrum exclusively.
In this paper we have presented the structures of malicious attacks on the cognitive ra-
dio network. We have identiﬁed attacks from both the traditional cellular networks and the
wireless sensor network arena that apply. We also presented attack scenarios speciﬁc to the cog-
nitive radio network architecture and capabilities. Following each attack scenario we presented
mitigating techniques particular to the attack.
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Recent security research on the cognitive radio network has focused on the insider threat
(Byzantine), jamming of the control channel or other portions of the spectrum, and externally
aﬀecting spectrum usage by masquerading as a primary user. More research needs to be com-
pleted in the area of secure transport protocols for the spectrum-aware cognitive radio networks,
considering the network's unique characteristics in spectrum management and spectrum mobil-
ity. Additionally, research needs to take place in the realm of cognitive radio ad hoc networks
(CRAHNS), addressing their distinctive security issues related to their network building func-
tions. Finally, further research needs to be conducted in the area of protecting the cognitive
radio function from many of the traditional threats, such as worms, Trojans, and viruses, as
well as new threats that attack the radio's ability to learn.
As the cognitive radio network concept matures and comes to fruition, the network security
sword play of thrust and parry will continue. The true challenge of the security warrior is prior
preparation for the battle. Extensive research and discussion about securing the network will
contribute to a proper framework that can be built into the cognitive radio system.
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CHAPTER 3. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF A METHOD FOR
SYNOPTIC LEVEL NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION
A paper accepted by COMPSAC 2015: The 39th Annual International Computers, Software
& Applications Conference
Deanna T. Hlavacek123 and J. Morris Chang4
3.1 Abstract
Current system administrators are missing intrusion alerts hidden by large numbers of false
positives. We propose an intrusion detection tool that eﬀectively uses select data to provide a
picture of network health. Our hypothesis is that by utilizing the data available at the node
and network levels we can create a synoptic picture of the network providing indications of many
intrusions or other network issues. Our major contribution is to provide a revolutionary way
to analyze node and network data for patterns, dependence, and eﬀects that indicate network
issues. Our ﬁrst contribution in this vein is to present a method based on utilizing the number
of packets sent, number of packets received, node reliability, route reliability, and entropy to
develop a synoptic picture of the network health in the presence of a sinkhole.
3.2 Introduction
Wireless ad hoc networks are self-organizing and self-conﬁguring infrastructure-less networks
of nodes which are connected by wireless links such as 802.11/WiFi products, wireless sensor
networks (WSNs), and the new cognitive radio network. With the growth in popularity of these
1Graduate Student, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
2Primary Researcher and Author.
3Author for correspondence.
4Associate Professor Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
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technologies there is a growing demand for intrusion detection systems (IDS) that can operate
with network node cooperation. Current research on intrusion detection systems for wireless
ad hoc systems focus mainly on anomaly or signature detection. These methods are subject to
high false positive rates. With limited time and resources, many true positives are lost in the
overload of the combined true and false alerts. Perhaps the answer is not more data, but the
better use of existing data.
Our motivation for research related to intrusion detection arises from the current lack of
comprehensive research into methods of analysis of selective information in an eﬀort to con-
struct a big picture of network security and integrity, termed as network health. Our major
contribution is to provide a revolutionary way to analyze node and network data for patterns,
dependence, and eﬀects that indicate network issues. Our ﬁrst contribution in this vein is to
present a method based on utilizing packet delivery ratio (PDR), node reliability, route reli-
ability, and entropy to develop a synoptic picture of the network health in the presence of a
simple sinkhole. In order to provide a proof of concept we utilize a simple grid based stationary
network similar to a wireless sensor network. With this simpliﬁed ﬁrst example we intend to
show that, although the concept of intrusion detection is not revolutionary, the method in which
we analyze the data for clues about network intrusion and performance is innovative, and can
be a valuable addition to the intrusion detection toolbox.
In this paper we will ﬁrst take a look at current research related to intrusion detection sys-
tems designed for wireless ad hoc networks. We then provide a description of our methodology
in network analysis for sinkhole detection, and our results based on simulation data. Last we
will conclude with a synopsis of the process and the impact of our experimental results. The
sections of the paper are organized as follows: Section 3.3.2 describes current research into intru-
sion detection systems and sinkhole detection in wireless ad hoc networks; Section 3.4 presents
the methodology of identifying a sinkhole based on the PDR, node reliability, and system en-
tropy; Section 3.5 presents our results with simulation and data analysis; Section 3.6 provides
comparison of the simulation results to other sinkhole identiﬁcation methods; and Section 3.7
is the conclusion.
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3.3 Related Work in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Wireless ad hoc networks have no router or access point providing infrastructure to the
network. Each node provides routing services, via routing protocols, by forwarding packets to
their neighbors. All nodes in an ad hoc network have equal status in the network, and can
associate with any network device within range. There are three main routing protocols for ad
hoc networks: Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), and
Ad Hoc On Demand Routing (AODV). OLSR is a proactive, or table-driven, protocol. DSR
and AODV are both on-demand, reactive protocols in which the nodes maintain routing tables.
AODV's routing tables are refreshed according to a timer. We have chosen to use the AODV
routing scheme for our ﬁrst demonstration.
3.3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Conventional intrusion detection systems (IDS) are based on misuse detection, anomaly
detection, or deviation from speciﬁcations. Misbehavior/misuse detection refers to identifying
an attack by comparing collected information against a predeﬁned list of signatures of known
attacks. Anomaly detection is a close opposite to misuse detection. With anomaly detection,
rather than storing a list of the signatures of known attacks, the system stores patterns of
normal behavior for comparison to the current behavior. The third technique, speciﬁcation
comparison, also compares the current behavior to a stored behavior proﬁle. However, the
comparison is against manually deﬁned speciﬁcations, rather than machine learning techniques.
Recently, most of the intrusion detection system research for wireless ad hoc systems has
focused upon the detection of anomalous behavior patterns. In the paper [110] a new detection
scheme called AODVSTAT is presented. The method is similar to other watchdog schemes in
that the nodes watch the packet events and the meta-data in the packets for anomalies in the
protocol. Deviations from the protocol are considered state changes, and trigger an alarming
event. In an eﬀort to lower false positive rates using packet features as the basis for anomaly
detection, the authors of [58] conduct careful feature selection from the available set of packet
features for their method. Similarly, [53] uses the entropy of packet features to detect deviations,
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and provides a ranking of alerts in an attempt to lower the false positive rate. The authors of
[108] base their system solely upon the packet sequence number mismatch with the expected
packet sequence number. A conﬁdence level for each node is calculated based on the number
of interactions with its neighbors. Rather than packet features, the authors of [135] base their
detection on anomalies in traﬃc patterns, comparing the current traﬃc pattern to a learned
traﬃc pattern. Each of these techniques requires either knowledge stored in memory of the
normal pattern of behavior, or some type of training before deployment. Attacks that do not
register against the learned normal proﬁle can not be detected by these systems. These methods
are also prone to false positives, since hiccups in the network can cause the systems to react
with identiﬁcation of pattern anomaly.
The authors of the papers [3, 34] both present hybrid detection schemes. The paper [3]
combines anomaly and misuse detection schemes in order to lower the false positive rate gener-
ally seen with anomaly detection, and raise the low detection rate ascribed to misuse detection.
The authors of [34] chose to combine the anomaly and speciﬁcation based schemes, and uses a
reputation based system in an attempt to lower the false positive rate. However, this method
adds much packet overhead as the nodes in the neighborhoods vote.
In comparison to these methods of intrusion detection, our intrusion detection method is
based not on stored patterns, signatures, or rules, but the eﬀect upon the node, route, and
network function. Our system requires no training or pre-placed data concerning the expected
network protocol or traﬃc pattern. Therefore, new or craftily tweaked older intrusion methods,
such as a stealthy sinkhole that follows network protocols while selectively dropping packets,
will still be identiﬁed, as long as the eﬀect of the disruption surpasses the established threshold.
We have no watchdogs observing the network, and so we are not plagued by the high false
positive rates endemic to these methods. Similarly, we are not doing signature comparison, so
we are not plagued by the inability (and associated low accuracy rate) to recognize new attack
signatures. Our system instead is monitoring the state of the network, and reacts when the
state of the whole, or portions of, the network move out of alignment. As in holistic medicine,
we do not only pay attention to the symptom; we analyze the symptoms to explore the network
function and ﬁnd the root cause of the malfunction.
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3.3.2 Sinkhole Detection
We consider sinkholes as Byzantines in the network. Byzantine behavior is displayed by
any action of a member node that negatively aﬀects the routing service in the network. Many
such attacks, such as eavesdropping or packet modiﬁcation, can be prevented by traditional
authentication, integrity, and encryption mechanisms. The malicious actions of a Byzantine
sinkhole may be more complex, such as modifying the hop count, sequence number, or list of
nodes in a path, in order to make itself more attractive as an entry to an ideal route. According
to the paper [6], attacks using these tactics can also be prevented with more sophisticated
authentication and integrity techniques. We therefore consider the stealthy sinkhole that drops
data packets, entirely or selectively, while participating in the routing protocol.
The authors of [6] present a method of identifying a sinkhole with link weights and probes.
However, this method is part of a newly proposed routing protocol that includes double ﬂooding
during route discovery and the sending of probes to all network nodes for attack discovery. These
steps create additional network overhead. Additionally, in this routing protocol, the sinkhole
will only be discovered if it is acting maliciously during the probing phase. Finally, this work
provides no insight as to how to identify a sinkhole in the accepted ad hoc routing protocols
Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), or
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR).
In the paper [57] the authors present a packet drop attack detection method in which the
neighbors adjacent to a communications route monitor the actions of the en route nodes. If a
particular node does not forward a speciﬁc number of packets in a certain time period, an alert
proclaiming a malicious node is started. The authors make a distinction between greyholes,
which drop only a portion of the packets, and blackholes, which drop all received packets.
Analysis by the authors indicates that only blackholes, and gray holes in the same vicinity,
can be identiﬁed. If no blackhole exists, the greyholes will not be identiﬁed. Similar to this
method is the watchdog method presented by the authors of [39]. Once again, collaborative
nodes observe the actions of the nodes en route and use a protocol to determine when an alarm
should be sounded. Unfortunately the reliability and eﬀectiveness of this method is diﬃcult to
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determine since the authors have not yet determined the false positive/false negative rates for
the protocol.
Several papers rely upon the sinkhole bucking the routing protocol by changing the sequence
numbers. The sinkhole identiﬁcation schemes described in the papers [22, 33, 46] are therefore
not eﬀective in identifying a stealthy sinkhole that does not change the packet sequence number.
The authors of [22] additionally use the previous image ratio to identify the sinkhole. In the
previous image ratio method the received routing packets are compared to other stored routing
packet images. However, this method relies upon the sinkhole having forged the route records
in their route request packets. Therefore, if a stealthy sinkhole has not forged the route records,
the sinkhole will not be identiﬁed by this method.
A third indicator of a sinkhole identiﬁed and used by the authors of [22, 46] is the route add
ratio. The route add ratio is the number of routes that traverse a particular node divided by
the total number of routes added to the node's routing table. Unfortunately, [46] only mentions
the idea of the route add ratio, but does not explain how the ratio is used. In [22] a network
node is speciﬁed to keep a counter for each node in the network, and increment the counter
when a route passing through the node is added to the cache. This presents the issue of one
node storing data for all of the nodes, and additional messages created and sent to the assigned
node when any network node adds a route to its cache. The data related to this study did not
provide a method to determine the message overhead related to this technique.
In comparison to these studies, our method does not rely solely upon the sinkhole cheating
on the routing protocol. Therefore, a stealthy node will still be identiﬁed by its eﬀect on the
network, rather than missed due to it not sending signals through the routing protocol. Also,
even though there are additional messages included with our sinkhole identiﬁcation scheme, no
additional messages are required before the possibility of a sinkhole is discovered. The overhead
of messages m related to sinkhole identiﬁcation is related to the number of hops from the
detecting node to the sinkhole and is very small. We analyze the number of messages required
in Section 3.6.3.
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3.4 Methodology
The methodology of the sinkhole identiﬁcation scheme consists of two parts. First, the
detection phase, in which one or more nodes are alerted that there is a possible sinkhole in the
network. Individual nodes calculate their neighbors' reliability values, and are alerted when
a reliability crosses a threshold. The second phase is the sinkhole identiﬁcation phase and
involves querying speciﬁc network nodes for data they have about their neighbors. We make
the assumption that each node is aware of its immediate neighbors. However, the nodes may
not immediately be aware of the position of its neighbors relative to itself or each other.
Algorithm 1 Calculations of Neighbor Reliability
//Done for each neighbor node (Y) around the starting node A
//routeRel: route reliability
//neighRel: neighbor reliability
1 : for each neighNode(Y)
//Calculate route reliability for routes X through neighNode Y
2 : for each route(X) (Z nodes along route)
3 : for each node(Z) on route X
4 : routeRel(X) = routeRel(X) * pdr(Z);
5 : saveRouteRel(XZ) = routeRel(X);
6 : get next node pdr(Z) on route(X);
7 : get next route(X);
//Calculate neighbor reliability using all routeRel(X)
8 : for each routeRel(X)
9 : neighRel(Y) = neighRel(Y) +
(routeRel(X) * [log2(1/routeRel(X))]);
10: saveNeighRel(X) = neighRel(Y);
11: get next routeRel(X);
12: get next neighNode(Y);
3.4.1 Detection Process
In the neighbor reliability method of determining the health of the network, each node
counts the number of packets sent and received along each route. The nodes calculate the
packet delivery ratio for the stored routes by relating the number of packets received along the
route to the number of packets sent along the route. This PDR is also referred to as the route
reliability, and represents the cumulative reliability for each node along a route. From this data,
the nodes each determine their neighbor reliability by calculating the entropy for all known
routes through the neighbor node. Neighbor reliability refers to a single node's perception of
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the probability of a packet following any route through a single neighbor to successfully reach
the intended destination. The Shannon entropy equation, used to estimate the diversity of the
system, is applied. The formula follows, where p(x) is the route reliability:
H(x) = −
∑
p(x)log2p(x) =
∑
p(x)log2(1/p(x)) (3.1)
Algorithm 1 describes the process to obtain the neighbor reliability values. Note that in
simulation we use the probability that a packet will reach its destination when routed through
an individual node for the PDR of node Z. This was substituted for the true PDR of a route
that would be known in a live network.
Using this method, assuming a stationary MANET grid of nodes with one node per grid
space, each node in the grid will have up to eight diﬀerent neighbor reliability values, each value
from the perspective of one of its (up to eight) neighbors. Additionally, each node will have
up to eight neighbors for which it has determined neighbor reliability values, comprising the
neighbor reliability set. Using its neighbor reliability set, each node calculates the standard
deviation of the set. A lower boundary is calculated by subtracting the standard deviation from
the mean of the set; the boundary acts as a threshold. The use of the standard deviation was
determined experimentally; one standard deviation provided a proper boundary to determine if
the neighbor reliability was low enough to indicate the possibility of a sinkhole when compared
to the neighbor set. The lower boundary in a live network will need to be determined based
upon the particular network. This process provides the node the ability to observe the current
state of the network surrounding it, and helps identify anomalies based on the current network
state. If the neighbor reliability of any neighbor crosses the threshold, the node is alerted
that there may be an attacker in the network. Note that until this point, all calculations and
decisions are made upon data collected by the node without additional messages or queries to
the network or neighbors. Therefore, unless an alert is signaled, there is no impact upon the
network throughput for this method.
The example in Figure 3.1 shows several nodes with reliability values applied to each node
by its neighbors. The values in the ﬁgure are charted according to compass coordinates from
the perspective of an individual node. For example, Node W applies the values of 5.443 to node
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AA, 5.324 to node BB, 5.436 to node CC, 5.276 to node X, 5.443 to node V, 5.393 to node R,
5.441 to node Q, and 5.329 to node S. These values comprise node W's neighbor reliability set.
Conversely, node W is applied the values of 0.1322 as perceived by node AA, 0.1315 by node
BB, 0.1331 by node C, 0.1333 by node X, et cetera.
Figure 3.1 Neighbor Reliability Plot (values * 10e-6)
3.4.2 A Proof
We consider a simple grid network of nodes with a sinkhole in the center (Figure 3.2). Let
a be the percentage of successful packet delivery for regular nodes; it is assumed regular nodes
drop few packets. The sinkhole drops a large number of received packets; let the percentage of
successful packet delivery for the sinkhole be b. The network uses AODV routing, utilizing the
shortest route. We make the following assumptions:
1. Each node is aware of all of its eight neighbors.
2. No route will pass through more than one of the source node's neighbors, and no more
than two neighbors of any node along the route.
3. All routes are of three hops.
4. Percentage a >> b.
A source node (src1) located next to the sinkhole will have seven neighbors with routes that do
not traverse the sinkhole. The source node will therefore experience a packet delivery percentage
of a. The last neighbor will have all packets routed through the sinkhole, experiencing a packet
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delivery percentage of b. The average percentage of packets experienced by this node will
therefore be:
PDRsrc1 = (7a+ b)/8. (3.2)
A source node (src2) two hops from the sinkhole will have more routing choices that do
not include the sinkhole. In the described network, ﬁve of the neighbors will have no routes
through the sinkhole. Of the three neighbors left, two will each have four of their nineteen
routes traversing the sinkhole (see Figure 3.2). Let this be represented by PDR31/33 since the
description applies to both of these neighbors in the example. One neighbor will have three of
its thirteen routes passing through the sinkhole (Figure 3.3). Let this be represented by PDR32.
The PDR experienced by src2 is therefore represented by the following:
PDRsrc2 = 5a+ PDR31/33 + PDR32 (3.3)
where
PDR31/33 = [2(15/19)a+ 2(4/19)b]/8 (3.4)
and
PDR32 = [(10/13)a+ (3/13)b]/8 (3.5)
or
PDRsrc2 = [7.53a+ .65b]/8. (3.6)
Likewise, a source node (src3) three hops from the sinkhole will have more routing choices
that do not include the sinkhole. In this scenario seven of the neighbors do not have any routes
through the sinkhole. One neighbor has three of its thirteen routes traversing the sinkhole. We
get the following equation:
PDRsrc3 = [7a+ (10/13)a+ (3/13)b]/8 (3.7)
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which is equivalent to:
PDRsrc3 = [7.77a+ .23b]/8. (3.8)
Since a >> b, we remove the terms with b from the equations, resulting in the relationship
PDRsrc1< PDRsrc2 < PDRsrc3 since
7a < 7.35a < 7.77a (3.9)
Figure 3.2 Route Example from SRC2 (Node 33)
Figure 3.3 Route Example from SRC2 (Node 32)
3.4.3 Sinkhole Identiﬁcation Process
The sinkhole identiﬁcation process works similar to water in a reservoir. When the water
reaches a higher point in the reservoir, it stops moving forward and splashes back. In our
identiﬁcation process, the query messages will move towards the lowest reliability point and
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stop at the higher value nodes on the other side of the lowest point. Once the higher nodes are
reached, the splash will be a broadcast message ﬂooded through the network reporting the
identity of the sinkhole.
In the identiﬁcation process, we assume that each node is aware of its immediate neighbors,
although not necessarily their relative positions. We call this set of neighbors ring one as
related to the alerted node. When a node determines that a threshold has been crossed, it
broadcasts a query to its immediate neighbors (ring one) for their neighbor lists. The query in-
cludes the alerted node's assignment of L1, which is the node with the lowest neighbor reliability
from the perspective of the alerted node. Only the neighbors with neighbor lists that include
L1 broadcast a reply to the query. Node L1 was able to receive the information sent by its own
immediate neighbors in response to the query made by the alerted node. Node L1 assigns L2
to its neighbor with the lowest reliability value (L2 will most likely, but not necessarily, be in
ring two), and sends this assignment along with a broadcast query for neighbor lists. Only the
neighbors with L2 in their neighbor lists that have not already broadcast their neighbor lists
during this identiﬁcation process round reply to the query. (Algorithm 2)
This process continues until we have reached the area around the sinkhole, ring n. The
nodes queried in ring n will include the sinkhole and some of its immediate neighbors. At
this point the sinkhole may or may not participate in the process. If it does participate, the
sinkhole will continue the process by identifying Ln-1. Ln-1 will then identify the sinkhole as
its neighbor with the lowest reliability value. The sinkhole may not acknowledge, nor realize,
it is the sinkhole. Therefore, the sinkhole (call the sinkhole S ) assigns LLOW (call this node
X ) to one of its neighbors. Node X compares its neighbor reliability values and re-identiﬁes
the sinkhole (S) as its neighbor with the lowest neighbor reliability. To attain conﬁrmation, X
broadcasts a query to its neighbors for a vote as to which of the two nodes they identify as the
node with the lowest value. Only nodes with both nodes S and X as neighbors reply. The node
requesting the vote will ﬂood the network with the identiﬁcation message naming the sinkhole.
If the sinkhole does not participate, the node (Ln-1) that sent the message to the sinkhole and
its neighbors will note that there have been no messages from Ln in time T. At this point, Ln-1
will resend a message to the sinkhole and neighbors common to the requesting node and the
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Algorithm 2 Identiﬁcation of Sinkhole
1 : initialize row, col, x to 0; AlertedNode is L0 at [0,0]
3 : Lx identiﬁes Lx+1 as neighbor with the lowest neighbor value
4 : Lx broadcasts query for neighbor lists along with Lx+1 identiﬁcation
5 : x=x+1
// if Lx participates in the discovery process it will automatically query neighbors
6 : while sinkhole not found
7 : Lx identiﬁes Lx+1 as neighbor with the lowest neighbor value
8 : if Lx+1 == Lx-1 OR Lx+1 == Lx-2 AND if other shared neighbors that have not yet been polled
exist
9 : immediate neighbors (not Lx-2, Lx+1, or Lx-1) vote to determine which of the compared nodes
has the lowest value
10: node that is not determined lowest value alerts network of identity of sinkhole
11: else if y > 2 AND Lx+1 == Lx-y
12: Lx-1 removes Lx neighbor value from neighbor list
13: x = x-1 //this is a loop with no positive sinkhole determination
14: else if Lx queries neighbors for THEIR neighbor list
15: Lx+1 receives neighbor lists from immediate neighbors and determines relative placement of
immediate neighbors
16: else if Lx-1 does not hear Lx query neighbors in time T
17: Lx-1 queries immediate neighbors shared with Lx (Lshared_1 and Lshared_2) for their neighbor
lists and neighbor values
18: Lx-1 determines relative locations of neighbors shared between Lshared_1 and Lshared_2
19: if neighbors shared include only Lx and Lx-1
20: Lshared_1 and Lshared_2 send queries for neighbor lists and reliabilities
21: neighbors with lists that include Lx respond to query
22: Lshared_1 and Lshared_2 provide query information to Lx-1
23: Lx-1 uses neighbor locations and neighbor values to determine if Lx has lowest local neighbor
value
24: if Lx has lowest neighbor value as reported by surrounding immediate neighbors
25: Lx-1 alerts network Lx is a sinkhole
26: else
27: Lx-1 removes Lx neighbor value from neighbor list
28: x = x-1
29: x=x+1
30: end while
non-responding (possible) sinkhole, requesting the reliability values for all of their neighbors. If
the neighbor lists received do not include at least three neighbors in common, additional queries
will be sent by the neighbors of Ln to their neighbors. The additional information received will
be provided to Ln-1. Analyzed together, this information will conﬁrm that the node with the
lowest reliability in ring n is indeed the sinkhole, and Ln-1 will broadcast the message identifying
the sinkhole to the network.
The action taken by the network upon identiﬁcation of the attacking node is dependent upon
the system protocol, and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are basically two
types of actions: isolation of the node, or incentivation for proper network behavior. Isolation
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means the suspect node may be ignored by the network when it advertises access to routes to
any destination, and so ostracized from the network. Incentivation means allowing the suspect
node to send its own data only at the rate that it is providing to the network, and this allowed
rate increases as the misbehaving node decreases the number of dropped packets and increases
its packet delivery ratio. It must be recalled that although we have referred to the suspect node
with low reliability an attacker, it may be a selﬁsh node, or just a malfunctioning node. This
method of identifying the unreliable node does not determine intent.
Table 3.1 Network Parameters
Node Parameters Value
Number of Nodes 30
Node Placement 6 by 5 grid
Simulation Duration 1500 seconds
Routing Protocol AODV
Type of Stations MANET
Node Speed 0 kts
Transmit Power .0001 w
Packet Reception Power Threshold -95 dBm
Buﬀer Size (Member Nodes) 256000
Buﬀer Size (sinkhole) 415
Route Length 5 nodes, 4 hops
3.5 Simulation
To obtain simulated network data we chose OPNET Modeler 17.5, a commercially available
tool set used by the communications industry for modeling, simulation, and analysis of commu-
nications networks and applications. The initial network topology is a six by ﬁve grid mobile
ad-hoc network (MANET). The size of our network was chosen based on a study of the eﬀects
of insider attacks by the authors of [28]. According to the study, thirty nodes is the ideal size
of network for a sinkhole to operate eﬀectively.
In the initial study the nodes are stationary and the parameters for the member nodes
are uniform. Traﬃc supplied by the OPNET MANET model is used. Each node is a traﬃc
generator. No specialized traﬃc is added, and no additional noise is added to the network.
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Ad hoc on demand (AODV) routing is chosen as the routing protocol. Route length for the
identiﬁcation method is limited to ﬁve nodes, with four hops. This limitation was imposed to
provide a simple initial standard for comparing route reliability results. The routes used for the
calculations are not all inclusive. Therefore, not all neighbors may play a part in determining
the calculated neighbor reliability value. Parameters for the member nodes are shown in Table
3.1.
The buﬀer size for the member nodes was left at the OPNET MANET default of 256000
packets. The buﬀer size for the attacker was lowered to 415 packets to simulate a sinkhole.
This buﬀer size was chosen because it allowed packets to be dropped without stopping all
traﬃc routing through the attacking node. The number of dropped packets at this setting
impacted signiﬁcantly the amount of data traﬃc sent by the attacking node. Normal nodes
sent an average of 903.5 packets over the 1500 second simulation period, as opposed to the 17.3
packets sent by the sinkhole. Note that the 1500 second simulation period and the 15 second
intervals were arbitrary. Since the sinkhole eﬀect is recorded almost immediately and the eﬀect
is nearly constant over the entire period using the simulation parameters described, the interval
parameters for recording the data can be optimized. Subsequent tests showed that the sinkhole
could be detected in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen seconds of the commencement of network traﬃc. Data
collected per node included:
1. At each node, the number of packets received per second in ﬁfteen second intervals.
2. At each node, the number of packets sent per second in ﬁfteen second intervals.
3.5.1 Discovery and Identiﬁcation Processes Using Simulation Results
In this context, the packet sent ratio (PSR) is the ratio of the number of data packets sent
to the number of data packets received at a particular node. To ﬁnd the neighbor reliability in
our simulation, we ﬁrst calculate the route reliability by multiplying the PSRs for each node
along a route, starting at the ﬁrst hop (as opposed to the sending node). Next we calculate the
entropy of all known routes through the neighbor node. Plotting the neighbor reliability values
on a plot of the network shows that the lower values tend to be centered around the sinkhole.
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Table 3.2 Node G's Neighbor Reliability
Starting
Node: G
Cumulative Reliability:
0.000258769
Average Reliability:
4.31282E-05
Reliability
Neighbor
List
A B C H L M
Reliability
Value List
3.05418E-06 2.95563E-06 3.05779E-06 2.21184E-06 2.62348e-06 2.2152E-06
Entropy
Per
Neighbor
List
5.59549E-05 5.42868E-05 5.60144E-05 4.07334E-05 4.82379e-05 4.07903E-05
For an example, we assume node G is the ﬁrst node to identify a possible attacker. From
the reliability calculations (Table 3.2), node G identiﬁes neighbors H and M as having entropy
values below the threshold value for node G. Node G currently has a view of the network that
includes its immediate neighbors, although node G may not know the relative locations of the
neighbor nodes at this time. Node G identiﬁes node H as the neighbor with the lowest reliability
value. Node G broadcasts this assignment and queries its neighbors for their neighbor lists.
Only G's neighbors that share H as a neighbor broadcast their neighbor list; therefore, nodes
L, M, C, and B broadcast their lists. Upon receipt of the data, node H places the nodes on the
grid relative to itself (3.4). Node H reports it's neighbor with the lowest neighbor reliability
value to node M, and queries its own neighbors for their neighbor lists. Again, only the neighbors
that share node M as a neighbor broadcast their neighbor lists. From this information, node M
is able to place itself and its immediate neighbors on the grid. Node R is assigned as having the
lowest neighbor reliability value by node M. Neighbors that share node R as a neighbor make
their neighbor list reports. Node R identiﬁes node W as the neighbor with the lowest reliability
value, continues the process, and node W identiﬁes node X. Node X then identiﬁes node W
as the neighbor with the lowest reliability. Since nodes W and X identiﬁed each other, shared
neighbor nodes vote for the neighbor with the lowest value. Since W has participated in the
process, and it has been identiﬁed as the neighbor with the lowest reliability in the local area,
node W (or, if needed, node X) announces to the network W is the sinkhole.
71
Table 3.3 Partial Table of Neighbor Reliability Values (*10e-5
Node H Neighbors L N M
Reliability Values 4.73898 5.32743 3.51034
Node M Neighbors Q R S
Reliability Values 5.56492 1.90244 5.39725
Node R Neighbors V W X
Reliability Values 5.29084 .130932 5.31013
Node W Neighbors X BB CC
Reliability Values 5.27565 5.32431 5.43592
Node X Neighbors W BB DD
Reliability Values .133259 5.23300 5.29058
We borrow a technique from weather forecasting to analyze the plot by drawing isopleths
for the reader to indicate the levels of entropy in the network. This provides a human-readable
synoptic view of the network at the current time. As can be noted in Figure 3.4, the sinkhole
has been identiﬁed as the lowest area of reliability in the network. Even though the immedi-
ate neighbors to the sinkhole node are not dropping packets, their proximity to the sinkhole
aﬀects their reliability value because of the number of routes they have stored for use in their
routing table that traverse the sinkhole. Nodes farther away from the sinkhole have their relia-
bility values less aﬀected by the attacker because they tend to have fewer routes traversing the
sinkhole.
Figure 3.4 Synoptic analysis of neighbor reliability
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3.5.2 Data Analysis - One Sinkhole
Analysis of the data set shows that every node except node E resulted in an alert due to at
least one of the neighbor nodes having entropy less than the one sigma lower boundary threshold.
It must be noted that node E did not have any routes traversing node W (the sinkhole) in its
routing table. Every other node had at least one route traversing node W. Also, starting the
identiﬁcation process from every node (except E) found W to be the sinkhole.
There are cases in which the identiﬁcation process may not be initiated and the sinkhole not
found. However, as the network matures and nodes store routes with the sinkhole traversed,
the identiﬁcation process will be initiated. The special cases are listed below:
1. If a node exists with no routes stored that traverse the sinkhole, the sinkhole will not be
detected by this particular node.
2. If a node exists with all routes traversing only one neighbor there will be no detection
alert by this node. This is due to the method of calculating the threshold.
3. If a node exists with with all routes traversing only two neighbors the detection process
will not be started. This is due to the method of calculating the threshold.
3.5.3 Additional Cases Investigated
In the case analyzed above we showed that one attacker acting as a sinkhole can be identiﬁed
in the stationary grid network of thirty nodes. Since the sinkhole was alerted upon by all but
the sinkhole itself and one additional node, the chance of sinkhole discovery was 93% (based
on the number of nodes that are alerted to a sinkhole in the network by the detection process
divided by the number of nodes in the network - in this case, 28/30 = 93%). This is because
the eﬀect of the sinkhole extends through the network for routes at least ﬁve nodes long. The
following cases investigate whether more than one sinkhole can be identiﬁed in the network of
thirty nodes.
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3.5.3.1 No Sinkholes in the Network
In the case of no sinkholes in the network, we would like to have no alerts, and to ﬁnd no
suspects. However, since no network is homogenous (including the OPNET MANET network
set up as described), it is likely that there will be at least one node in a neighborhood of nearly
homogenous transmitting neighbors that will be falsely identiﬁed as a sinkhole. Using the
algorithm described based solely on one standard deviation as the threshold, in a network with
no intentional sinkholes placed, there were twenty-six nodes that were alerted to the possibility
of a sinkhole. Four false positives were identiﬁed. This result portends the possible result that
after identiﬁed true positives (sinkholes) in a network, the process may then ﬁnd one or more
false positives.
3.5.3.2 Two Adjacent Sinkholes in the Network
In this case, we have included two adjacent sinkholes operating in the same area of the
network (nodes V, W). Experimental results show that all but one node was alerted to the
possibility of a sinkhole in the network, and nine nodes have two neighbor reliability values
that indicate the presence of one or more sinkholes. Since the sinkholes are adjacent, the
identiﬁcation process ﬁrst ﬁnds the sinkhole with the lowest value. After the identiﬁed sinkhole
is removed from the network, as well as all routes in route lists incorporating the sinkhole, the
remaining nodes automatically re-calculate the neighbor reliability values. The second sinkhole
is identiﬁed by the identiﬁcation process since it now has the lowest neighbor reliability value
in the network.
In this instance, node DD again was not alerted to the possibility of a sinkhole. This time
node DD had one neighbor reliability value that was high because it had no routes with sinkholes
included. The other two neighbor reliability values were nearly equal, lower, but fairly close to
the higher value. Therefore, the method of identiﬁcation and alerting based on incorporating
the standard deviation did not indicate an outlier based on our thresholding scheme.
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Table 3.4 Neighbor Lists for Nodes K and L
Starting
Node
Neighbors Number
Routes
with
Sink-
holes vs.
Number
Routes
Neighbor
Reliability
Value
Node K
Neighbors
F 1/3 3.999E-05
G 2/6 3.882E-05
L 3/9 3.958E-05
P 3/8 3.885E-05
Q 3/9 4.073E-05
Node L
Neighbors
F 0/2 5.924E-05
G 2/4 2.961E-05
H* 3/4 1.592E-05
K* 2/3 2.258E-05
M 1/11 5.435E-05
P 0/1 5.886E-05
Q 3/8 3.888E-05
R 1/8 5.245E-05
3.5.3.3 Two Randomly Distributed Sinkholes in the Network
There are two sinkholes in the network located near opposite corners of the grid (nodes I, V).
Experimental results show that all but two of the other grid nodes were alerted to the presence
of at least one sinkhole in the network by their neighbor reliability values. After applying the
sinkhole identiﬁcation process as described in this paper, each sinkhole was correctly identiﬁed
by the alerted nodes.
Two of the nodes each have two neighbor reliability values that indicate the existence of
one or more sinkholes. The ﬁrst node, S, has two neighbors whose reliability values cross the
threshold; both of the neighbors' reliability scores are aﬀected by their routes through the same
sinkhole. The single sinkhole was correctly identiﬁed.
The second node (L) also has two neighbors (H, K) with reliability values that indicate the
presence of a sinkhole, as denoted by the asterisks in the Table 3.4. However, each neighbor's
values are aﬀected by routes through a diﬀerent sinkhole. Therefore, if we follow the identiﬁ-
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cation process in which we ﬁrst place and query the neighbor with the lowest reliability value,
one sinkhole is identiﬁed by node L. After the ﬁrst identiﬁed sinkhole and all associated routes
are removed from the network route lists, and the neighbor reliability values are re-calculated,
the second sinkhole is identiﬁed by node L. However, after the associated routes are removed
and the process followed a third time there were two false positives identiﬁed in the network.
The two nodes that gave null results (did not indicate the presence of a sinkhole) were K
and DD. We would expect nodes that have no routes through the sinkholes to be unable to
alert upon the possibility of a sinkhole. However, both of these nodes have routes traversing
each sinkhole. The neighbor reliability values did not alert these nodes because none of the
values crossed the calculated threshold for the node. Investigation shows that in both cases, the
lists of routes through every immediate neighbor included nearly half of the routes traversing
a sinkhole, and the other half of the routes not traversing a sinkhole. Therefore, the mean of
the route set for each neighbor of a node falls between the values reported for routes with no
sinkhole, and the values for routes with a sinkhole (Section 5.2.1 number 4). (It should also be
noted that node K is at the edge of the network, and node DD is in a corner of the network.
Although this placement does not guarantee failure in identifying a sinkhole, it does lower the
possibility due to the smaller number of neighbor nodes for comparison. However, the success
or failure also depends upon the routes contained in the routing table of the node.)
The result is no values fall outside of the threshold, and the node does not receive an alert.
In essence, by the perspective of these two nodes, routes including sinkholes are as common in
the network as routes with no sinkholes, and therefore will not be identiﬁed as outliers. This
argument foretells the results we will see in future cases with increased numbers of sinkholes.
The Table 3.4 shows the neighbors of nodes K and L with their neighbor reliability values
and the ratio of the number of routes that traverse the neighbor and a sinkhole to the routes
that do not go through a sinkhole. In this case, node K has no neighbors for which the number
of routes through a sinkhole is greater than the number of routes with no sinkhole nodes. L has
two such neighbors - H and K (note that here we are not looking at node K, but as node K as
a neighbor of node L). Nodes H and K both met the conditions we set for alerting node L of a
possible sinkhole in the network. Node K did not receive any such alert.
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3.5.3.4 Multiple Randomly Placed Sinkholes in the Network
Multiple randomly placed sinkhole nodes were placed in the network. Table 3.5 shows the
number of sinkholes, alerts, sinkholes identiﬁed, sinkholes missed, and false sinkholes identiﬁed
in the thirty node network. It is important to note that this table represents the number of node
members that would alert upon a sinkhole and start the discovery process. However, with a
protocol in place to determine which alerted node would take action, the other nodes would not
initiate the identiﬁcation process. As a consequence, the number of falsely identiﬁed sinkholes
appears quite high. This is because several nodes would alert upon the same false node.
Table 3.5 shows that as the number of sinkholes increased, the number of nodes receiving
alerts decreased. This was expected, because as sinkholes become more numerous, using the
algorithm based on the standard deviation, localized neighborhoods of the network will see the
results of the sinkholes as a norm, rather than an anomaly.
In this network we were able to identify all of the sinkholes in networks with six or less sink-
holes. In the cases of more than six sinkholes, at least one sinkhole was left unidentiﬁed. After
the sinkholes were identiﬁed, the sinkholes and associated routes were removed from the routing
tables and the neighbor reliabilities re-calculated. The identiﬁcation process was repeated until
there were no alerts in the network, or until any alerts were deemed non-productive because of
loops in the process (i.e. node A points to node B as the neighbor with the lowest neighbor
reliability value, who points to node C, to node D, to node E, to node A). In all of the networks
with 8 or fewer actual sinkholes randomly placed in the network at least one false positive was
identiﬁed.
3.5.3.5 New Criteria for Threshold
The original threshold criteria allowed too many false sinkholes to be identiﬁed. Such
identiﬁcation could result in friendly nodes being excluded from the network. After reviewing
the data for every case, an additional threshold was added to the algorithm. This threshold
excluded nodes with neighbor reliabilities that were not at least one order of magnitude less
than the average of the local neighbor reliabilities from causing alerts. The results seen in Table
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Table 3.5 One Standard Deviation as Threshold
Sinkholes
In
Network
Alerts Sinkholes
Identi-
ﬁed
Sinkholes
Missed
False
Sink-
holes
0 26 0 0 4
2 28 2 0 2
4 25 4 0 >1
6 20 6 0 >1
8 10 7 1 >1
10 6 6 4 0
15 2 6 9 0
18 0 0 18 0
3.6 show that there were no false positives reported when using the new threshold. For the
networks with four sinkholes or less, all of the sinkholes were properly identiﬁed. For networks
with six, eight, or ten sinkholes, up to two additional sinkholes were unidentiﬁed when compared
to the results in the Table 3.5. Since it is expected that it is highly unlikely there will be more
than one or two misbehaving nodes in a network of thirty nodes, the tradeoﬀ when using the
enhanced threshold criteria is for less disruption in the network due to the removal of innocent
nodes.
Table 3.6 Experimental Results - Additional Threshold Criteria
Sinkholes
In
Network
Alerts Sinkholes
Identi-
ﬁed
Sinkholes
Missed
False
Sink-
holes
0 0 0 0 0
2 13 2 0 0
4 14 4 0 0
6 12 5 1 0
8 8 5 3 0
10 3 4 6 0
15 1 0 15 0
18 0 0 18 0
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3.6 Analysis of Network Overhead
The method presented does not depend upon stored patterns, signatures, or rules. It does,
however, require limited storage (s) of additional collected data and a small amount of energy (e)
for calculations. Messages (m) are only required for identiﬁcation when a sinkhole is detected.
Therefore, the overhead o can be described by the equation:
o = s+ e+m. (3.10)
3.6.1 Storage
The AODV routing tables already house information about the next hop to known desti-
nations. The next hop is an immediate neighbor. Therefore, the data we require to be stored
in the routing table can be associated with the next hop, or neighbor. We assign ss as the
storage space used to hold the number of packets sent and sr as the storage space for the number
of packets received. After the calculation for the neighbor reliability is completed, it is stored
in snr. The additional storage space s required by a network of i nodes, each with b neighbors,
can therefore be represented by the equation
s = ib(ss + sr + snr). (3.11)
3.6.2 Energy
The detection and identiﬁcation processes rely upon the calculation of the packet delivery
ratio and neighbor reliability values assigned to the b neighbors of the i nodes in the network.
The energy required for the packet delivery ratio calculation is represented by epd. Similarly, the
energy required by the neighbor reliability calculation is represented by enr. Additional energy
is required by the creation (emc) and distribution (emd) of the identiﬁcation messages m. The
total additional network energy consumption e required by the detection and identiﬁcation
processes can therefore be described by the equation
e = m(emc + emd) + ib(epd + enr). (3.12)
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3.6.3 Messages
Messages related to the identiﬁcation process are generated and transmitted in the network
only when a sinkhole is detected. As mentioned before, there are no additional network messages
required for the detection process. The message overhead is dependent upon how far, or the
number of hops h, the detecting node is from the sinkhole. Therefore, mLow refers to the number
of messages required for the assignments of LLow along the path to the sinkhole. Also partially
dependent upon the number of hops to the sinkhole are the number of neighbor list messages
(mnl) which are sent by nodes that have both the assigning node and LLow in common. Whether
the sinkhole participates in the process by assigning a LLow greatly aﬀects the number of
messages generated. We therefore apply binomials j and k to reﬂect participation where j = 1 for
no participation, and k = 1 if there is participation. The additional messages generated near the
sinkhole when the sinkhole fails to participate is mf , with mp reﬂecting the number of messages
generated during the splash back beyond the sinkhole due to its participation. Finally, we
include the messages generated by the average number of voters, mv . The number of messages
required by the identiﬁcation method can be approximated by the following equation:
m = mLow +mnl + kmp + jmf +mv. (3.13)
This equation can be simpliﬁed by including the parameters for the number of hops and the
average number of neighbors common to Ln−1 and Ln in each hop to:
m = h+ 2h+ 5k + 3j + 3 (3.14)
or
m = 3h+ 8k + 6j. (3.15)
Figure 3.5 provides a graph depicting the actual messages sent by nodes on each ring compared
to the estimated number of messages for the ring. A protocol for sharing the burden of starting
the sinkhole identiﬁcation process would need to be developed in a real network, and is not in
the scope of this paper. With the proper protocol, only one node would start the identiﬁcation
process, limiting the number of messages as overhead.
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Figure 3.5 Number of Messages Per Ring
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a hypothesis that, by adapting a methodology borrowed from
the science of meteorology, we can utilize the data available at both the node and cooperative
network levels to create a synoptic picture of the network health, providing indications of any
intrusions or other network issues. Our major contribution is to provide a revolutionary way
to analyze node and network data for patterns, dependence, and eﬀects that indicate network
issues at a distance. This method did not rely upon the conventional methods of stored patterns
for comparison, but only proper analysis of a subset of the real time parameters of the network.
Simulations using the network described in Table 3.1 showed that the original scheme found
false sinkholes in networks with eight or fewer sinkhole nodes. However, the addition of a
second threshold resulted in the elimination of the false positives, with the trade oﬀ of increased
false negatives in networks of six or more sinkholes. This tradeoﬀ is justiﬁed because we can
realistically expect a network to have fewer than six (sinkhole) attackers. Therefore, using the
two thresholds provides proper intrusion detection for this type of attack.
Our results showed the number of nodes in a thirty node network that would start the
identiﬁcation process and identify the sinkhole(s) based upon the threshold criteria. For the
sinkhole identiﬁcation process to be implemented in a real network, a protocol for sharing the
responsibility of identifying the sinkhole would need to be developed. The objective of the
protocol would be to allow identiﬁcation of the sinkhole while limiting the number of nodes
starting the identiﬁcation process, and the number of messages ﬂooding the network. Possible
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strategies are a round robin system based upon time, or assignment of responsibility to cluster
heads.
The synoptic analysis technique presented in this paper is founded upon comparing the
counts of events in or eﬀects on the wireless network. Other attacks that are based upon caus-
ing or aﬀecting countable events that trigger changes in network characteristics are candidates
for synoptic analysis. Attacks at the physical, network, and data link layers such as jamming,
HELLO ﬂood, and wormhole assaults are likely contenders. Challenges to the use of the tech-
nique described include the development of protocols to identify the initiating node(s) and the
development of a proper network reaction. An additional challenge is a method to provide the
network nodes with more distributed network data without increasing the controlling network
traﬃc.
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CHAPTER 4. A METHOD FOR SYNOPTIC LEVEL NETWORK
INTRUSION DETECTION IN A WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORK
A paper submitted to Ad Hoc Networks
Deanna T. Hlavacek123 and J. Morris Chang4
4.1 Abstract
Current system administrators are missing intrusion alerts hidden by large numbers of false
positives. Rather than accumulation more data to identify true alerts, we propose an intrusion
detection tool that eﬀectively uses select data to provide a picture of network health. Our
hypothesis is that by utilizing the data available at both the node and cooperative network levels
we can create a synoptic picture of the network providing indications of many intrusions or other
network issues. Our major contribution is to provide a revolutionary way to analyze node and
network data for patterns, dependence, and eﬀects that indicate network issues. We collect
node and network data, combine and manipulate it, and tease out information about the state
of the network. We present a method based on utilizing the number of packets sent, number of
packets received, node reliability, route reliability, and entropy to develop a synoptic picture of
the network health in the presence of a sinkhole and a HELLO Flood attacker. This method
conserves network throughput and node energy by requiring no additional control messages to
be sent between the nodes unless an attacker is suspected. We intend to show that, although the
concept of an intrusion detection system is not revolutionary, the method in which we analyze
the data for clues about network intrusion and performance is highly innovative.
1Graduate Student, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
2Primary Researcher and Author.
3Author for correspondence.
4Associate Professor Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
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4.2 Introduction
Wireless ad hoc networks are self-organizing and self-conﬁguring infrastructure-less networks
of nodes which are connected by wireless links. Ad hoc networks are becoming more popular with
802.11/WiFi capable products for communication, entertainment, work, and study. Wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) are being deployed in the home and oﬃce for security and energy
conservation. WSNs are also deployed in many places in the environment, acting as watchdogs
in forests to watch for ﬁres, on mountaintops to alert on avalanches, and on bridges to report ice
development. Additionally, the new cognitive radio is being developed with ad hoc capability.
The cognitive radio provides enhanced environmental awareness and cooperative capabilities,
and is capable of identifying and utilizing unused frequencies dynamically. This allows more
concurrent wireless communications in a given spectrum band at one location. The cognitive
radio is expected to be oﬀered to the public, but its most anticipated deployments are to
emergency responders and military forces to allow communication in infrastructure-less areas.
With the growth in popularity of these technologies, there is a growing demand for intrusion
detection systems that can operate with network node cooperation. An intrusion detection
system (IDS) is a software application that monitors the network for, and reports on, malicious
activities or policy violations. Current research on intrusion detection systems for wireless ad
hoc systems focuses mainly on anomaly detection. Generally, the anomalies garnering the most
attention are anomalies in routing protocol, traﬃc patterns, and packet meta-data. However,
anomaly and large data based intrusion detection systems are susceptible to high false positive
rates. With limited time and resources, many true positives are lost in the overload of the
combined true and false alerts, and other data.
An example of this is the Target point-of-sale breach in 2013. Although an alert was sounded
by the intrusion detection system FireEye, system administrators missed the warning. Over 40
million credit card numbers were sent to Russia before administrators investigated the alarm and
took action to close the breach [107]. Similar breaches occurred at Home Depot and a variety
of restaurants and other retail centers. Since the false positive rate for anomaly detection
tends to be high, research has now moved more towards hybrid solutions, combining anomaly
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detection with misuse detection or speciﬁcation deviation. All of these methods require some
prior training of the network nodes or pre-positioning of data for comparison.
Perhaps the solution is not more data. Rather, the solution may lie in the ability of a system
to eﬀectively use select data. Igor Baikalov, chief scientist at Securonix, was quoted in an article
by the New York Times [107]: We don't need 'big data'. We need big information. By carefully
removing the noise created by large amounts of data, we allow our security professionals to focus
on information with value, quickly identify attacks, and make timely decisions.
Our motivation for research related to intrusion detection arises from the current lack of
comprehensive research into methods of analysis of selective information in an eﬀort to construct
a big picture of network security and integrity, termed as network health. Research into the
parameters of the nodes and networks, the interplay of parameters and their eﬀect upon each
other, and how the concurrence of certain parameter levels portend negative or positive network
health can bring valuable insight into the diagnosis of network ills.
Our hypothesis is that, by adapting a methodology borrowed from the science of meteorol-
ogy, we can utilize the data available at both the node and cooperative network levels and create
a synoptic picture of network health, providing indications of any intrusions or other network
issues. Parameters such as packet delivery ratio, packet sequence number, route-add ratio, and
many others have previously been used to alert on and/or identify intruders. However, this data
also provides valuable information about the state of the network as a whole. By analyzing the
packet, route, and node data at a network level we expect to develop a synoptic picture of the
network and identify indicators comprised of diﬀerent types and levels of data. The visual rep-
resentation of the synoptic network picture is expected to be much like synoptic weather charts
depicting the temperature, pressure, and relative humidity centers that, once properly analyzed,
are indicative of changing weather. And, just as a meteorologist collects, combines, analyzes,
and interprets temperature, pressure, humidity, wind direction, and wind speed to determine
the weather conditions in an area, we can collect, combine, analyze, and interpret the number of
sent packets, received packets, control messages, broken links, re-transmitted packets, and node
energy consumption (for example) to paint a picture of the wireless network and determine the
network health. In this sense, just as thermometers, barometers, and anemometers can monitor
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the environment for approaching storms, we have network tools that monitor parameters that
can be used to identify malfunctioning areas of the wireless network. Since the synoptic analysis
technique presented is founded upon comparing the counts of events in or eﬀects on the wireless
network it is anticipated that other attacks that are based upon causing or aﬀecting countable
events that trigger changes in network characteristics are candidates for synoptic analysis. Ex-
amples are attacks at the physical, network, and data link layers such as a sinkhole, jamming,
HELLO ﬂood, and wormhole assaults.
Our major contribution is to provide a revolutionary way to analyze node and network
data for patterns, dependence, and eﬀects that indicate network issues. Our ﬁrst contribution
in this vein was presented in [41]. It described a method based on utilizing packet delivery
ratio (PDR), node reliability, route reliability, and entropy to develop a synoptic picture of
the network health in the presence of a sinkhole. Future study will determine if the method,
possibly enhanced, will work in a mobile network. This work revisits sinkhole detection and
identiﬁcation in a grid network as a demonstration. The work is expanded to include a sinkhole
in a thirty node scrambled network. We also include the detection and identiﬁcation of a
HELLO Flood attacker using the same methodology. We intend to show that, although the
concept of intrusion detection is not revolutionary, the method in which we analyze the data for
clues about network intrusion and performance is innovative, and can be a valuable addition to
the intrusion detection toolbox.
In this paper we will take a look at current research related to intrusion detection systems
designed for wireless ad hoc networks, sinkhole detection, and HELLO Flood attacker detection.
Next we provide a description of our methodology in network analysis for detection and identiﬁ-
cation of a single sinkhole and multiple sinkholes in a grid network, and our results based on the
simulation data as presented in [41]. Additionally we provide analysis of the technique based
on a single sinkhole in a scrambled network and on a HELLO Flood attacker in a scrambled
network. Last we will conclude with a synopsis of the process and the impact of our experimen-
tal results. The sections of the paper are organized as follows: Section 4.3.2 describes current
research into intrusion detection systems, sinkhole detection, and HELLO Flood detection in
wireless ad hoc networks; Section 4.4 presents the methodology of identifying an attacker based
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on the PDR, node reliability, and system entropy; Section 4.5 presents our results with simula-
tion of a sinkhole and HELLO Flood attacker in wireless ad hoc networks, and data analysis;
Section 4.6 provides comparison of the simulation results to other sinkhole and HELLO Flood
attacker identiﬁcation methods; and Section 4.7 is the conclusion.
4.3 Related Work in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Wireless ad hoc networks have no router or access point providing infrastructure to the
network. Each node provides routing services, via routing protocols, by forwarding packets to
their neighbors. All nodes in an ad hoc network have equal status in the network, and can
associate with any network device within range. There are three main routing protocols for ad
hoc networks: Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), and
Ad Hoc On Demand Routing (AODV). OLSR is a proactive, or table-driven, protocol. DSR
and AODV are both on-demand, reactive protocols in which the nodes maintain routing tables.
AODV's routing tables are refreshed according to a timer. We have chosen to use the AODV
routing scheme for our ﬁrst demonstration.
4.3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Conventional intrusion detection systems (IDS) are based on misuse detection, anomaly
detection, or deviation from speciﬁcations. Misbehavior/misuse detection refers to identifying
an attack by comparing collected information against a predeﬁned list of signatures of known
attacks. Anomaly detection is a close opposite to misuse detection. With anomaly detection,
rather than storing a list of the signatures of known attacks, the system stores patterns of
normal behavior for comparison to the current behavior. The third technique, speciﬁcation
comparison, also compares the current behavior to a stored behavior proﬁle. However, the
comparison is against manually deﬁned speciﬁcations, rather than machine learning and training
techniques.
Recently, most of the intrusion detection system research for wireless ad hoc systems has
focused upon the detection of anomalous behavior patterns. In the paper [110] a new detection
scheme called AODVSTAT is presented. The method is similar to other watchdog schemes
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in that the nodes watch the packet events and the meta-data in the packets for anomalies
in the protocol. Deviations from the protocol are considered state changes, and trigger an
alarming event. In an eﬀort to lower false positive rates using packet features as the basis for
anomaly detection, the authors of [58] conduct careful feature selection from the available set
of packet features for their method. Similarly, [53] uses the entropy of packet features to detect
deviations, and provides a ranking of alerts in an attempt to lower the false positive rate. The
authors of [108] base their system solely upon the packet sequence number mismatch with the
expected packet sequence number. A conﬁdence level for each node is calculated based on the
number of interactions with its neighbors. Rather than packet features, the authors of [135]
base their detection on anomalies in traﬃc patterns, comparing the current traﬃc pattern to
a learned traﬃc pattern. All of these techniques either requires knowledge stored in memory
of the normal pattern of behavior, or some type of training before deployment. Attacks that
do not register against the learned normal proﬁle can not be detected by these systems. These
methods are also prone to false positives, since hiccups in the network can cause the systems
to react with identiﬁcation of pattern anomaly.
The authors of the papers [3, 34] both present hybrid detection schemes. The paper [3]
combines anomaly and misuse detection schemes in order to lower the false positive rate gener-
ally seen with anomaly detection, and raise the low detection rate ascribed to misuse detection.
The authors of [34] chose to combine the anomaly and speciﬁcation based schemes, and uses a
reputation based system in an attempt to lower the false positive rate. However, this method
adds much packet overhead as the nodes in the neighborhoods vote.
In comparison to these methods of intrusion detection, our intrusion detection method is
based not on stored patterns, signatures, or rules, but the eﬀect upon the node, route, and
network function. Our system requires no training or pre-placed data concerning the expected
network protocol or traﬃc pattern. Therefore, new or craftily tweaked older intrusion methods,
such as a stealthy sinkhole that follows network protocols while selectively dropping packets,
will still be identiﬁed, as long as the eﬀect of the disruption surpasses the established threshold.
We have no watchdogs observing the network, and so we are not plagued by the high false
positive rates endemic to these methods. Similarly, we are not doing signature comparison, so
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we are not plagued by the inability (and associated low accuracy rate) to recognize new attack
signatures. Our system instead is monitoring the state of the network, and reacts when the
state of the whole, or portions of, the network move out of alignment. As in holistic medicine,
we do not only pay attention to the symptom; we analyze the symptoms to explore the network
function and ﬁnd the root cause of the malfunction.
4.3.2 Sinkhole Detection
We consider sinkholes as Byzantines in the network. Byzantine behavior is displayed by
any action of a member node that negatively aﬀects the routing service in the network. Many
such attacks, such as eavesdropping or packet modiﬁcation, can be prevented by traditional
authentication, integrity, and encryption mechanisms. The malicious actions of a Byzantine
sinkhole may be more complex, such as modifying the hop count, sequence number, or list of
nodes in a path, in order to make itself more attractive as an entry to an ideal route. According
to the paper [6], attacks using these tactics can also be prevented with more sophisticated
authentication and integrity techniques. We therefore consider the stealthy sinkhole that drops
data packets, entirely or selectively, while participating in the routing protocol.
The authors of [6] present a method of identifying a sinkhole with link weights and probes.
However, this method is part of a newly proposed routing protocol that includes double ﬂooding
during route discovery and the sending of probes to all network nodes for attack discovery. These
steps create additional network overhead. Additionally, in this routing protocol, the sinkhole
will only be discovered if it is acting maliciously during the probing phase. Finally, this work
provides no insight as to how to identify a sinkhole in the accepted ad hoc routing protocols
Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), or
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR).
In the paper [57] the authors present a packet drop attack detection method in which the
neighbors adjacent to a communications route monitor the actions of the en route nodes. If a
particular node does not forward a speciﬁc number of packets in a certain time period, an alert
proclaiming a malicious node is started. The authors make a distinction between greyholes,
which drop only a portion of the packets, and blackholes, which drop all received packets.
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Analysis by the authors indicates that only blackholes, and gray holes in the same vicinity, can
be identiﬁed. If no blackhole exists, the greyholes will not be identiﬁed. Similar to this method
is the watchdog method presented by the authors of [39]. Again, collaborative nodes observe
the actions of the nodes en route and use a protocol to determine when an alarm should be
sounded. Unfortunately the reliability and eﬀectiveness of this method is diﬃcult to determine
since the authors have not yet determined the false positive/false negative rates for the protocol.
Several papers rely upon the sinkhole bucking the routing protocol by changing the sequence
numbers. The sinkhole identiﬁcation schemes described in the papers [22, 33, 46] are therefore
not eﬀective in identifying a stealthy sinkhole that does not change the packet sequence number.
The authors of [22] additionally use the previous image ratio to identify the sinkhole. In the
previous image ratio method the received routing packets are compared to other stored routing
packet images. However, this method relies upon the sinkhole having forged the route records
in their route request packets. Therefore, if a stealthy sinkhole has not forged the route records,
the sinkhole will not be identiﬁed by this method.
A third indicator of a sinkhole identiﬁed and used by the authors of [22, 46] is the route add
ratio. The route add ratio is the number of routes that traverse a particular node divided by
the total number of routes added to the node's routing table. Unfortunately, [46] only mentions
the idea of the route add ratio, but does not explain how the ratio is used. In [22] a network
node is speciﬁed to keep a counter for each node in the network, and increment the counter
when a route passing through the node is added to the cache. This presents the issue of one
node storing data for all of the nodes, and additional messages created and sent to the assigned
node when any network node adds a route to its cache. The data related to this study did not
provide a method to determine the message overhead related to this technique.
In comparison to these studies, our method does not rely solely upon the sinkhole cheating
on the routing protocol. Therefore, a stealthy node will still be identiﬁed by its eﬀect on the
network, rather than missed due to it not sending signals through the routing protocol. Also,
even though there are additional messages included with our sinkhole identiﬁcation scheme, no
additional messages are required before the possibility of a sinkhole is discovered. The overhead
of messages m related to sinkhole identiﬁcation is related to the number of hops from the
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detecting node to the sinkhole and is very small. We analyze the number of messages required
in Section 4.6.3.
4.3.3 HELLO Flood Attacker Detection
The HELLO ﬂood attack was ﬁrst described by the authors of [51] as an attack against wire-
less sensor networks. However, due to similarities in the routing protocols of ad hoc networks,
the attack can also be applied to the cognitive radio network [40]. The attack relies upon an
attacking node ﬂooding the network, or at least a portion of the network, with HELLO packets
broadcast at a higher transmission power. Since the network nodes receiving the HELLO pack-
ets assume that the sender is within normal radio range, they will attempt to use the attacking
node as a route to other nodes. This can result in a network in a state of confusion.
One counter measure against the HELLO ﬂood attack suggested by the authors of [51] is to
conﬁrm the bidirectionality of a link using an identiﬁcation veriﬁcation protocol. The protocol
employs an encrypted echoback mechanism before using the link. It is acknowledged that this
defense is less eﬀective when an attacker has a highly sensitive receiver along with the powerful
transmitter.
The authors of [94] suggest the the network use a received signal strength (RSS) value as a
threshold. Received HELLO packets are compared to the threshold. If the RSS of a packet is
greater than the threshold, the node is determined to be a stranger. If a packet is received such
that the RSS meets the threshold, the sending node is determined to be a friend. Network
nodes additionally test friend nodes by sending a test packet. If the acknowledgment to the
packet is not received from the friend in the allotted time, it is determined the friend is
actually a stranger.
In the paper [13] the authors suggest a solution using a base station. If the station determines
there may be a denial of service (DoS) attack taking place, the station challenges clients with
cryptographic puzzles. The diﬃculty of the puzzles distributed to a node is based upon a node's
trust value.
A base station is also used as a Trusted Third Party in a countermeasure suggested in [51].
With this method, the base station facilitates the establishment of session keys between parties
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of the network. The keys are then used by the nodes to verify each other's identities. The
number of shared keys must be limited so the attacker cannot establish a connection with every
node.
In comparison to these studies, our method does not rely upon the use of a base station
in the network. Additionally, the method proposed by the authors will not have the overhead
of exchanging or storing cryptographic keys. Our method also will not depend upon the prior
training of the network concerning the received signal strength threshold, nor will there be
additional message overhead due to the sending of test packets. As will be shown, our method
will only incur message overhead during the identiﬁcation process after the HELLO ﬂood attack
is detected.
4.4 Methodology
The methodology of the attacker identiﬁcation scheme consists of two parts. First, the
detection phase, in which one or more nodes are alerted that there is a possible attacker in the
network. Individual nodes calculate their neighbors' reliability values, and are alerted when
a reliability crosses a threshold. The second phase is the attacker identiﬁcation phase and
involves querying speciﬁc network nodes for data they have about their neighbors. We make
the assumption that each node is aware of its immediate neighbors. However, the nodes may
not immediately be aware of the position of its neighbors relative to itself or each other.
4.4.1 Detection Process
In the neighbor reliability method of determining the health of the network, each node
counts the number of packets sent and received along each route. The nodes calculate the
packet delivery ratio for the stored routes by relating the number of packets received along the
route to the number of packets sent along the route. This PDR is also referred to as the route
reliability, and represents the cumulative reliability for each node along a route. From this data,
the nodes each determine their neighbor reliability by calculating the entropy for all known
routes through the neighbor node. Neighbor reliability refers to a single node's perception of
the probability of a packet following any route through a single neighbor to successfully reach
92
Algorithm 3 Calculations of Neighbor Reliability
//Done for each neighbor node (Y) around the starting node A
//routeRel: route reliability
//neighRel: neighbor reliability
1 : for each neighNode(Y)
//Calculate route reliability for routes X through neighNode Y
2 : for each route(X) (Z nodes along route)
3 : for each node(Z) on route X
4 : routeRel(X) = routeRel(X) * pdr(Z);
5 : saveRouteRel(XZ) = routeRel(X);
6 : get next node pdr(Z) on route(X);
7 : get next route(X);
//Calculate neighbor reliability using all routeRel(X)
8 : for each routeRel(X)
9 : neighRel(Y) = neighRel(Y) +
(routeRel(X) * [log2(1/routeRel(X))]);
10: saveNeighRel(X) = neighRel(Y);
11: get next routeRel(X);
12: get next neighNode(Y);
the intended destination. The Shannon entropy equation, used to estimate the diversity of the
system, is applied. The formula follows, where p(x) is the route reliability:
H(x) = −
∑
p(x)log2p(x) =
∑
p(x)log2(1/p(x)) (4.1)
Algorithm 3 describes the process to obtain the neighbor reliability values. Note that in
simulation we use the probability that a packet will reach its destination when routed through
an individual node for the PDR of node Z. This was substituted for the true PDR of a route
that would be known in a live network.
Using this method, assuming a stationary MANET grid of nodes with one node per grid
space, each node in the grid will have up to eight diﬀerent neighbor reliability values, each value
from the perspective of one of its (up to eight) neighbors. Additionally, each node will have
up to eight neighbors for which it has determined neighbor reliability values, comprising the
neighbor reliability set. Using its neighbor reliability set, each node calculates the standard
deviation of the set. A lower boundary is calculated by subtracting the standard deviation from
the mean of the set; the boundary acts as a threshold. The use of the standard deviation was
determined experimentally; one standard deviation provided a proper boundary to determine if
the neighbor reliability was low enough to indicate the possibility of a sinkhole when compared
to the neighbor set. The lower boundary in a live network will need to be determined based
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upon the particular network. This process provides the node the ability to observe the current
state of the network surrounding it, and helps identify anomalies based on the current network
state. If the neighbor reliability of any neighbor crosses the threshold, the node is alerted
that there may be an attacker in the network. Note that until this point, all calculations and
decisions are made upon data collected by the node without additional messages or queries to
the network or neighbors. Therefore, unless an alert is signaled, there is no impact upon the
network throughput for this method.
The example in Figure 4.1 shows several nodes with reliability values applied to each node
by its neighbors. The values in the ﬁgure are charted according to compass coordinates from
the perspective of an individual node. For example, Node W applies the values of 5.443 to node
AA, 5.324 to node BB, 5.436 to node CC, 5.276 to node X, 5.443 to node V, 5.393 to node R,
5.441 to node Q, and 5.329 to node S. These values comprise node W's neighbor reliability set.
Conversely, node W is applied the values of 0.1322 as perceived by node AA, 0.1315 by node
BB, 0.1331 by node C, 0.1333 by node X, et cetera.
Figure 4.1 Neighbor Reliability Plot (values * 10e-6)
4.4.2 A Proof
We consider a simple grid network of nodes with a sinkhole placed in the center of the network
(Figure 4.2). The sinkhole drops a large number of all received packets; let the percentage of
successful packet delivery for the sinkhole be b. The network uses AODV routing, utilizing the
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shortest route. We make the following assumptions:
1. Each node is aware of all of its eight neighbors.
2. No route will pass through more than one of the source node's neighbors, and no more
than two neighbors of any node along the route.
3. All routes are of three hops.
4. All nodes except the sinkhole drop a very small number of packets. Let the percentage of
successful packet delivery for these nodes be a.
5. Percentage a >> b.
A source node (src1) located next to the sinkhole will have seven neighbors with routes that
do not traverse the sinkhole, and therefore experience a packet delivery percentage of a. The
last neighbor will have all packets routed through the sinkhole, experiencing a packet delivery
percentage of b. The average percentage of packets experienced by this node will therefore be:
PDRsrc1 = (7a+ b)/8. (4.2)
A source node (src2) two hops from the sinkhole will have more routing choices that do not
include the sinkhole. In the described network, ﬁve of the neighbors will have no routes through
the sinkhole. Of the three neighbors left, two will each have four of their nineteen routes
traversing the sinkhole (see Figure 4.2). Let this be represented by PDR31/33.One neighbor
will have three of its thirteen routes passing through the sinkhole (Figure 4.3). Let this be
represented by PDR32. The PDR experienced by src2 is therefore represented by the following:
PDRsrc2 = 5a+ PDR31/33 + PDR32 (4.3)
where
PDR31/33 = [2(15/19)a+ 2(4/19)b]/8 (4.4)
and
PDR32 = [(10/13)a+ (3/13)b]/8 (4.5)
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or
PDRsrc2 = [7.53a+ .65b]/8. (4.6)
Likewise, a source node (src3) three hops from the sinkhole will have more routing choices
that do not include the sinkhole. In this scenario seven of the neighbors do not have any routes
through the sinkhole. One neighbor has three of its thirteen routes traversing the sinkhole. We
get the following equation:
PDRsrc3 = [7a+ (10/13)a+ (3/13)b]/8 (4.7)
or
PDRsrc3 = [7.77a+ .23b]/8. (4.8)
Since a >> b, we remove the terms with b from the equations. We can also remove the
denominator of 8 since it is the same for all equations. By the relationship below, we prove
that PDRsrc1< PDRsrc2 < PDRsrc3.
7a < 7.35a < 7.77a (4.9)
Figure 4.2 Route Example from SRC2 (Node 33)
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Figure 4.3 Route Example from SRC2 (Node 32)
4.4.3 Identiﬁcation Process
The identiﬁcation process works similar to water in a reservoir. When the water reaches a
higher point in the reservoir, it stops moving forward and splashes back. In our identiﬁcation
process, the query messages will move towards the lowest reliability point and stop at the higher
value nodes on the other side of the lowest point. Once the higher nodes are reached, the splash
will be a broadcast message ﬂooded through the network reporting the identity of the attacker.
We use a sinkhole as the attacker for the following identiﬁcation step description.
In the identiﬁcation process, we assume that each node is aware of its immediate neighbors,
although not necessarily their relative positions. We call this set of neighbors ring one as
related to the alerted node. When a node determines that a threshold has been crossed, it
broadcasts a query to its immediate neighbors (ring one) for their neighbor lists. The query in-
cludes the alerted node's assignment of L1, which is the node with the lowest neighbor reliability
from the perspective of the alerted node. Only the neighbors with neighbor lists that include
L1 broadcast a reply to the query. Node L1 was able to receive the information sent by its own
immediate neighbors in response to the query made by the alerted node. Node L1 assigns L2
to its neighbor with the lowest reliability value (L2 will most likely, but not necessarily, be in
ring two), and sends this assignment along with a broadcast query for neighbor lists. Only the
neighbors with L2 in their neighbor lists that have not already broadcast their neighbor lists
during this identiﬁcation process round reply to the query. (Algorithm 4)
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Algorithm 4 Identiﬁcation of Sinkhole
1 : initialize row, col, x to 0; AlertedNode is L0 at [0,0]
3 : Lx identiﬁes Lx+1 as neighbor with the lowest neighbor value
4 : Lx broadcasts query for neighbor lists along with Lx+1 identiﬁcation
5 : x=x+1
// if Lx participates in the discovery process it will automatically query neighbors
6 : while attacker not found
7 : Lx identiﬁes Lx+1 as neighbor with the lowest neighbor value
8 : if Lx+1 == Lx-1 OR Lx+1 == Lx-2 AND if other shared neighbors that have not yet been polled
exist
9 : immediate neighbors (not Lx-2, Lx+1, or Lx-1) vote to determine which of the compared nodes
has the lowest value
10: node that is not determined lowest value alerts network of identity of attacker
11: else if y > 2 AND Lx+1 == Lx-y
12: Lx-1 removes Lx neighbor value from neighbor list
13: x = x-1 //this is a loop with no positive attacker determination
14: else if Lx queries neighbors for THEIR neighbor list
15: Lx+1 receives neighbor lists from immediate neighbors and determines relative placement of
immediate neighbors
16: else if Lx-1 does not hear Lx query neighbors in time T
17: Lx-1 queries immediate neighbors shared with Lx (Lshared_1 and Lshared_2) for their neighbor
lists and neighbor values
18: Lx-1 determines relative locations of neighbors shared between Lshared_1 and Lshared_2
19: if neighbors shared include only Lx and Lx-1
20: Lshared_1 and Lshared_2 send queries for neighbor lists and reliabilities
21: neighbors with lists that include Lx respond to query
22: Lshared_1 and Lshared_2 provide query information to Lx-1
23: Lx-1 uses neighbor locations and neighbor values to determine if Lx has lowest local neighbor
value
24: if Lx has lowest neighbor value as reported by surrounding immediate neighbors
25: Lx-1 alerts network Lx is a attacker
26: else
27: Lx-1 removes Lx neighbor value from neighbor list
28: x = x-1
29: x=x+1
30: end while
This process continues until we have reached the area around the sinkhole, ring n. The
nodes queried in ring n will include the sinkhole and some of its immediate neighbors. At
this point the sinkhole may or may not participate in the process. If it does participate, the
sinkhole will continue the process by identifying Ln-1. Ln-1 will then identify the sinkhole as
its neighbor with the lowest reliability value. The sinkhole may not acknowledge, nor realize,
it is the sinkhole. Therefore, the sinkhole (call the sinkhole S ) assigns LLOW (call this node
X ) to one of its neighbors. Node X compares its neighbor reliability values and re-identiﬁes
the sinkhole (S) as its neighbor with the lowest neighbor reliability. To attain conﬁrmation, X
broadcasts a query to its neighbors for a vote as to which of the two nodes they identify as the
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node with the lowest value. Only nodes with both nodes S and X as neighbors reply. The node
requesting the vote will ﬂood the network with the identiﬁcation message naming the sinkhole.
If the sinkhole does not participate, the node (Ln-1) that sent the message to the sinkhole and
its neighbors will note that there have been no messages from Ln in time T. At this point, Ln-1
will resend a message to the sinkhole and neighbors common to the requesting node and the
non-responding (possible) sinkhole, requesting the reliability values for all of their neighbors. If
the neighbor lists received do not include at least three neighbors in common, additional queries
will be sent by the neighbors of Ln to their neighbors. The additional information received will
be provided to Ln-1. Analyzed together, this information will conﬁrm that the node with the
lowest reliability in ring n is indeed the sinkhole, and Ln-1 will broadcast the message identifying
the sinkhole to the network.
The action taken by the network upon identiﬁcation of the attacking node is dependent upon
the system protocol, and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are basically two
types of actions: isolation of the node, or incentivation for proper network behavior. Isolation
means the suspect node may be ignored by the network when it advertises access to routes to
any destination, and so ostracized from the network. Incentivation means allowing the suspect
node to send its own data only at the rate that it is providing to the network, and this allowed
rate increases as the misbehaving node decreases the number of dropped packets and increases
its packet delivery ratio. It must be recalled that although we have referred to the suspect node
with low reliability an attacker, it may be a selﬁsh node, or just a malfunctioning node. This
method of identifying the unreliable node does not determine intent.
4.5 Simulation
We simulate the detection and identiﬁcation in several networks. We start with a grid
of thirty nodes with one sinkhole. We then simulate and provide analysis for up to eighteen
sinkholes in the grid network. We also analyze a network of thirty nodes in a scrambled network
with one sinkhole. Finally, we simulate a HELLO Flood attack in a scrambled network of twenty
nodes. It is shown that the methodology described works for several attackers in one network,
for scrambled and grid networks, and for both sinkhole and HELLO ﬂood attackers.
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Table 4.1 Network Parameters
Node Parameters Value
Number of Nodes 30
Node Placement 6 by 5 grid
Simulation Duration 1500 seconds
Routing Protocol AODV
Type of Stations MANET
Node Speed 0 kts
Transmit Power .0001 w
Packet Reception Power Threshold -95 dBm
Buﬀer Size (Member Nodes) 256000
Buﬀer Size (sinkhole) 415
Route Length 5 nodes, 4 hops
4.5.1 Sinkhole Attack
To obtain simulated network data we chose OPNET Modeler 17.5, a commercially available
tool set used by the communications industry for modeling, simulation, and analysis of commu-
nications networks and applications. The initial network topology is a six by ﬁve grid mobile
ad-hoc network (MANET). The size of our network was chosen based on a study of the eﬀects
of insider attacks by the authors of [28]. According to the study, thirty nodes is the ideal size
of network for a sinkhole to operate eﬀectively.
For the initial study the nodes are all stationary and the parameters for the member nodes
are uniform. Traﬃc supplied by the OPNET MANET model is used. Each node is a traﬃc
generator. No specialized traﬃc is added, and no additional noise is added to the network.
Ad hoc on demand (AODV) routing is chosen as the routing protocol. Route length for the
identiﬁcation method is limited to ﬁve nodes, with four hops. This limitation was imposed to
provide a simple initial standard for comparing route reliability results. The routes used for the
calculations are not all inclusive. Therefore, not all neighbors may play a part in determining
the calculated neighbor reliability value. Parameters for the member nodes are shown in Table
4.12.
The buﬀer size for the member nodes was left at the OPNET MANET default of 256000
packets. The buﬀer size for the attacker was lowered to 415 packets to simulate a sinkhole.
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This buﬀer size was chosen because it allowed packets to be dropped without stopping all
traﬃc routing through the attacking node. The number of dropped packets at this setting
impacted signiﬁcantly the amount of data traﬃc sent by the attacking node. Normal nodes
sent an average of 903.5 packets over the 1500 second simulation period, as opposed to the 17.3
packets sent by the sinkhole. Note that the 1500 second simulation period and the 15 second
intervals were arbitrary. Since the sinkhole eﬀect is recorded almost immediately and the eﬀect
is nearly constant over the entire period using the simulation parameters described, the interval
parameters for recording the data can be optimized. Subsequent tests showed that the sinkhole
could be detected in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen seconds of the commencement of network traﬃc. Data
collected per node included:
1. At each node, the number of packets received per second in ﬁfteen second intervals.
2. At each node, the number of packets sent per second in ﬁfteen second intervals.
Table 4.2 Node G's Neighbor Reliability
Start
Node
G
Reliability
Neighbor
List
GA GB GC GH GL GM
Reliability
Value List
3.0541E-06 2.9556E-06 3.0578E-06 2.2118E-06 2.6235e-06 2.2152E-06
Reliability
Cumula-
tive (all
nodes)
0.00025877
Reliability
Average
(all
nodes)
4.3128E-05
Entropy
Per
Neighbor
List
5.5955E-05 5.4287E-05 5.6014E-05 4.0733E-05 4.8238e-05 4.0790E-05
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4.5.1.1 Discovery and Identiﬁcation Processes Using Simulation Results
In this context, the packet sent ratio (PSR) is the ratio of the number of data packets sent
to the number of data packets received at a particular node. To ﬁnd the neighbor reliability in
our simulation, we ﬁrst calculate the route reliability by multiplying the PSRs for each node
along a route, starting at the ﬁrst hop (as opposed to the sending node). Next we calculate the
entropy of all known routes through the neighbor node. Plotting the neighbor reliability values
on a plot of the network shows that the lower values tend to be centered around the sinkhole.
For an example, we assume node G is the ﬁrst node to identify a possible attacker. From
the reliability calculations (Table 4.2), node G identiﬁes neighbors H and M as having entropy
values below the threshold value for node G. Node G currently has a view of the network that
includes its immediate neighbors, although node G may not know the relative locations of the
neighbor nodes at this time. Node G identiﬁes node H as the neighbor with the lowest reliability
value. Node G broadcasts this assignment and queries its neighbors for their neighbor lists.
Only G's neighbors that share H as a neighbor broadcast their neighbor list; therefore, nodes
L, M, C, and B broadcast their lists. Upon receipt of the data, node H places the nodes on the
grid relative to itself (4.4). Node H reports it's neighbor with the lowest neighbor reliability
value to node M, and queries its own neighbors for their neighbor lists. Again, only the neighbors
that share node M as a neighbor broadcast their neighbor lists. From this information, node M
is able to place itself and its immediate neighbors on the grid. Node R is assigned as having the
lowest neighbor reliability value by node M. Neighbors that share node R as a neighbor make
their neighbor list reports. Node R identiﬁes node W as the neighbor with the lowest reliability
value, continues the process, and node W identiﬁes node X. Node X then identiﬁes node W
as the neighbor with the lowest reliability. Since nodes W and X identiﬁed each other, shared
neighbor nodes vote for the neighbor with the lowest value. Since W has participated in the
process, and it has been identiﬁed as the neighbor with the lowest reliability in the local area,
node W (or, if needed, node X) announces to the network W is the sinkhole.
We borrow a technique from weather forecasting to analyze the plot by drawing isopleths
for the reader to indicate the levels of entropy in the network. This provides a human-readable
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Table 4.3 Partial Table of Neighbor Reliability Values
Node H Neighbors L N M
Reliability Values 4.73898E-05 5.32743E-05 3.51034E-05
Node M Neighbors Q R S
Reliability Values 5.56492E-05 1.90244E-05 5.39725E-05
Node R Neighbors V W X
Reliability Values 5.29084E-05 .130932E-05 5.31013E-05
Node W Neighbors X BB CC
Reliability Values 5.27565E-05 5.32431E-05 5.43592E-05
Node X Neighbors W BB DD
Reliability Values .133259E-05 5.23300E-05 5.29058E-05
synoptic view of the network at the current time. As can be noted in Figure 4.4, the sinkhole
has been identiﬁed as the lowest area of reliability in the network. Even though the immedi-
ate neighbors to the sinkhole node are not dropping packets, their proximity to the sinkhole
aﬀects their reliability value because of the number of routes they have stored for use in their
routing table that traverse the sinkhole. Nodes farther away from the sinkhole have their relia-
bility values less aﬀected by the attacker because they tend to have fewer routes traversing the
sinkhole.
Figure 4.4 Synoptic analysis of neighbor reliability
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4.5.1.2 Data Analysis - One Sinkhole
Analysis of the data set and the data related to each node shows that every node except
node E resulted in an alert due to at least one of the neighbor nodes having entropy less than
the one sigma lower boundary threshold. It must be noted that node E did not have any routes
traversing node W (the sinkhole) in its routing table. Every other node had at least one route
traversing node W. Also, starting the identiﬁcation process from every node (except E) found
W to be the attacker (or malfunctioning node).
There are cases in which the identiﬁcation process may not be initiated and the sinkhole not
found. However, as the network matures and nodes store routes with the sinkhole traversed,
the identiﬁcation process will be initiated. The special cases are listed below:
1. If a node exists with no routes stored that traverse the sinkhole, the sinkhole will not be
detected by this particular node.
2. If a node exists with all routes traversing only one neighbor there will be no detection
alert by this node. This is due to the method of calculating the threshold.
3. If a node exists with with all routes traversing only two neighbors the detection process
will not be started. This is due to the method of calculating the threshold.
4.5.1.3 Additional Cases Investigated
In the case analyzed above we showed that one attacker acting as a sinkhole can be identiﬁed
in the stationary grid network of thirty nodes. Since the sinkhole was alerted upon by all but
the sinkhole itself and one additional node, the chance of sinkhole discovery was 93% (based
on the number of nodes that are alerted to a sinkhole in the network by the detection process
divided by the number of nodes in the network - in this case, 28/30 = 93%). This is because
the eﬀect of the sinkhole extends through the network for routes at least ﬁve nodes long. The
following cases investigate whether more than one sinkhole can be identiﬁed in the network of
thirty nodes.
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No Sinkholes in the Network In the case of no sinkholes in the network, we would like
to have no alerts, and to ﬁnd no suspects. However, since no network is homogenous (including
the OPNETMANET network set up as described), it is likely that there will be at least one node
in a neighborhood of nearly homogenous transmitting neighbors that will be falsely identiﬁed
as a sinkhole. Using the algorithm described based solely on one standard deviation as the
threshold, in a network with no intentional sinkholes placed, there were twenty-six nodes that
were alerted to the possibility of a sinkhole. Four false positives were identiﬁed. This result
portends the possible result that after identiﬁed true positives (sinkholes) in a network, the
process may then ﬁnd one or more false positives.
Two Adjacent Sinkholes in the Network In this case, we have included two adjacent
sinkholes operating in the same area of the network (V, W). Experimental results show that
all but one node was alerted to the possibility of a sinkhole in the network, and nine nodes
have two neighbor reliability values that indicate the presence of one or more sinkholes. Since
the sinkholes are adjacent, the identiﬁcation process ﬁrst ﬁnds the sinkhole with the lowest
value. After the identiﬁed sinkhole is removed from the network, as well as all routes in route
lists incorporating the sinkhole, the remaining nodes automatically re-calculate the neighbor
reliability values. The second sinkhole is identiﬁed by the identiﬁcation process since it now has
the lowest neighbor reliability value in the network.
In this instance, node DD again was not alerted to the possibility of a sinkhole. This time
node DD had one neighbor reliability value that was high because it had no routes with sinkholes
included. The other two neighbor reliability values were nearly equal, lower, but fairly close to
the higher value. Therefore, the method of identiﬁcation and alerting based on incorporating
the standard deviation did not indicate an outlier based on our thresholding scheme.
Table 4.4 Node L's Neighbors Below 1 Sigma Threshold
Results Neighbor Neighbor
Entropy Outlier Name LH LK
Entropy Outlier Value 1.592E-05 2.258E-05
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Table 4.5 Neighbor Lists for Nodes K and L
Node K
Neighbors
Number
Routes
with
Sinkholes
vs. Number
Routes
Neighbor
Reliability
Value
Node L
Neighbors
Number
Routes
with
Sinkholes
vs. Number
Routes
Neighbor
Reliability
Value
KF 1/3 3.999E-05 LF 0/2 5.924E-05
KG 2/6 3.882E-05 LG 2/4 2.961E-05
KL 3/9 3.958E-05 LH 3/4 1.592E-05
KP 3/8 3.885E-05 LK 2/3 2.258E-05
KQ 3/9 4.073E-05 LM 1/11 5.435E-05
LP 0/1 5.886E-05
LQ 3/8 3.888E-05
LR 1/8 5.245E-05
Two Randomly Distributed Sinkholes in the Network There are two sinkholes in
the network located near opposite corners of the grid (I, V). Experimental results show that
all but two of the other grid nodes were alerted to the presence of at least one sinkhole in the
network by their neighbor reliability values. After applying the sinkhole identiﬁcation process
as described in this paper, each sinkhole was correctly identiﬁed by the alerted nodes.
Two of the nodes each have two neighbor reliability values that indicate the existence of
one or more sinkholes. The ﬁrst node, S, has two neighbors whose reliability values cross the
threshold; both of the neighbors' reliability scores are aﬀected by their routes through the same
sinkhole. The single sinkhole was correctly identiﬁed.
The second node (L) also has two neighbors with reliability values that indicate the presence
of a sinkhole (Table 4.4). However, each neighbor's values are aﬀected by routes through a
diﬀerent sinkhole. Therefore, if we follow the identiﬁcation process in which we ﬁrst place and
query the neighbor with the lowest reliability value, one sinkhole is identiﬁed by node L. After
the ﬁrst identiﬁed sinkhole and all associated routes are removed from the network route lists,
and the neighbor reliability values are re-calculated, the second sinkhole is identiﬁed by node
L. However, after the associated routes are removed and the process followed a third time there
were two false positives identiﬁed in the network.
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The two nodes that gave null results (did not indicate the presence of a sinkhole) were K
and DD. We would expect nodes that have no routes through the sinkholes to be unable to
alert upon the possibility of a sinkhole. However, both of these nodes have routes traversing
each sinkhole. The neighbor reliability values did not alert these nodes because none of the
values crossed the calculated threshold for the node. Investigation shows that in both cases, the
lists of routes through every immediate neighbor included nearly half of the routes traversing
a sinkhole, and the other half of the routes not traversing a sinkhole. Therefore, the mean of
the route set for each neighbor of a node falls between the values reported for routes with no
sinkhole, and the values for routes with a sinkhole (Section 5.2.1 number 4). (It should also be
noted that node K is at the edge of the network, and node DD is in a corner of the network.
Although this placement does not guarantee failure in identifying a sinkhole, it does lower the
possibility due to the smaller number of neighbor nodes for comparison. However, the success
or failure also depends upon the routes contained in the routing table of the node.)
The result is no values fall outside of the threshold, and the node does not receive an alert.
In essence, by the perspective of these two nodes, routes including sinkholes are as common in
the network as routes with no sinkholes, and therefore will not be identiﬁed as outliers. This
argument foretells the results we will see in future cases with increased numbers of sinkholes.
The Table 4.5 shows the neighbors of nodes K and L with their neighbor reliability values
and the ratio of the number of routes that traverse the neighbor and a sinkhole to the routes
that do not go through a sinkhole. In this case, node K has no neighbors for which the number
of routes through a sinkhole is greater than the number of routes with no sinkhole nodes. L has
two such neighbors - H and K (note that here we are not looking at node K, but as node K as
a neighbor of node L). Nodes H and K both met the conditions we set for alerting node L of a
possible sinkhole in the network. Node K did not receive any such alert.
Multiple Randomly Placed Sinkholes in the Network Multiple randomly placed
sinkhole nodes were placed in the network. Table 4.6 shows the number of sinkholes, alerts,
sinkholes identiﬁed, sinkholes missed, and false sinkholes identiﬁed in the thirty node network.
It is important to note that this table represents the number of node members that would alert
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upon a sinkhole and start the discovery process. However, with a protocol in place to determine
which alerted node would take action, the other nodes would not initiate the identiﬁcation
process. As a consequence, the number of falsely identiﬁed sinkholes appears quite high. This
is because several nodes would alert upon the same false node.
Table 4.6 shows that as the number of sinkholes increased, the number of nodes receiving
alerts decreased. This was expected, because as sinkholes become more numerous, using the
algorithm based on the standard deviation, localized neighborhoods of the network will see the
results of the sinkholes as a norm, rather than an anomaly.
In this network we were able to identify all of the sinkholes in networks with six or less sink-
holes. In the cases of more than six sinkholes, at least one sinkhole was left unidentiﬁed. After
the sinkholes were identiﬁed, the sinkholes and associated routes were removed from the routing
tables and the neighbor reliabilities re-calculated. The identiﬁcation process was repeated until
there were no alerts in the network, or until any alerts were deemed non-productive because of
loops in the process (i.e. node A points to node B as the neighbor with the lowest neighbor
reliability value, who points to node C, to node D, to node E, to node A). In all of the networks
with 8 or fewer actual sinkholes randomly placed in the network at least one false positive was
identiﬁed.
Half the Network Consists of Randomly Placed Sinkholes This case is constructed
to determine if sinkholes can still be identiﬁed when half of the network nodes are acting as
sinkholes. The sinkholes were randomly placed in the network. Because half of the nodes are
sinkholes, and half are not, the network as a whole can be considered homogenous. Therefore,
we expect the diﬃculty on identifying a single sinkhole to be high.
Results of the experiment show that two nodes were alerted to the possibility of a sinkhole.
One of node K's neighbors had all routes traversing at least 2 or more sinkholes. This resulted
in a very low neighbor reliability value, and so node K received an alert. After several iterations
in which a sinkhole was identiﬁed, the sinkhole and its associated routes were removed from
the network and route lists, the neighbor calculations were recalculated, and another node was
alerted, six out of the ﬁfteen sinkholes were identiﬁed.
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In the case of the second node that received an alert, node Z, all of the neighbor reliabilities
were aﬀected by routes through one or more sinkholes. However, two of node Z's immediate
neighbors were sinkholes. The routes of one of these neighbors traversed enough other sinkholes
to result in a neighbor reliability value that crossed the established threshold calculated by the
standard deviation process. After following the process described in 4, node Z was identiﬁed as
a sinkhole. After removing node Z and all routes from the tables traversing node Z, no nodes
received alerts indicating the possibility of a sinkhole in the network.
It must be noted that the analysis has been conducted in a static network; i.e. no additional
routes are being added to the route lists as the sinkholes and their associated routes are removed
from the network. In an active network, nodes attempting to communicate would be replacing
removed routes with new routes not including a sinkhole, thereby rebuilding their route lists.
These results show that the method described in this paper is heavily route and route list
dependent, and performs best in a mature network.
Table 4.6 Experimental Results - One Standard Deviation as Threshold
Sinkholes
In Network
Alerts Sinkholes
Identiﬁed
Sinkholes
Missed
False
Sinkholes
0 26 0 0 4
2 28 2 0 2
4 25 4 0 >1
6 20 6 0 >1
8 10 7 1 >1
10 6 6 4 0
15 2 6 9 0
18 0 0 18 0
4.5.1.4 New Criteria for Threshold
The original threshold criteria allowed too many false sinkholes to be identiﬁed. Such
identiﬁcation could result in friendly nodes being excluded from the network. After reviewing
the data for every case, an additional threshold was added to the algorithm. This threshold
excluded nodes with neighbor reliabilities that were not at least one order of magnitude less
than the average of the local neighbor reliabilities from causing alerts. The results seen in Table
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4.7 show that there were no false positives reported when using the new threshold. For the
networks with four sinkholes or less, all of the sinkholes were properly identiﬁed. For networks
with six, eight, or ten sinkholes, up to two additional sinkholes were unidentiﬁed when compared
to the results in the Table 4.6. Since it is expected that it is highly unlikely there will be more
than one or two misbehaving nodes in a network of thirty nodes, the tradeoﬀ when using the
enhanced threshold criteria is for less disruption in the network due to the removal of innocent
nodes.
4.5.1.5 Generalized results for grid networks with more than one sinkhole
Analysis of the data from the simulation has shown that under other than the special
conditions listed above, the sinkhole will eventually be discovered. The intent of the sinkhole is
not determined; the misbehaving node may be an attacker, a malfunctioning node, or a selﬁsh
node. Only the actions of the node in relation to the network identiﬁes the node as a sinkhole.
It should also be noted that the AODV periodically calls for the clearing of the routing tables.
This provides a selﬁsh or malfunctioning node the opportunity to re-enter the network.
Experiments with two, three, four, ﬁve, and six sinkholes present indicate that using the
same method as described, each of the sinkholes can be individually discovered. However,
several ﬁndings must be noted:
1. The identiﬁcation process will only identify one sinkhole per originating node with process
completion.
2. After removal of all routes traversing an identiﬁed sinkhole from the routing tables, if
the discovery process warrants the commencement of the identiﬁcation process, an additional
sinkhole will likely be discovered. This will continue until no new alerts are received.
3. If two sinkholes are adjacent, the sinkhole with the lowest value will initially be discovered.
Once the network has identiﬁed the sinkhole and all nodes have removed all routes from their
tables that traverse the sinkhole, the discovery and identiﬁcation phases can begin again. At
this time the adjacent sinkhole will be discovered.
4. Nodes in diﬀerent areas of the network alerted to a suspect sinkhole will identify (gen-
erally) the sinkhole that is closest to them. As mentioned in 2, with the removal of the routes
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traversing the identiﬁed sinkhole, additional sinkholes will likely be found if the discovery pro-
cess warrants the commencement of the identiﬁcation process.
Table 4.7 Experimental Results - Additional Threshold Criteria
Sinkholes
In Network
Alerts Sinkholes
Identiﬁed
Sinkholes
Missed
False
Sinkholes
0 0 0 0 0
2 13 2 0 0
4 14 4 0 0
6 12 5 1 0
8 8 5 3 0
10 3 4 6 0
15 1 0 15 0
18 0 0 18 0
4.5.1.6 Scrambled Network
A scrambled (Figure 4.5) network of thirty nodes with one sinkhole was simulated. Node
S was assigned as the sinkhole. Besides the node placement, the network parameters are as
provided by Table 4.12.
Results of the simulation show that twenty-ﬁve of the nodes were alerted to the sinkhole
using the additional threshold criteria described in Section 4.5.1.4. Four nodes other than the
sinkhole did not alert to the sinkhole. The nodes not receiving alerts were C, I, N, and L.
Nodes I, N, and L each have only two neighbors; therefore, special case three as described in
Section 4.5.1.2 applies. Node C has has three neighbors. However, two of its neighbors have
a similar number of routes through the sinkhole, and the third neighbor does not have any
traversing routes that cross the sinkhole. Consequently, an outlier is not observed and node C
is not alerted to the presence of the sinkhole.
4.5.1.7 Eﬀects of Network Size on Sinkhole Detection
The network size of thirty nodes was initially chosen based upon the study presented in [28].
Subsequent tests using the sinkhole detection process described show that in networks smaller
than 30 nodes the sinkhole can be detected using the initial threshold of one standard deviation
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Figure 4.5 Scrambled Network
below the local neighbor reliability average. However, in the smaller networks the sinkhole is
not detected with the additional requirement of a neighbor reliability value at least one order
of magnitude smaller than its local neighbor's average reliability value.
Tests were conducted on a larger network with varying numbers of hops in the routes. A
one-hundred node (ten by ten) grid network was created with the parameters displayed in Table
4.8. The sinkhole was placed in the top left corner of the large network, one node from the left
edge and one node from the top edge of the network (a similar potion as node V in 4.4). Routes
of four hops (ﬁve nodes), ﬁve hops (six nodes), and six hops (seven nodes) were simulated and
the data analyzed for detection and identiﬁcation of the sinkhole. Percent accurately alerted
is the percentage of nodes that are within ﬁve hops of the sinkhole in the respective networks
that actually detect the sinkhole. As expected, the total number of nodes that are within the
route length limit of the sinkhole and can therefore detect the sinkhole does not include the
sinkhole.
Comparison of results for routes of four hops, ﬁve nodes in the original thirty node network
to results observed in the larger network are displayed in Table 4.9. In both networks all of
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Table 4.8 Network Parameters
Node Parameters Value
Number of Nodes 100
Node Placement 10 by 10 grid
Simulation Duration 200 seconds
Routing Protocol AODV
Type of Stations MANET
Node Speed 0 kts
Transmit Power .0001 w
Packet Reception Power Threshold -95 dBm
Buﬀer Size (Member Nodes) 256000
Buﬀer Size (sinkhole) 415
the nodes within four hops of the sinkhole were alerted to its presence. However, in the larger
network there were a high number of false alerts. In order to reduce this number we added an
additional criteria during analysis of the large network. The original additional criteria of one
magnitude smaller (as described in 4.5.1.4) eliminated all of the true and false alerts in the large
network. Instead we applied a new additional criteria. The new threshold is equivalent to one-
half of one order of magnitude of the neighbor reliability subtracted from the whole neighbor
reliability. Nodes not meeting this criteria are excluded from causing alerts. A comparison of
the results of the large network analysis with and without the additional criteria is in Table
4.10.
As can be seen in Table 4.10, addition of the new criteria drops the number of false positives
(incorrectly alerted nodes) from ﬁfty-eight to one node. The trade-oﬀ is that the number
of correctly alerted nodes drops from thirty-ﬁve to twenty-eight nodes. This means that the
network would still be alerted to the presence of the sinkhole and the identiﬁcation process
would be started.
Table 4.11 presents the results of the ﬁve, six, and seven node length routes in the larger,
one-hundred node network. Both the original results and the results when incorporating the
new criteria are displayed. The results from the large network indicate that the original method
presented for identifying one or more sinkholes in a thirty node network needs tweaking for
diﬀerently sized networks. The new criteria we added to eliminate a number of the false positives
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Table 4.9 Comparison of Sinkhole Discovery in Small and Large Networks (Four Hop Routes)
Small Network Large Network
Correctly
Alerted
(True
Positive)
28 nodes 35 nodes
Correctly
Did Not
Alert (True
Negative)
2 nodes 7 nodes
Incorrectly
Alerted
(False
Positive)
0 nodes 58 nodes
Incorrectly
Did Not
Alert (False
Negative)
0 nodes 0 nodes
Percent
Correctly
Alerted
100% 100%
without eliminating the true positives was dependent upon the size of the network. It is expected
the requirement for criteria tweaking is due to the ﬁdelity of the network data; in a larger
network more variation between the PDR of nodes was observed, and this variation resulted in
a larger number of false positives. However, after proper tweaking, the number of true positives
remained high enough to ensure detection of the sinkhole with a small number of false positives.
4.5.2 HELLO Flood Attack
In order to simulate a network under attack by a HELLO Flooder we create a MANET
consisting of twenty randomly placed nodes (see Figure 4.6). The area covered by the network
is 20,000 square meters. The nodes are stationary and the parameters for the member nodes
are uniform. Traﬃc supplied by the OPNET MANET model is used. Each node is a traﬃc
generator. No specialized traﬃc is added, and no additional noise is added to the network. Ad
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Table 4.10 Comparison of Sinkhole Discovery in Large Networks (Four Hop Routes) with
Enhanced Threshold
Without New Criteria With New Criteria
Correctly
Alerted
(True
Positive)
35 nodes 28 nodes
Correctly
Did Not
Alert (True
Negative)
7 nodes 64 nodes
Incorrectly
Alerted
(False
Positive)
58 nodes 1 node
Incorrectly
Did Not
Alert (False
Negative)
0 nodes 7 nodes
Percent
Correctly
Alerted
100% 80%
hoc on demand (AODV) routing is chosen as the routing protocol. Route length for the iden-
tiﬁcation method is limited to ﬁve nodes, with four hops. The routes used for the calculations
are not all inclusive. Therefore, not all neighbors may play a part in determining the calculated
neighbor reliability value. Parameters for the member nodes are shown in Table 4.12.
The transmission power of the member nodes was .0001 w. The transmission power of the
attacking node was raised to .100 w; this allowed the attacker to transmit the HELLO packets
to approximately half of the network. The packet reception power threshold was -95 dBm for
all nodes. The number of dropped packets at this setting impacted signiﬁcantly the amount
of data traﬃc sent by the attacking node. The attacker was also close enough to the network
to receive packets from some of the closest nodes. Normal nodes received an average of 63,958
packets over the 200 second simulation period, as opposed to the 3776 data packets received by
the HELLO ﬂooder. Note that the 200 second simulation period and the 15 second intervals
were arbitrary. Data collected per node included:
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Table 4.11 Results for Large Network - Five, Six, Seven Node Routes
Five Node
Routes - 35
Nodes in
Range
Six Node
Routes - 48
Nodes in
Range
Seven Node
Routes - 63
Nodes in
Range
W/out
New
Criteria
With
New
Criteria
W/out
New
Criteria
With
New
Criteria
W/out
New
Criteria
With
New
Criteria
Correctly
Alerted
(True
Positive)
35 nodes 28 nodes 47 nodes 34 nodes 61 nodes 46 nodes
Correctly
Did Not
Alert (True
Negative)
7 nodes 64 nodes 10 nodes 48 nodes 8 nodes 30 nodes
Incorrectly
Alerted
(False
Positive)
58 nodes 1 node 43nodes 5 node 30 nodes 8 node
Incorrectly
Did Not
Alert (False
Negative)
0 nodes 7 nodes 0 nodes 13 nodes 0 nodes 15 nodes
Percent
Correctly
Alerted
100% 80% 98% 71% 97% 73%
1. At each node, the number of packets received per second in ﬁfteen second intervals.
2. At each node, the number of packets sent per second in ﬁfteen second interval.
4.5.2.1 Discovery and Identiﬁcation Processes Using Simulation Results
To ﬁnd the neighbor reliability in our simulation, we ﬁrst calculate the route reliability by
multiplying the PDRs for each node along a route, starting at the ﬁrst hop (as opposed to the
sending node). Next we calculate the entropy of all known routes through the neighbor node.
Plotting the neighbor reliability values on a plot of the network shows that the lower values
tend to be centered around the sinkhole.
116
Table 4.12 Network Parameters
Node Parameters Value
Transmit Power (member nodes) .0001 w
Transmit Power (attacker) .100 w
Hello interval (member nodes) (1, 1.1)
Hello interval (attack node) (.1, .2)
Route Length 5 nodes, 4 hops
For an example, we assume node N is the ﬁrst node to identify a possible attacker. From the
reliability calculations (Table 4.13), node N identiﬁes neighbor U as having an entropy value
below the threshold value for node N. Node N currently has a view of the network that includes
its immediate neighbors, although node N may not know the relative locations of the neighbor
nodes at this time. Node N identiﬁes node U as the neighbor with the lowest reliability value.
Node N broadcasts this assignment to its neighbors, which includes node U.
Node U identiﬁes node Q as the neighbor with the lowest reliability, and broadcasts this to
the neighborhood. Since node M (the attacker) is broadcasting messages with greater power,
node Q perceives node M as a neighbor. Node Q identiﬁes node M as the neighbor with the
lowest neighbor reliability value. Node Q broadcasts this to the neighborhood.
Node M is not truly a neighbor of node Q; therefore node M does not receive the message
identifying it as the neighbor with the lowest reliability. Hence, node Q does not receive a
response from node M in time T. Node Q rebroadcasts the identiﬁcation of M and queries its
neighbors for their neighbor with the lowest reliability value. Nodes R, P, and K also believe
they share M as a neighbor, and M is their neighbor with the lowest reliability value. Node Q
announces the identity of the attacker as node M.
Table 4.13 Node N's Neighbor Reliability (values X 10e6)
Starting Node: N Cum. Rel.:
6115
Ave. Rel.:
1529
Reliability Neigh. List D P Q U
Reliability Value List 6046 1994 3455 .000232
Entropy Per Neigh.
List
196477 6474 1129325 .001825
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4.5.2.2 Analysis
Analysis of the data set shows that seven nodes in the twenty node network did not detect
the attack (see Figure 4.6). One node was the attacker itself. Five of these nodes were not
within range of the HELLO messages and did not list routes that included the attacker (node
M). Each of the twelve nodes in range of the attacker except node P alerted to at least one
of their neighbor nodes having entropy less than the one sigma lower boundary threshold. It
is noted that node P had a similar number of neighbors with routes through the attacker as
neighbors without. This resulted in not enough variation in the reliability values to indicate an
attacker. Node S was able to detect the attack; node S was suﬃciently close to M that a few of
the messages were received and forwarded by node M. Starting the identiﬁcation process from
every alerted node found M to be the attacker.
There are cases in which the identiﬁcation process may not be initiated and the attacker
not found. However, as the network matures and nodes store routes with the attacker included
as a hop, the identiﬁcation process will be initiated. The special cases are listed below:
1. If a node exists that does not receive the HELLO ﬂood messages and has no routes stored
that traverse the attacker, the node will not detect the attack.
2. If a node exists with all routes traversing only one neighbor there will be no detection
alert by this node. This is due to the method of calculating the threshold.
3. If a node exists with with all routes traversing only two neighbors the detection process
will not be started. This is due to the method of calculating the threshold.
Table 4.14 Partial Table of Neighbor Reliability Values (values X 10e6)
U's
Neighbors
N Q T
Rel. Values 6023 2418 6156
Q's
Neighbors
K M N R U
Rel. Values 2267 .000219 5462 .000234 5843
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4. If a node exists that is within normal reception range of the attacker, and the attacker
properly routes packets it receives, the node will not detect the attack.
Figure 4.6 Simulated Network
4.6 Analysis of Network Overhead
The method presented does not depend upon stored patterns, signatures, or rules. It does,
however, require limited storage (s) of additional collected data and a small amount of energy
(e) for calculations. Messages (m) are only required for identiﬁcation when an attacker is
detected. Therefore, the overhead o can be described by the equation:
o = s+ e+m. (4.10)
4.6.1 Storage
In the detection method described we use the crossing of the neighbor reliability threshold
to alert a network node to the presence of an attacker. The neighbor reliability value calcula-
tions depend upon the packet delivery ratios experienced when messages are sent through each
neighbor. To determine the packet delivery ratio and the consequent neighbor reliability, each
node needs to store the number of packets sent and the number of packets received when routing
through each neighbor. This necessitates additional storage in the routing tables warehoused
at each node.
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The AODV routing tables already house information about the next hop to known desti-
nations. The next hop is an immediate neighbor. Therefore, the data we require to be stored
in the routing table can be associated with the next hop, or neighbor. We assign ss as the
storage space used to hold the number of packets sent and sr as the storage space for the number
of packets received. After the calculation for the neighbor reliability is completed, it is stored
in snr. The additional storage space s required by a network of i nodes, each with b neighbors,
can therefore be represented by the equation
s = ib(ss + sr + snr). (4.11)
4.6.2 Energy
The detection and identiﬁcation processes rely upon the calculation of the packet delivery
ratio and neighbor reliability values assigned to the b neighbors of the i nodes in the network.
The energy required for the packet delivery ratio calculation is represented by epd. Similarly, the
energy required by the neighbor reliability calculation is represented by enr. Additional energy
is required by the creation (emc) and distribution (emd) of the identiﬁcation messages m. The
total additional network energy consumption e required by the detection and identiﬁcation
processes can therefore be described by the equation
e = m(emc + emd) + ib(epd + enr). (4.12)
4.6.3 Messages
Messages are only required in the network if an attacker is detected. The number of messages
required by the method in the case of sinkhole detection is generally larger than the number of
messages required in the case of a HELLO Flood attacker. This is because the HELLO Flood
attacker broadcasts its HELLO message with greater energy, so many nodes in the network
believe the attacker is a neighbor. Hence, the ﬂooder is identiﬁed from a greater distance. In
the case of the sinkhole attack, the node identifying the sinkhole will be a true neighbor of the
sinkhole.
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4.6.3.1 Sinkhole
Messages related to the identiﬁcation process are generated and transmitted in the network
only when an attacker is detected. As mentioned before, there are no additional network
messages required for the detection process. The message overhead is dependent upon how far,
or the number of hops h, the detecting node is from the attacker. Therefore, mLow refers to
the number of messages required for the assignments of LLow along the path to the attacker.
Also partially dependent upon the number of hops to the attacker are the number of neighbor
list messages (mnl) which are sent by nodes that have both the assigning node and LLow in
common. Whether the attacker participates in the process by assigning a LLow greatly aﬀects
the number of messages generated. We therefore apply binomials j and k to reﬂect participation
where j = 1 for no participation, and k = 1 if there is participation. The additional messages
generated near the attacker when the sinkhole or HELLO Flooder fails to participate is mf ,
with mp reﬂecting the number of messages generated during the splash back beyond the
attacker due to its participation. Finally, we include the messages generated by the average
number of voters, mv . The number of messages required by the identiﬁcation method can be
approximated by the following equation:
m = mLow +mnl + kmp + jmf +mv. (4.13)
This equation can be simpliﬁed by including the parameters for the number of hops and
the average number of neighbors common to Ln−1 and Ln in each hop. Here we use the grid
network with an average of eight neighbors per node:
m = h+ 2h+ 5k + 3j + 3 (4.14)
or
m = 3h+ 8k + 6j. (4.15)
Table 4.15 provides the number of messages generated for the identiﬁcation of the sinkhole
by each individual alerted node during simulation using the original thirty node grid network
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with one compliant sinkhole. Note that hops is often equal to the ring as listed in the table.
However, there are situations due to node placement on the ring in which two hops can occur
on a ring. Figure ?? provides a graph depicting the actual messages sent by nodes on each ring
compared to the estimated number of messages for the ring.
A protocol for sharing the burden of starting the sinkhole identiﬁcation process would need
to be developed in a real network, and is not in the scope of this paper. With the proper
protocol, only one node would start the identiﬁcation process, limiting the number of messages
as overhead. Note that the path provided in the Table 4.15 is not the route used to send
traﬃc; it is the path followed from the detecting node to the sinkhole through the nodes with
the lowest neighbor reliability values.
Figure 4.7 Number of Messages Per Ring (One Sinkhole)
4.6.3.2 HELLO Flood
Messages related to the identiﬁcation process are generated and transmitted in the network
only when an attacker is detected. As mentioned before, there are no additional network
messages required for the detection process. The message overhead is dependent upon the
number of hops h the detecting node is from the attacker itself, or from a node that believes the
attacker is a neighbor. We include the messages generated by the average number of voters,
mv for both voting and providing neighbor lists mnl. Note that as we get close enough to the
HELLO ﬂooder all of the Lx neighbors believe they are neighbors to both LLOW (the attacker)
and L, so they all provide neighbor lists. We also include one message for the second query
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made by the assigning node that gets no reply from the attacker. The number of messages
required by the identiﬁcation method can be approximated by the following equation:
m = h+mnl +mv + 1. (4.16)
Figure 4.8 provides a graph depicting the messages sent during simulation by nodes on
each ring compared to the number of messages estimated by Equation 4.16 for the ring. As
mentioned in the sinkhole message analysis, a protocol for sharing the burden of starting the
HELLO ﬂood attacker identiﬁcation process would need to be developed in a real network, and
is not in the scope of this paper. With the proper protocol, only one node would start the
identiﬁcation process, limiting the number of messages as overhead.
Figure 4.8 Number of Messages Per Ring (HELLO Flood Attack)
4.6.4 Steps Required for Attacker Detection and Identiﬁcation
There are two phases that must be considered when modeling the number of required steps c
for the described method. We assign cd to the number of steps required in the detection phase,
and cid to the number of steps required for the identiﬁcation phase. The following equation
therefore reﬂects the total number of steps required in order to identify an attacker:
c = cd + cid. (4.17)
In the detection phase a node assigned by an established burden-sharing protocol will use
the stored packets received and sent data to calculate the neighbor reliabilities for its neighbors.
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The node will then calculate the threshold, and compare the neighbor reliabilities to the the
threshold. With cnr representing the neighbor reliability calculation step, cthr representing the
threshold calculation, and ccom representing the comparison step, the steps to detection can be
represented by the equation:
cd = cnr + cthr + ccom. (4.18)
Each of the factors in the equation for cd is equal to one, so we can simplify this equation to
cd = 3.
The number of steps required for attacker identiﬁcation is highly dependent upon how far,
or the number of hops h, the detecting node is from the attacker. In the case of the HELLO
Flood attacker, h represents the number of hops to a node that perceives itself as a neighbor
to the attacker. This number is represented by ch. We remind you that there are situations
due to node placement on the ring in which two hops, or steps, can occur on a ring. There are
additional steps depending upon whether the attacker participates in the identiﬁcation process.
To model this we again apply binomials j and k to reﬂect participation, where j = 1 for no
participation and k = 1 if there is participation. In the case of the HELLO Flood attacker, we
can expect j = 1 in most cases since the attacker will be too far from the identiﬁers to hear the
identiﬁcation and voting messages. Finally, we add the voting step, cv which takes place at the
end of the process. The number of steps required by the identiﬁcation phase can therefore be
represented by the equation:
cid = ch + jcf + kcp + cv. (4.19)
By including the parameters for the number of hops and the known subset number of steps for
the participation and non-participation cases, the equation for the steps for identiﬁcation can
be simpliﬁed to:
cid = h+ j + 2k + 1 (4.20)
or
cid = h+ 2j + 3k. (4.21)
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The total number of steps required for the detection and identiﬁcation of an attacker can
now be approximated by the equation.
c = 3 + h+ 2j + 3k (4.22)
Further simpliﬁcation gives us the equation:
c = h+ 5j + 3k. (4.23)
The number of steps per route required by the identiﬁcation process for the single sinkhole are
listed in Table 4.15, and the number of steps required for HELLO ﬂood attacker identiﬁcation
are listed in 4.16. The sinkhole analysis is for the simulation using the original thirty node grid
network with one compliant sinkhole. We assume the attacker is participating in the process
during simulation (if it is in range of message reception) when calculating the number of steps
listed in the tables. Figure ?? provides a graph depicting the actual number steps required for
the nodes in each ring to identify the sinkhole, as compared to the estimated number of steps.
Figure 4.10 provides the same data for the HELLO ﬂood attacker.
Figure 4.9 Number of Steps Per Ring (One Sinkhole)
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a hypothesis that, by adapting a methodology borrowed from
the science of meteorology, we can utilize the data available at both the node and cooperative
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Figure 4.10 Number of Steps Per Ring (HELLO Flood Attack)
network levels to create a synoptic picture of the network health, providing indications of any
intrusions or other network issues. Our major contribution is to provide a revolutionary way
to analyze node and network data for patterns, dependence, and eﬀects that indicate network
issues at a distance. We collect node and network data, combine and manipulate it, and tease
out information about the state of the network. By using the data gathered, such as packet
delivery ratio, node reliability, and route reliability, we showed we could combine, analyze, and
interpret the data to build a picture of the network state. We demonstrated this by simulating
one or more sinkholes in a grid network of thirty nodes, one sinkhole in a scrambled network
of thirty nodes, and a HELLO ﬂood attacker in a scrambled network of twenty nodes. With
proper mathematical analysis of the data we were able to build a network picture and identify
the attackers with little energy expended for calculation or messages. This method did not rely
upon the conventional methods of stored patterns for comparison, but only proper analysis of
a subset of the real time parameters of the network.
Simulations using the network described in Table 4.12 showed that the original scheme
found false sinkholes in networks with eight or fewer sinkhole nodes. However, the addition of a
second threshold resulted in the elimination of the false positives, with the trade oﬀ of increased
false negatives in networks of six or more sinkholes. This tradeoﬀ is justiﬁed because we can
realistically expect a network to have fewer than six (sinkhole) attackers. Therefore, using the
two thresholds provides proper intrusion detection for this type of attack.
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Table 4.15 Messages Generated in Identiﬁcation Process (Sinkhole)
Ring
(n)
Detecting
Node
Path Actual
# of
Steps
Actual #
of
Messages
Ring
(n)
Detecting
Node
Path Actual
# of
Steps
Actual #
of
Messages
1 Q Q-W 4 12 2 T T-X-W 5 12
1 R R-W 4 11 2 U U-Z-V-
W
6 16
1 S S-W 4 11 2 Y Y-CC-W 5 11
1 V V-W 4 13 2 Z Z-V-W 5 13
1 X X-W 4 10 2 DD DD-X-
W
5 12
1 AA AA-W 4 12 3 F F-L-R-
W
6 18
1 BB BB-W 4 13 3 G G-H-M-
R-W
7 20
1 CC CC-W 4 11 3 H H-M-R-
W
6 17
2 K K-Q-W 5 15 3 I I-N-R-W 6 17
2 L L-R-W 5 15 3 J J-N-R-
W
6 16
2 M M-R-W 5 16 4 A A-G-H-
M-R-W
8 21
2 N N-R-W 5 13 4 B B-H-M-
R-W
7 21
2 O O-T-X-
W
6 14 4 C C-G-H-
M-R-W
8 22
2 P P-V-W 5 15 4 D D-H-M-
R-W
7 21
Simulations in a larger network indicated the proposed method required an adjusted criteria
to eliminate a number of the false positives. This result implies that the method described will
work for diﬀerently sized networks. However, additional work needs to be done to determine
standard criteria, or a method of determining network-based criteria, that is applicable to
diﬀerent sizes of networks. Additionally, Shannon's entropy equation was used for the analysis
of the network results. It is possible that another entropy equation may provide ﬁner results
that may be less aﬀected by the level of ﬁdelity required by each network.
Our results included the numbers of nodes in the simulated networks that would start the
identiﬁcation process and identify the attackers presented based upon the threshold criteria. For
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Table 4.16 Messages Generated in Identiﬁcation Process (HELLO Flood)
Actual
Ring (n)
/ Per-
ceived
Ring
Detecting
Node
Path Actual
Num-
ber of
Steps
Actual
Num-
ber of
Mes-
sages
Actual
Ring (n)
/ Per-
ceived
Ring
Detecting
Node
Path Actual
Num-
ber of
Steps
Actual
Num-
ber of
Mes-
sages
1/1 S S-M 4 11 3/1 K K-M 5 7
2/1 E E-M 5 8 3/2 Q Q-R-
M
6 8
2/1 H H-M 5 14 4/2 G G-A-
M
6 8
2/1 C C-M 5 10 4/3 D D-G-
A-M
7 9
2/1 R R-M 5 10 4/3 U U-Q-
R-M
7 9
3/1 A A-M 5 9 4/4 N N-U-
Q-R-
M
8 9
3/1 F F-M 5 10
the sinkhole or HELLO ﬂood attacker identiﬁcation process to be implemented in a real network,
a protocol for sharing the responsibility of identifying the attacker would need to be developed.
The objective of the protocol would be to allow identiﬁcation of the attacker while limiting
the number of nodes starting the identiﬁcation process, and the number of messages ﬂooding
the network. Possible strategies are a round robin system based upon time, or assignment of
responsibility to cluster heads.
The synoptic analysis technique presented in this paper is founded upon comparing the
counts of events in or eﬀects on the wireless network. Other attacks that are based upon causing
or aﬀecting countable events that trigger changes in network characteristics are candidates for
synoptic analysis. Attacks at the physical, network, and data link layers such as jamming
and wormhole assaults are likely contenders. Challenges to the use of the technique described
include the development of protocols to identify the initiating node(s) and the development of
a proper network reaction. An additional challenge is a method to provide the network nodes
with more distributed network data without increasing the controlling network traﬃc.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
With our increasing usage of the air as a medium for connecting electronically with the world,
the current spectrum deﬁned for commercial and personal usage has become crowded. This
trend is expected to continue. The cognitive radio network with software deﬁned capabilities will
open to users more spectrum frequencies, and hence, enhanced communication opportunities.
However, the new technology also provides avenues for new attacks perpetrated by malicious
or selﬁsh users with the desire to inhibit communication, capture or change the message, or use
the spectrum exclusively.
In the second chapter of this dissertation we explored the structures of malicious attacks on
the cognitive radio network. We identiﬁed attacks from both the traditional cellular networks
and the wireless sensor network arena that apply to the cognitive radio network. We also
presented attack scenarios speciﬁc to the cognitive radio network architecture and capabilities.
Following each attack scenario we presented mitigating techniques particular to the attack.
In the third chapter we presented a hypothesis that, by adapting a methodology borrowed
from the science of meteorology, we could utilize the data available at both the node and coop-
erative network levels to create a synoptic picture of the network health, providing indications
of any intrusions or other network issues. Our major contribution was to provide a revolution-
ary way to analyze node and network data for patterns, dependence, and eﬀects that indicate
network issues at a distance. By using the data gathered, such as packet delivery ratio, node
reliability, and route reliability, we showed we could combine, analyze, and interpret the data to
build a picture of the network state. We demonstrated this by simulating one or more sinkholes
in a grid network of thirty nodes. We expanded upon the premise with additional studies in the
fourth chapter. We simulated one sinkhole in a scrambled network of thirty nodes, one sinkhole
in hundred node grid network, and a HELLO ﬂood attacker in a scrambled network of twenty
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nodes. With proper mathematical analysis of the data we were able to build a network picture
and identify the attackers with little energy expended for calculation or messages. This method
did not rely upon the conventional methods of stored patterns for comparison, but only proper
analysis of a subset of the real time parameters of the network.
Simulations using the network described in Table 4.12 showed that the original scheme
found false sinkholes in networks with eight or fewer sinkhole nodes. However, the addition
of a second threshold resulted in the elimination of the false positives, with the trade oﬀ of
increased false negatives in networks of six or more sinkholes. This tradeoﬀ is justiﬁed because
we can realistically expect a network to have fewer than six (sinkhole) attackers. Analysis of
the data derived from the larger, one hundred node network indicated that new thresholding
criteria was required for the larger network in order to eliminate false positives. Therefore,
using the two thresholds provides proper intrusion detection for this type of attack, and the
proper thresholding scheme is dependent upon the size of the network.
Our results included the numbers of nodes in the simulated networks that would start the
identiﬁcation process and identify the attackers presented based upon the threshold criteria. For
the sinkhole or HELLO ﬂood attacker identiﬁcation process to be implemented in a real network,
a protocol for sharing the responsibility of identifying the attacker would need to be developed.
The objective of the protocol would be to allow identiﬁcation of the attacker while limiting
the number of nodes starting the identiﬁcation process, and the number of messages ﬂooding
the network. Possible strategies are a round robin system based upon time, or assignment of
responsibility to cluster heads.
The synoptic analysis technique presented in this dissertation is founded upon comparing the
counts of events in or eﬀects on the wireless network. Other attacks that are based upon causing
or aﬀecting countable events that trigger changes in network characteristics are candidates for
synoptic analysis. Attacks at the physical, network, and data link layers such as jamming
and wormhole assaults are likely contenders. Challenges to the use of the technique described
include the development of protocols to identify the initiating node(s) and the development of
a proper network reaction. An additional challenge is a method to provide the network nodes
with more distributed network data without increasing the controlling network traﬃc.
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The greatest advantage to incorporating the presented method into the intrusion detection
toolbox is that the data required for analysis is all derived from the current network. Proper
analysis of the data provides a window into the state of the current activity of the network,
or its network health. By using carefully selected data we may be able to reduce the data
overload experienced by the system administator, and instead identify and stop attacks on the
network in a timely manner.
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